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“Starting from Below Zero”: Iraqi Refugee Resettlement and 
Integration in the United States and Austin, Texas 
 
 
Christopher Joseph Ulack, Ph.D. 
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Supervisor:  Karl W. Butzer 
 
This dissertation explores the resettlement and integration of Iraqi refugees 
coming to the United States, and particularly to Austin, TX, from 2008-2012.  On a broad 
level, it seeks to understand how peoples, organizations, and government actors combine 
to negotiate the controversial practice of third-country refugee resettlement. Data is 
drawn from 16 months of participant observation at a local refugee resettlement agency 
in Austin with Iraqi refugees and from one-on-one interviews with many of those 
refugees and with local agency service providers.  The research seeks to explore what 
(and how) federal, state, and local policies shape the everyday resettlement and 
integration experiences of Iraqi refugees in Austin.  In addition to policy and other 
structural obstacles in place in the current American resettlement paradigm, the 
dissertation also seeks to understand aspects of agency utilized by Iraqi refugees and 
how, if at all, cultural, social, and political factors contextualize and impact their 
experiences upon arrival to the United States and throughout their first few months in this 
 vii 
country.  The study finds that Iraqi refugees are highly impacted both by political and 
social structural issues already in place within the receiving society but also by cultural 
and social factors and frameworks which they “bring with them” from Iraq.  The study 
also illustrates that the current literature on refugees underemphasizes refugees’ voices.  
These voices depict the experience of resettlement and integration in the United States as 
one where many feel a sense of being caught “between here and there” and constantly 
trying to “catch up with life” but without enough help, support, or guidance.  The voices 
underscore the human experience and struggle of forced migration generally and 
specifically that of third country resettlement of Iraqi refugees to the United States. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This dissertation tells a story about refugees.  The story itself is a very particular 
one about a specific group of refugees that came to the US between 2006-2012: Iraqi 
refugees displaced by the American-led invasion of Iraq beginning in 2003.  Although 
this story deals with a particular (albeit extremely diverse) group of people and has its 
own complicated and complex context and history, it contributes to broader and 
important discourses going on within the fields of migration and refugee studies.  This 
“field”, however, is not limited simply to those studying refugee issues within academia.  
These discourses span academia, the media (print and online), the blogosphere and other 
outlets available in the public sphere.  These discourses, in the broadest terms, are the 
ongoing debates over immigration in the US and the sticky and controversial matter of 
relations between the “West” and the Arab-Islamic world.  Iraqi refugee resettlement to 
the US overlaps with these two debates in various ways and has the ability to offer 
insights on these important, if not divisive, issues.  This dissertation strives to use the 
story of Iraqi refugees in the US to make contributions to the ongoing dialogue.    
At the outset, this research topic is influenced by the desire to understand how 
peoples, organizations, and governments negotiate the controversial practice of third-
country refugee resettlement1.  International humanitarian responses to human 
                                                             
1 It should be noted here that the term refugee is used in this work not in a general sense but referring to 
those who have been legally designated as refugees under the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees 1951 Convention relating to the status of Refugees and the following 1967 protocols: “a person 
who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership 
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displacement have been formed and reformed over the past six decades.  Third-country 
refugee resettlement is a specific humanitarian strategy developed for protecting 
displaced peoples when they can neither return to their home country nor be safely or 
successfully integrated within the country to which they initially fled.   While this and 
other strategies have been designed by various institutions, agencies, and governments to 
help relieve people fleeing from violence and discrimination around the world, we 
continue to witness a controversial and discriminatory politics of exclusion and control 
concerning third-country refugee resettlement.  Moreover, refugee movement, and forced 
displacement generally, play a specific and important role in the broader contemporary 
debates about (im)migration.  The American-led 2003 invasion of Iraq and the 
subsequent Iraqi refugee crisis highlight many of these controversial issues.  It is these 
issues which I wish to discuss in greater detail in this dissertation. 
 
1.1 SIGNIFICANCE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The 2003 American-led war in Iraq and the resulting ethno-sectarian violence 
which grew out of that conflict caused one of the largest movements of refugees in the 
Middle East since the Palestinian refugee migrations in 1948.  The United Nations 
estimates that the number of displaced Iraqis from this conflict, at its height, was around 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country” 
(http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c125.html).  Although the term refugee and the legal definition of 
who can be a refugee is heavily contested, all attempts will be made in this dissertation to differentiate 
between legally designated refugees and those who are displaced but not considered refugees. 
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4 million, with over half of those internally displaced within Iraq.  These numbers are 
based off of estimates provided by the governments of Iraq and those receiving countries 
of Iraqi refugees such as Syria, Jordan, and Egypt and have thus come under much 
scrutiny2.  As close to half of displaced Iraqis are seeking refuge in countries bordering 
Iraq, namely Syria and Jordan, this exodus of people has had a destabilizing effect on the 
region economically and socially.  Moreover, Iraqis living in exile in Syria, Jordan, 
Lebanon and other countries throughout the region are often doing so with few, if any, 
rights, benefits, or protection.  Moreover, since the advent of the Arab Spring, many 
Iraqis have found themselves in equally dangerous situations in countries such as Syria 
and are faced with a difficult decision (that is to say, if a choice is even available) to stay 
or return to a possibly worse situation in Iraq.  The bleak situation for displaced Iraqis 
inside and outside of Iraq has compelled international humanitarian organizations and 
some countries to coordinate their efforts to resettle Iraqi refugees elsewhere: primarily 
the United States and a small number of European countries such as Sweden and 
Germany.  Having resettled over 85,000 Iraqi refugees since 2005, the United States has 
become the main receiving country of this refugee population.  While third-country 
refugee resettlement in the United States and Europe is offered to some as a viable 
alternative to languishing without rights or opportunities in countries throughout the Arab 
World, making the transition to life in the US has proven to be challenging at best. 
                                                             
2 Issues regarding the numbers of Iraqi refugees will be covered in more detail in chapter 4. 
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This dissertation project examines the geopolitics of refugee response policies, 
processes and resettlement in the United States through the lens of the Iraqi Refugee 
Crisis which began in earnest in 2005.  It looks in brief at Iraqi refugee migration within 
the Middle East, especially between Iraq and Syria, by looking at the policies of 
displacement in receiving countries as well as how the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement 
and Migration (MoDM) has attempted to solve its loss of human capital as well as the 
ongoing problem of internal displacement within the country.  The dissertation research 
strives more specifically, however, not only to document and understand the process and 
experience of third country refugee resettlement and integration among Iraqi refugees in 
the U.S. and particularly Austin, TX, but on a broader level to enter into the dialogue and 
debate over refugee migration to the U.S. and more particularly about the specific 
discourses surrounding Arab refugee migration to the U.S.  To do this, the research 
explores Iraqi refugee integration in the United States through an analysis of the personal 
experiences of Iraqi refugees, and through examination of the policies and projects of a 
refugee resettlement agency in Austin, TX. Specifically, the research was guided by the 
following questions:  
 What federal, state, and local policies shape refugee resettlement and 
integration in the United States? 
 How does the system of using voluntary agencies (volags) and local 
resettlement agencies work and is it an adequate system for resettlement and 
integration for Iraqi refugees, in particular? 
 How, if at all, does the political/social/cultural context of Iraq affect Iraqis 
resettlement experience in the US? 
 How does place affect Iraqi refugee integration and identity? 
 How do aspects of the current political atmosphere in the US (i.e. anti-
immigration, anti-Arab, anti-Muslim, Iraq War since 2003) affect the 
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resettlement and integration experiences of refugees broadly, and specifically 
Iraqi refugees?  How do they negotiate these issues, if at all, in their daily lives? 
 What are the feelings of Iraqi refugees and local resettlement agency service 
providers towards the US and towards the US refugee resettlement system? 
 How do Iraqis negotiate identity after arriving and living in the United States?  
How are their sectarian and/or ethnic identities maintained or dispensed with 
once in the US?  How do Iraqi refugees identify themselves here in the US?  
How might sectarian and/or ethnic identity affect their integration to the US? 
   
The decision to conduct research with Iraqi refugees, as opposed to one of the 
other various refugee populations arriving to the United States, was made due to the 
unique characteristics of Iraqi displacement within the region of the Middle East and also 
in regards to the resettlement of Iraqis to the US.  Additionally, the Iraqi refugee crisis 
was chosen due to my own interests and background.  This project as a whole and the 
specific research questions it seeks to answer have been in part formed over the past 8 
years in which I have been volunteering and/or working with refugee populations and 
studying the region of the Middle East.  From 2003-2005, I volunteered with refugees 
from all over the world as an English teacher and community advocate in Lexington, KY.  
From the outset, I was interested in the way that refugees arrived to a place such as 
Lexington and then how they integrated into their new surroundings.  Oftentimes sent to 
a place with few or no friends or relatives, refugees are forced to start anew with few 
resources.  Then in 2008 after receiving my M.A. in Middle Eastern Studies from the 
University of Texas at Austin I began volunteering with the first of two refugee 
resettlement agencies in Austin, Caritas.  As a community advocate volunteer at Caritas I 
was assigned to work closely with a single Iraqi family to help them navigate their first 
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few months in the U.S.  This opportunity provided the chance to observe firsthand the 
process of Iraqi refugee resettlement in Austin.  While the resettlement of this particular 
family was challenging to say the least, it was not until I began working (as part of my 
research) at the second refugee agency, Refugee Services of Texas (RST) in 2009 that I 
was able to observe how varied the experiences of resettlement/integration were from 
individual to individual and from family to family.  Working first as the Employment 
Specialist for Middle East Refugee populations and then as the Employment Program 
Supervisor and, finally, as the Resettlement Program Supervisor, I was able to gain 
firsthand knowledge about the policies and practices of refugee resettlement in the US as 
well as work one-on-one with refugee families and individuals from all over the world, 
particularly Iraq.  Through these combined experiences, I was able to get a deeper 
understanding of the macro and micro-level policies, and problems, of international 
refugee response and management and additionally, get a sense of the challenges, 
hardships, and adversity that refugees face upon arrival to the US. 
While refugees suffer and endure hardships all over the world and in increasing 
numbers, the Iraqi Refugee Crisis presented issues that made it unique in many ways 
from other refugee situations.  First and foremost, the large scale displacement in Iraq 
was caused by a high profile, controversial war begun by the United States, the country 
that would then, after much debate, resettle tens of thousands of Iraqi citizens.  One 
example of America’s role in making this a unique refugee situation was its design of a 
program developed to aid Iraqis inside of Iraq who had worked/translated for the 
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American forces, the Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) Program.  Secondly, the geopolitical 
context into which Iraqi refugees are resettling in the West can serve to further their sense 
of discrimination and disadvantage.  The arrival of Iraqi refugees to Europe and the US 
has come at a time of increased hostility towards immigration in the West and in an era of 
escalating mistrust of Arab/Islamic society and culture.  Third, the Iraqi Refugee Crisis is 
the largest displacement event in the Middle East in decades (rivaled now by the crisis in 
Syria) and provides an important glimpse into possible future (noting here the state 
violence and subsequent human displacement in recent examples of uprisings in Libya, 
Syria, and Yemen) refugee movement and migration policy in the Middle East.  Finally, 
Iraqi refugees expose some of the worst aspects of the refugee experience; the damaging 
cost of war, the consequences of severe discrimination and sectarian strife, the difficulties 
of living in an urban setting of a border country such as Syria (as opposed to a refugee 
camp) with no rights and few, if any, benefits or aid, and the final step of moving to a 
third country (such as the US) where one may know nothing of the culture, language, 
economy, or society, all while dealing with the events and anguishes of the past.   
While third country refugee resettlement is viewed as a humanitarian enterprise, 
refugee populations often face severe stress and anxiety in their new home, along with 
various other hardships and challenges that come with resettling in a new country.  Local 
resettlement agencies which are located around the country to help refugees make the 
transition and ultimately gain self-sufficiency, despite their effort, hard work, and good 
intentions, are frequently underfunded and understaffed, often increasing the difficulties 
 8 
for disadvantaged refugee populations.  Despite these challenges, refugee populations are 
an integral and growing segment in US cities such as Austin, TX.  Refugee populations 
affect and are impacted by entities such as local schools, public transportation, the local 
economy, housing laws, and medical services.  Despite growing refugee populations and 
the challenges they face, refugee resettlement remains an issue that many people know 
very little about.  In many instances, refugees are nearly invisible populations within the 
communities to which they are resettling. 
To better highlight the experiences that many refugees face after arriving in the 
US, I want to recount bits of my experience with one of the families with whom I worked 
at RST.  Providing a specific example will more fully elaborate the struggles many 
refugees face.  It should be noted, however, that the experience of this particular family is 
not, of course, necessarily representative of all refugee integration experiences in the US.  
While many other Iraqi refugees and refugees of other nationalities and ethnic groups do 
certainly share similarities to this family’s experience, it is important to call attention to 
refugees’ varied and diverse encounters with resettlement and integration.   
One of the families with whom I worked at RST consisted of 5 members: a 
mother and father in their late 50’s/early 60’s, a son in his early 20’s, an 18 year old 
daughter, and another son age 6.  While the family is from Baghdad and the children 
were all born in Iraq, they are considered Palestinian as both the parents were born in 
Palestine and migrated as children to Iraq.  Palestinian migrants in Iraq were given 
special treatment by Saddam Hussein for a number of reasons but after the fall of the 
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Hussein regime in 2003, the Palestinian community was one of the first groups to be 
targeted by insurgent groups in Iraq.  Many Palestinians in Iraq were killed in the early 
years of the war and those who escaped were not allowed into Syria or Jordan (as were 
other Iraqi refugees) due to their lack of documentation (such as passports).  Iraq has no 
path to citizenship for migrants such as those from Palestine; neither for the immigrant 
parents, nor for the children who were born in Iraq.  Without official documentation 
showing any type of nationality, Palestinians who were able to escape the violence in Iraq 
were put into makeshift UN refugee camps in “no man’s land” along the Syrian-Iraqi 
borderlands.  These camps in the middle of the desert were without electricity, running 
water, or regular supplies of food.  The severe conditions of the camps were well 
documented on the United Nations website as that organization searched for host 
countries willing to resettle this “nation-less” refugee population.  Not until 2009 did the 
US agree to begin resettling Palestinian Iraqis from one of the camps along the border. 
When this family arrived in Austin, I went with a volunteer to pick them up at the 
airport and bring them to their apartment which had been furnished by a group of 
volunteers.  Having lived in one of the camps along the Syria-Iraq border for more than 
two years, this family came with very few resources or belongings, financial or material.  
None of the members of the family knew any English.  None had finished high school 
and only the father had previous work experience, at a book store.  Additionally, the 
father had a number of health concerns including diabetes and vision impairment.  The 
mother of the family had health concerns as well but they were psychological as opposed 
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to physical.  The family had been through a number of traumatic experiences in Iraq 
which most likely added to the already high levels of emotional stress and anxiety they 
were experiencing due to moving to a new home.  The family had no relatives in Austin 
although there was another family in town whom they knew from the camp.   
Upon arrival, the six year old son was enrolled in Austin Independent School 
District in the first grade.  The 18 year old daughter chose not to enroll in high school as 
her previous level of education was too low.  The eldest son was able to enroll in the 
nearest Job Corps Center in San Marcos, TX a few months after arriving, a good 
opportunity for him, but it meant the family was without its main potential money earner.  
Due to cultural considerations, the family has deemed it inappropriate for the 18 year old 
daughter to work on her own in the city and thus she continues to stay at home.  The 
parents have not been able to find work due to their lack of English, their age, and health 
concerns.  Having been in Austin now for over a year, all financial aid through the local 
resettlement agency is exhausted (these benefits last for a maximum of eight months, 
often less).  The family is now living month to month with the help of local mosque and 
church groups who will soon cut off funding as well.  Additionally, they are not eligible 
to receive any type of benefits from the Social Security Administration (SSA) due to their 
age (under 65) and as the SSA did not regard their health issues as warranting benefits on 
those grounds.  Moreover, multiple members of the family continue to experience 
feelings of depression and isolation no doubt due to the combination of past and present 
events.         
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Taking the experience of this family into consideration, one begins to get a sense 
of the various types of stress and adversity a refugee may face after arriving to a new 
country.  The “normal” emotional and psychological hardships of starting anew in a 
different country such as depression, isolation, and culture shock are compounded, 
however, by other outside factors such as the economic crisis that the US is presently 
experiencing, specific state and federal policies concerning refugee resettlement, and 
understaffed/underfunded local non-profit resettlement agencies.  Finally, the forced 
migration of Iraqi refugees has come at an important and specific geopolitical moment.  It 
has come at a time of increased hostility towards immigration in the “West” and in an era 
of escalating mistrust of Arab and Islamic society and culture.  With these issues in mind, 
how is resettlement and integration negotiated by the different stakeholders who are 
active in resettling Iraqi refugees to the United States and, of course, by the refugees 
themselves?  Moreover, how might this issue be addressed in the social sciences and 
specifically within the field of geography?  These questions will be addressed in more 
detail in the next chapter. 
 
1.2 DATA AND METHODS 
The primary methodologies utilized for this study were participant observation 
and one-on-one semi-structured interviews.  Participant observation, carried out from 
June 2009-September 2010, was conducted while working at Refugee Services of Texas 
(RST) in a variety of different positions (Employment Specialist for Middle East Refugee 
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populations, Employment Program Supervisor, and Resettlement Program Supervisor).  
By working at RST, I was able to gain an “insiders” knowledge of the various policies, 
practices, and processes of refugee resettlement in the United States.  Not only was I able 
to observe the daily procedures at RST, but I was also able to work closely with refugees 
from all over the world.  In this capacity I observed how refugees were affected by the 
various policies and processes of refugee resettlement.  Furthermore, I formed close 
relationships with many of the refugees who arrived throughout 2009-2010, many of 
them Iraqi.  These relationships allowed me to have a sizeable number of Iraqi refugees 
(whom I knew well) to interview about their individual experiences with resettlement in 
the US. 
Working at Refugee Services of Texas as part of my research happened largely by 
chance.  As I was preparing to begin my research and was building relationships with 
Caritas of Austin and other resettlement agencies around the nation (many of which were 
in Detroit) a friend sent me a job posting for Employment Specialist for Middle East 
populations at RST.  It seemed like an interesting opportunity so I applied, was called in 
for an interview and was offered the position.  The agency director was fully aware of my 
current status as a doctoral student, the topic of my dissertation, and that I would 
eventually have to return to being a full-time student.  Agreeing that I would stay at least 
a full year at RST, I took the position and started in June 2009.  In the end, I worked at 
RST for 16 months and it was one of the most intense, challenging, and rewarding 
experiences of my life.   
 13 
As the Employment Specialist for Middle Eastern populations I was tasked to 
work with refugees almost solely from Iraq but also from Iran, Afghanistan, and Somalia 
(populations from those countries were designated “Middle Eastern” by the agency).  My 
primary job responsibilities as worded in the job description were, “As Employment 
Specialist, you would have your own caseload composed primarily of Iraqi clients, with 
the possibly of other Arabic speaking Iranians, Somali, and others, as needed.  You 
would be conducting intakes to gather their background education and work experience, 
conducting job readiness classes in Arabic, networking with employers, and taking the 
clients on job interviews, as needed.  Plus documenting it all, naturally.”  While there 
were various duties in this position, the primary characteristic by which an Employment 
Specialist is judged (beyond organizational skills, ability to handle large case loads, 
language skills, etc.) is by his/her ability to find full-time employment for their clients. 
This, however, is also the most difficult thing to do, especially in a failing economy but 
also for other reasons which will be explained in more detail in following chapters.     
For about one month I worked in this capacity until the agency decided to 
restructure the positions and the various programs in the office.  For example, instead of 
three Employment Specialists in the Employment Program who all worked under the 
direction of the area director, an Employment Program Supervisor would be named who 
would work under the director and the remaining two employment specialists would then 
be under the direction and guidance of the Employment Program Supervisor.  I applied 
for and was promoted to Employment Program Supervisor at this time.  In this position I 
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continued to work closely with many Iraqi refugees but also had more interaction with 
some of the other primary arrival groups such as Burmese and Nepalese refugees.  
Additionally, I was tasked as the Employment Program Supervisor to oversee the 
program.  Some of the main duties of this position included: ensuring compliance with all 
contracts and agreements between RST and some of the main government-sponsored 
funding programs such as the Matching Grant Program (MG) and the Refugee Cash 
Assistance Program (RCA); making sure the other Employment Specialists were 
following the contract guidelines and properly documenting their interactions with their 
clients; attending national and state meetings; preparing reports for state quarterly refugee 
meetings; networking and building new relationships with businesses in the local Austin 
community.  I held this position until October 2009 when I then applied for and was 
promoted to the Resettlement Program Supervisor.   
I spent the remainder of my time at RST (until September 2010) in this position.  
As Resettlement Program Supervisor I carried out some of the same supervisory 
responsibilities as the Employment Program Supervisor (ensuring compliance with all 
contracts, attending national and state meetings, ensuring that caseworkers are 
documenting daily interactions, etc.) but the position also included new responsibilities 
that come with managing an entirely different program.  The main tasks of the 
Resettlement Program (as opposed to finding jobs for clients and preparing them for 
employment in the US) is to provide refugee clients with the necessary “core services” 
that they are entitled to in their first 90 days after arrival.  Core services include: picking 
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newly arriving refugees up at the airport; finding, leasing, and furnishing an apartment 
for an individual or a family and transporting them from the airport to the apartment; 
applying for food stamps, Medicaid, and social security card for all new clients; enrolling 
each client to a specific temporary government-sponsored funding program such as MG 
or RCA; providing cultural orientation to all newly arrived clients; and organizing and 
transporting clients to all medical appointments.  This list only partially covers the 
myriad of core services which are required for each new refugee and during a period of 
high-volume arrivals, ensuring that all core services are conducted properly and 
efficiently and that everything is documented can be challenging with a limited number 
of staff.  As the Resettlement Program Supervisor then, my main duty was not only to 
help with these services but also to ensure that they were conducted in compliance with 
RST’s contracts with the United States Refugee Program (USRP) as well as similar 
contracts with the state of Texas. 
 During the time I was working with Refugee Services of Texas, I kept a regular 
journal noting my experiences and interactions at RST.  Entries from this journal were 
transcribed and coded for reoccurring themes.  Topics such as policy, community, self-
sufficiency, employment, language, and cultural orientation, just to name a few, were 
themes I regularly engaged with while at RST.  Journal entries are used as a primary data 
source throughout this dissertation and are cited by the date of the entry and will give 
context where necessary and/or useful.       
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One-on-one semi-structured interviews were conducted during the spring 2011 
academic semester.  Respondents were identified largely through the development of 
relationships formed while working at RST.  Snowball sampling was also utilized 
however, as a small number of the interviews conducted were with respondents who had 
been identified by either other refugees or by agency directors who had previously 
spoken with refugee clients about the research.  I carried out approximately 24 interviews 
with Iraqi refugees and refugee service providers in Austin, TX.  20 of the interviews 
were with Iraqi refugees while the remaining four interviews were conducted with 
directors and/or staff of various refugee organizations in Austin, TX.  The four 
organizations represented in these interviews were Refugee Services of Texas (refugee 
resettlement agency), CARITAS of Austin (refugee resettlement agency), Multicultural 
Refugee Coalition (a non-profit working to support and empower refugees throughout the 
resettlement process), and finally Interfaith Action of Central Texas (iACT for Refugee 
Program coordinates all English as a Second Language instruction for refugees arriving 
in Austin, TX).   The Iraqis interviewed for this study were refugees who arrived in 
Austin, TX as refugees from the current war in Iraq.  Iraqis who had been here less than 
one year were not interviewed.  The participants had to be between the ages of 18 and 65.  
The reason for this age range was that I wanted to interview refugees who were work 
eligible as the challenges of finding employment is a major theme for all refugees in 
achieving self-sufficiency.  Only two of the 23 respondents were female due to cultural 
concerns among the population being interviewed.  All respondents were fluent in Arabic 
 17 
while some were also fluent in English.  If the respondent was fluent in English and 
comfortable speaking that language then the interview was conducted in English.  If the 
respondent spoke only a minimal level of English or none at all, then the interview was 
conducted in Arabic by either me or a translator who was familiar with certain dialects of 
Iraqi Arabic which I am not proficient in.  An informed consent document was provided 
to each respondent in Arabic and/or English, depending on the respondent’s proficiency 
in the English language. 
All interviews, whether with refugees or organization directors, were in-depth, 
semi-structured interviews.  Refugees, in particular were first asked to talk about their 
lives in Iraq (where they were from, education, professions, etc.), and then about their 
flight from Iraq, if they did indeed cross a border.  They were asked about the situation 
under which they were forced to leave Iraq and about the process of applying for and 
being granted refugee status.  Finally they were asked to talk in detail about their 
experience arriving in the US, their expectations and the realities of living here, and what 
they considered to be some of the main challenges of coming to the US as refugees.  
Additionally, they were asked about their experience and relationship with the various 
organizations supporting refugees in Austin and about the policies and processes 
connected with refugee resettlement in the US.  
Organization directors were also asked to talk about their background and the 
context in which they began working with refugees.  They were then asked about the 
agencies for which they worked, their goals, and their opinions about the policies and 
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processes of refugee resettlement.  All respondents were asked if they had suggestions for 
improving refugee resettlement in Austin.  The reason for the open-ended semi-structured 
interviews was to allow issues such as integration, identity, home, and US refugee policy 
(some of the main issues cited in the research questions) come out naturally in 
conversation rather than being introduced by the researcher.  If these topics, or others of 
importance to the study, were raised by the respondents then the interviewer would probe 
on these issues in greater detail.  All interviews lasted between 60-90 minutes and were 
conducted at the University of Texas at Austin.  Additionally, all interviews were 
transcribed and coded for recurring themes, those of which will be discussed in greater 
length in the following chapters.    
 
1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
In the next chapter, I attempt to “place” this study within the broader literatures of 
migration/refugee studies as well as within geography specifically.  In some instances 
these overlap, of course, as migration and refugee studies are inherently interdisciplinary.  
Nevertheless, by discussing in detail the concepts and literatures of political geography, 
geopolitics, and migration studies, I attempt to show where and how these various 
literatures intersect and where, if at all, this study fits.  From this point of departure, I 
then make an effort to trace the “story” of the Iraqi refugee crisis; from Iraq to Austin, 
TX. 
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This “story” begins with a very brief history of Iraq, its past and current 
population dynamics and movements, and the effects of colonialism and an authoritarian 
dictatorship on its geography and demography.  It tracks some of the sectarian 
undercurrents that existed before the American-led invasion and then follows in more 
detail the 2003 invasion itself.   From there, the possible causes and consequences of the 
large-scale movement of Iraqis beginning in 2006, both inside and out of the country, are 
explored.  I then describe the difficult situation for Iraqi refugees after 2006 who were 
surviving as internally displaced peoples inside of Iraq as well as those who had crossed 
international borders into Syria, Jordan, and to a lesser extent Lebanon.  Turning then to 
the international response (or lack thereof) to the crisis, I briefly outline the reaction of 
several European countries and finally the response of the United States.   
The remainder of the dissertation concerns itself with the ways in which the US 
reacted to the crisis and the resulting resettlement of tens of thousands of Iraqis within its 
borders.  In covering the US response the Iraqi refugee crisis, I first discuss the highly 
political process that took place to begin bringing Iraqis to this country and then the 
programs and policies that were set up to begin to actually process and admit them.  
Second, I turn to the numbers of Iraqis admitted to the US and how those numbers 
fluctuated from 2006-2013 as well as where Iraqis were resettling.  Finally, I use my 
experiences of working at a refugee resettlement agency in Austin, TX and, through 
numerous in depth interviews, the voices of Iraqi refugees themselves, to take a critical 
look at how the federal policies and programs for refugees affected the experience of 
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Iraqi resettlement in the US in 2009 and 2010.  In addition to these policies and 
programs, I look in detail at how other structural barriers may have affected their 
resettlement.  Some of these barriers include the economic recession, a prevailing 
atmosphere of anti-immigration sentiment, and Islamaphobic tendencies among segments 
of the American population due in part to the events of 9/11 and continuous military 
involvement in the Arab and Islamic world.  Aside from structural obstacles, I also look 
some of the cultural aspects that Iraqis bring with them to the US and carry with them 
throughout the resettlement experience.  These cultural aspects are ones that are called 
out by Iraqis in the interviews and, as can be seen later in the dissertation, can be a help 
or a hindrance.  Further, other aspects of personal agency are discussed based off the 
interview data such as social capital, mobility, transnational communication, the role of 
religious organizations and institutions, and perceptions of the importance of citizenship 
in this country and its role in the overall process of integration.  As much as possible, I 
tried to let the voices of Iraqis tell this story, especially from the time following the 2003 
American-led invasion.  In the interviews, I had respondents trace their own stories, from 
Iraq to the United States.  In gathering and coding those stories and through my own 
participant observation, I then attempted to provide a comprehensive critique of the Iraqi 
resettlement experience here in the US and particularly in Austin, TX.  From this critique 
then, I hope to provide some valuable contributions to larger discussions going on within 
migration and refugee studies and more broadly within the field of geography. 
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Chapter 2: Migration/Refugee Studies, Geopolitics, and Geography: A 
Literature Review 
 
 The purpose of this chapter is to situate this dissertation research within the 
relevant literatures.  Migration is an inherently interdisciplinary topic and thus research 
and written works on migration span the social sciences.  Refugee studies is largely 
considered a subsection of migration studies but it is a necessary distinction as there is 
some debate about the differences and/or similarities between political and economic 
migrants.  It would be impossible and far beyond the scope of this paper to attempt to 
organize in a coherent way the myriad of academic works on migration that exist.  It is 
necessary then to choose carefully what should be included within this brief amount of 
space but which will still give proper context for the remainder of the dissertation.  This 
chapter will first strive to discuss the challenges of categorizing different types of 
migrants and the debates about how refugees may or may not fall easily into any one 
category.  Second, given what Jennifer Hyndman calls the “politics of humanitarianism”, 
refugee aid strategies, especially concerning third-country refugee resettlement, have 
increasingly become a (geo)political issue involving international cooperation between 
nation-states, multi-national organizations, and religiously affiliated aid organizations 
(Hyndman 2000).  This chapter will therefore discuss the idea and literature of 
geopolitics and political geography and how it relates to refugee movements as well as 
refugee aid strategies.  Finally, throughout each of these sections there will be discussions 
concerning the ways in which migration/refugee studies and geopolitics are intertwined 
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with the discipline of geography and how this study fits and contributes broadly to these 
disciplines. 
 
2.1 MAKING SENSE OF MIGRATION AND REFUGEE STUDIES: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES AND 
DEBATES 
 “Today immigrants appear as threatening outsiders, knocking at the gates, or 
crashing the gates, or sneaking through the gates into societies richer than those from 
which the immigrants came” (Sassen 1999, 1).  This quote from Saskia Sassen’s Guests 
and Aliens, although written in 1999, is still largely relevant today.  The negative 
viewpoint of floods of immigrants and refugees to a country is one of the multiple 
epistemologies within the discourse surrounding immigration not only to the US but to 
the “West” in general.  It is a point that is necessary to consider in any discussion of 
global migration today.  Sassen does well to show that while this is a dominant theme in 
contemporary times, it is also an old theme, and in many respects, it is a myth.   
Increasingly, immigration to Western nations is being frowned upon and heavily guarded 
and controlled.  While the US and European nations espouse the ideals of 
multiculturalism and diversity, these same nations are struggling to find solutions as to 
how to manage immigration and multiculturalism within their borders.  Broad and 
complex notions of diversity, community, education, citizenship, integration, 
transnationalism, and globalization are all connected and intertwined in issues of 
immigration and local and federal governments are often faced with difficult decisions as 
to how to negotiate these connected and sometimes conflicting ideas.   
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Migration, however, is not simply a process of people crashing the gates into 
richer countries and it cannot be bound by East-West/North-South characterizations.  
Migration is a process which is carried out by us all in one way or another.  As King 
(2002) states in his article on new ways to “map” European migration: 
I wonder how many of you, reading this paper, have never engaged in some kind of 
migration…So are migrants therefore still to be regarded as the ‘others’ who are 
different from ‘us’? Or is it the case that all of us are, in some way or another, 
migrants or the product of migration? (King 2002, 94)  
 
This is an important point to remember as it illustrates the fact that migration can no 
longer be viewed as a process simply involving large numbers of poor, uneducated, and 
desperate peoples pushed merely by economic despair.  This view was, however, the 
most common depiction of migrants in earlier academic discourses (Park 1928).  To some 
extent it has persisted, not so much within academia, but certainly within the media.  
White (2002), for example, shows how hydraulic metaphors used by the media about 
incoming migrants and refugees, such as terms like “flood”,  “flows”, and “swamp” 
suggest that migrants are not only “out of place”, but that they are thought of as an 
impingement and intrusion upon the receiving society as well (2002, 1056).  One can find 
these views in most countries, including the United States where, for example, increasing 
numbers of Mexican migrants has led to arguments over the use of the Spanish language 
in schools, the emergence of a “security fence” erected along the US-Mexican border, 
and the expenses and validity concerning the deportation of “illegal” Mexican migrants.  
Concern over the persistence of this negative view of migrants has been expressed and 
discussed by a number of scholars such as Malkki (1992), Sassen (1999), and Appadurai 
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(2006).  But as King notes, migration is a much larger and all-encompassing phenomenon 
affecting or carried out by, in one way or another, people the world over. 
One need not look far to find other examples which highlight the complexity of 
migration, whether it be forced or voluntary.  If one looks, for example, at the thousands 
of people displaced by major natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina in 2005 in New 
Orleans, the earthquake in the town of L’Aquila in central Italy in 2009, or the 
devastating 2011 tsunami in Japan, it brings up interesting questions not only in the 
context of refugee studies and wider discussions about displacement, but also in the 
broader context of migration studies.  Where are people affected by these disasters going?  
How long will they stay in their respective destinations?  What should be the role of the 
state in their overall wellbeing?  Do any types of patterns present themselves in 
movements such as this in terms of class, gender, ethnicity, or race?  What about patterns 
having to do with their destinations?  Are these displaced people refugees?  What will be 
the future ramifications of their movement on the towns and cities which they fled, and 
even on their nations of origin? 
 It is interesting to relate these questions, which are pointed at a very specific 
“type” of migrant, to other categories of migrants.  Many of the questions remain the 
same.  If that is true, then how do scholars and researchers begin to make sense of 
migration?  Where do these migrants “fit” in relation to other types of migrants and is 
grouping migrants a necessity for understanding the various causes and effects of human 
movement?  Asking questions such as this highlights the continuously blurring 
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distinctions between migrant/migration types.  It also illustrates the inherent complexity 
in trying to make sense of migration.  
If one can make the assumption then that migration is affecting most human 
beings in some way or other, then how can we make sense of this extremely complex and 
variegated process?  With changing economic, political, social, and cultural backdrops, 
migration patterns and processes change as well.  They change spatially and they change 
temporally.  And thus older models, classification schemes, and migration/migrant 
typologies need to be continually re-assessed and defined.  In this context, this section 
will first briefly review previous migrant typologies and models, then discuss possible 
new ways to view and/or classify migrants today, and finally, enter into a more nuanced 
discussion about how refugees fit into this overall process and phenomenon.     
 
2.1.1 Previous Migrant Typologies and Classification Schemes 
 Discussions about theories of migration and classification schemes usually begin 
with Ravenstein (1889) who first theorized a set of laws of migration based upon his 
observations and statistical data from most European countries as we as the United States.  
He thus devises theories or “laws” ranging from different migration stages to migration 
distances, urban and rural forms of migration, what he terms “migration currents and 
countercurrents”, gender and migration, and technology and migration.  His system of 
laws is, of course, a contextual one which focuses almost exclusively on “Western” forms 
of migration.  It doesn’t account for or discuss migration processes and patterns in other 
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parts of the world such as Asia or Africa.  Interestingly, it deals with European migrants 
going to these places (an outcome of the colonial and imperial era in which he was living) 
but not the other way around.  Ravenstein does discuss different migrant types such as 
rural and urban migrants, short distance and long distance migrants, and internal and 
international migrants, but creating a typology for distinctive migrant types is not his 
main concern.  Rather it is to compare and contrast between migration processes and 
patterns across space in order to devise his “laws of migration”. 
 One of the next works attempting to theorize and classify the migration process in 
a general sense was Lee’s (1966).  Lee draws heavily on Ravenstein and again, does not 
formulate a scheme for classifying migrant types, but instead for hypothesizing about 
three main aspects of migration: volume of migration, the establishment of stream and 
counterstream, and the characteristics of migrants.  In his analysis of the different 
characteristics of migrants he sites factors such as “The heightened propensity to migrate 
at certain stages of the life cycle is important in the selection of migrants” (1966, 57).  
Through characterizations such as this, one gets a feel for some of the different migrant 
types he is talking about such as old and young migrants, poor and rich migrants, married 
and unmarried migrants, and educated and uneducated ones.  Lee’s paper was much less 
a comprehensive examination of migration across space as was Ravenstein’s, but instead 
a work meant for guiding future research projects on migration and subsequently for 
testing future research questions and results against Lee’s hypotheses. 
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 Two other early scholars attempting to make sense of migration who should not 
be overlooked were Fairchild (1918), and Petersen (1958).  They are grouped together 
here (and not part of a more chronological analysis) because of an overall similarity in 
their formulations (Petersen, as did Lee with Ravenstein’s work, admittedly borrows 
heavily from Fairchild).  Fairchild begins by categorizing four main causes of human 
movement: invasion, conquest, colonization, and finally, immigration.  Unlike 
Ravenstein, Fairchild takes a much more historical (rather than spatial) approach to his 
classification scheme.  The difference between immigration and the other three types of 
human movement is a sociological one, however, which is based purely upon an 
individual’s decision.  It is of importance to his overall discussion of immigration (and 
later ones) that Fairchild notes:  
…immigration is a distinctly individual undertaking.  States may direct, 
control, regulate, or encourage immigration, but the motives which lead men 
into this form of movement are strictly individual ones and the causes which 
arouse these motives are conditions which react upon the individual alone.  
The end sought is neither the advantage of the country of origin, nor the 
country of destination, but the improvement of the condition of the individual 
(1918: 21).  
This focus on the individual signals Fairchild’s recognition of the strong probability of 
economic factors as being a reason for the push of the individual from one place to 
another.  For Fairchild, immigration is seen as a way to better oneself.  Despite this focus, 
he does also acknowledge other “less important” types of immigration, specifically, 
forms of forced migration such as when peoples are expelled from places or 
“compulsory” forms of migration such as the slave trade (Fairchild 1918, 24). Finally, he 
makes a very brief comment about internal and intra-state migration.   
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 These typologies are important for Petersen (1958) as he creates his own, 
focusing largely on issues such as ecological push, migration policy, people's aspirations, 
and social momentum.  Petersen makes an important statement opposing the sole use of 
statistical data in deducing theories or “laws” about migration.  He states, “Migration 
differs from fertility and mortality in that it cannot be analyzed, even at the outset, in 
terms of non-cultural, physiological factors, but must be differentiated with respect to 
relevant social conditions” (265).  The overuse of statistics without factoring in social and 
cultural aspects of the push-pull of migration is where Petersen finds major problems 
with the way Ravenstein (1889) tried to make sense of migration.  One can see from 
Petersen’s typology below (figure 2.1) how he visualizes different forms of migration. 
 
Figure 2.1 Petersen’s Migration Typology 
 
Source: Petersen (1958) 
 
 Another important aspect of Petersen’s typology is how he begins to recognize 
and deal at length with some of the more nuanced characteristics of migrant types.  
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Petersen is one of the first scholars of migration to use the term “continuum” although he 
does not actually draw up such a model.  Nevertheless he does account for some of the 
complex distinctions of different migrant types especially concerning certain push 
factors.  Notably he states of forced migration in particular: 
It is useful to divide this class into impelled migration, when the migrants 
retain some power to decide whether or not to leave, and forced migration, 
when they do not have this power. Often the boundary between the two, the 
point at which the choice becomes nominal, may be difficult to set. 
Analytically, however, the distinction is clear cut, and historically it is often 
so. The difference is real, for example, between the Nazis' policy (roughly 
1933-38) of encouraging Jewish emigration by various anti-Semitic acts and 
laws, and the later policy (roughly 1938-45) of herding Jews into cattle-trains 
and trans-porting them to camps (Petersen 1958: 261, emphasis original). 
 
Distinguishing between these two instances is an important departure from some of the 
previous ways of thinking about migration.  No longer must migrants be thought of 
necessarily in terms of a series of boxes or rows and columns.  Rather they can be 
thought of as having a place along a spectrum.  Although Petersen does not actually use 
the term or idea of a spectrum, he does think about migration along a sort of continuum.  
Later in the paper one finds that Petersen does use the word “continuum” while, at the 
same time, reflecting on some of his criticisms of Ravenstein’s (1889) work: 
While few today would follow Ravenstein's example by denoting their 
statements "laws," most treatments of migratory selection still imply a 
comparable degree of generality. Even the best discussions typically neglect 
to point out that selection ranges along a continuum, from total migration to 
total non-migration, or that the predominance of females in rural-urban 
migration that Ravenstein noted must be contrasted with male predominance 
in, for example, India's urbanization (Petersen 1958: 265) 
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Petersen’s typology and ideas about a continuum which accounts for the different shades 
of migrant types, continues to be used in more current studies of migration and in theories 
of migration (Krishnan and Odynak 1987). Richmond (1988) borrows from it to create 
what he calls “the migrant continuum”.  Richmond demonstrates the inherent difficulty in 
categorizing migrant types into clearly delineated and different groupings.  Creating a 
migrant continuum as Richmond does is helpful in that it does not box in particular 
migrant types which may either straddle the borders of the various categorizations or who 
contain characteristics from more than one of the categories.  Moreover, while 
Richmond’s continuum was created for thinking about all migrant types, he is, as the title 
of his paper makes clear, talking primarily about refugees.  In developing his model he 
states:  
All human behavior is constrained.  Choices are not unlimited but are 
determined by the structuration process.  However, ‘degrees of freedom’ may 
vary.  Individual and group autonomy and potency are situationally 
determined.  It would be more appropriate to recognize a continuum at one 
end of which individuals and collectivities are proactive and at the other 
reactive.  Under certain conditions, the decision to move may be made after 
due consideration of all relevant information, rationally calculated to 
maximize net advantage, including both material and symbolic rewards.  At 
the other extreme, the decision to move may be made in a state of panic 
facing a crisis situation which leaves few alternatives but escape from 
intolerable threats.  Between these two extremes, many of the decisions made 
by both ‘economic’ and ‘political’ migrants are a response to diffuse anxiety 
generated by a failure of the social system to provide for the fundamental 
needs of the individual, biological, economic, and social (Richmond 1988: 
17, emphasis original). 
 
Below we find the visual manifestation of Richmond’s continuum (figure 2).  Despite 
what one would infer from the quote above (that Richmond’s spectrum is strictly 
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horizontal with two extremes), the diagram actually contains a y and an x axis.  The 
vertical axis represents decision-making and the horizontal axis represents “the 
interaction of economic and sociopolitical forces, reflecting that they come full circle as 
internal and external state powers converge” (Richmond 1988, 20). Richmond’s 
paradigm does a good job of identifying and dealing with the many shades of gray in 




Figure 2.2 Richmond’s Paradigm of International Population Movements 
 
Source: Richmond (1988) 
Even a continuum or model that did account for spatial variables would fall short, 
however, in explaining new types of migration, particularly for transnational migrants.  
Broadly, this point stresses the need for the continual reassessment of migration/migrant 
typologies and theories as migration itself is a continually changing and dynamic process.  
More specifically, it raises the point about transnationalism, which has become a new 
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paradigm in migration studies.  In order to try to make sense of migration taking into 
account the current concept of transnational communities, which can broadly be defined 
as, “a set of intense, cross-border social relations that enable individuals to participate in 
the activities of daily life in two or more nations”, then a different sort of diagram would 
have to be created (Bailey 2001, 413).  Even if this were done, however, it would still fail 
in highlighting the different social, cultural, political, and economic forces which come to 
bear on such movements.  How does one account, for example, for the effects of 
national/international policy, humanitarian aid and benefits (if there are any), existing or 
forming ethnic migrant communities in the place of arrival, upon the various types of 
migrant characterized in a chart, diagram, or classification scheme?  This becomes 
increasingly difficult due to processes such as globalization and technological advances 
such as the internet, although attempts are still being made which are much more “up to 
date” than any of the previously mentioned typologies, from Ravenstein’s to Richmond’s. 
Using the concept of transnationalism as a backdrop Pries (2001) figures there to 
be four “ideal-types” of migrants: immigrants, return migrants, diaspora migrants, and 
transmigrants.  Looking at past migrant typologies, Pries reconsiders them, taking into 
account the current importance of transnationalism.  Within this reassessment he 
identifies a new kind of social space which is, for him, a transnational social space where 
the permanence of international borders begin to fade as people are able to not only 
communicate across borders but also live and move among two or more places 
continuously, creating the possibility of forming more than one national and/or cultural 
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identity.  Pries’ article falls short, though, in making a clear delineation between 
transnational communities and diasporic communities, which to an extent can also be 
transnational.   
Finally, King (2002) critiques and criticizes previous typologies of migrant types 
and their many dualisms or “migration dyads”, in particular.  King accurately states: 
We need to appreciate that many of the key questions that were asked to 
frame our understanding of the functioning of migration now have a very 
different array of answers from the largely economic ones which shaped our 
earlier analyses.  Now, new mobility strategies are deployed to achieve 
economic and, importantly, non-economic objectives.  In the new global and 
European map of migration, the old dichotomies of migration study – internal 
versus international, forced versus voluntary, temporary versus permanent, 
legal versus illegal – blur as both the motivations and modalities of migration 
become much more diverse (2002: 89). 
 
King suggests that some of the new migrant types that need to be included to a greater 
extent in studies of migration are independent female migration, migrations of crisis, 
skilled and professional migrations, student migration, retirement migration, and “hybrid-
tourism” migration.  These “new” types of migrant should by no means be looked at as a 
complete picture.  More importantly, they are simply a current dynamic of today’s 
broader migration “map” that are often overlooked by researchers, although since the 
publication of King’s article in 2002 a growing number of studies have appeared 
discussing these new migrant types (King and Ruiz-Gelices 2003; Baláz and Williams 
2004; Ackers 2005).  The migrant/migration typologies and classification schemes listed 
above do not by any means represent the entirety of these sorts of paradigms which have 
been established (others which could be included are Wilbur Zelinsky 1971; Kunz 1973).  
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Instead, they are meant to show the complexity of migration and, particularly, the 
complexity of making sense of migration.  The typologies included here try not only to 
make sense of the process of migration as a whole, but also of how the classification of 
the refugee/forced migrant fits into this broader discussion.  The following section thus 
deals with the issue of the refugee in the phenomenon of migration. 
 
2.1.2 The Refugee within Geography and Migration Studies 
Given the fact that migration is such a pervasive issue and happens at all scales, 
migration studies is an area of research that has long interested geographers.  Geography 
has thus played an important role in migration research over the years.  Gober and Tyner 
identify four main themes that represent current migration studies in geography: “1) the 
effects of economic restructuring on migration patterns and processes; 2) the effects of 
demographic cycles on migration rates and timing; 3) the integration of migration and 
residential mobility into a life-course perspective; 4) ethnographic approaches to 
migration” (2003, 187).  A significant omission to this list is the effects of political 
processes on migration.  In the last decade and a half, however, there has been a trend in 
geographical migration studies focusing on the political and geopolitical aspects and 
causes of migration (Leitner 1997; Tesfahuney 1998; Hyndman 2000; Wright and Ellis 
2000; C. R. Nagel 2002; A. Mountz 2003; Caroline R. Nagel and Staeheli 2005a; Blitz 
2007; Gamlen 2008; Coutin 2010; Alison Mountz 2011). Regardless of this omission in 
Gober and Tyner’s article, migration research in geography is becoming increasingly 
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popular due to the rich yet complex issues that are prevalent within it.  One of those 
issues is refugee studies.    
Like other sub-fields of migration research, refugee studies has no academic 
disciplinary home.  Due to the variety of issues within refugee studies it is inherently 
interdisciplinary.  Refugee studies includes issues covered in the fields of law (Khanna 
2006; Cohen 2008; Travis 2009), clinical psychology (Smid et al. 2011), health and 
medicine (Shoeb, Weinstein, and Halpern 2007; Mitschke et al. 2011; Inhorn and Serour 
2011), social work (L. Briggs 2011; Harding and Libal 2012) and, of course, the various 
disciplines within the social sciences.  There is surprisingly, however, a dearth of 
research on refugee issues within the field of geography.  This is a shame since many 
topics concerning refugees and refugee resettlement reach the heart of human geography.  
A field which has dedicated much of its efforts to studying the diverse characteristics of 
space and place, social justice, and disadvantaged and minority populations, exploring the 
complexities of refugee migration and international refugee resettlement fits well within 
geography.  Whether examining the extremely controlled and political process of refugee 
movement across space or looking at the effects of refugee movement on sending and 
receiving communities, third-country refugee resettlement as an aspect of migration 
merits more attention within the field.  This is especially true as the manner in which 
refugee resettlement is negotiated by various stakeholders can be helpful for 
understanding many of the broader issues of migration.  Geographers who have focused 
on refugees in the past have often done so largely in the context of the Horn of Africa 
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(Rogge 1985; Black and Robinson 1993; Bascom 1993; Kuhlman 1994; Bascom 1998; 
Hyndman 2000). Even outside of the field of geography, much research on aspects of 
refugee integration in the “West” takes place outside the US (Robinson 1993; Waxman 
2001; Mestheneos and Loannidi 2002; Lamba 2003; Ager and Strang 2008; Stewart et al. 
2008).  There have been some works, although not many, which begin to tackle the issue 
of forced migration and displacement in the region of the Middle East (Chatty 2010; 
Shami 1996; Shami 1994).  Works focusing specifically on aspects of Middle Eastern or 
Arab refugee populations resettling in the “West” are also concentrated mainly outside of 
the United States, specifically Europe, Canada, and Australia (Al-Rasheed 1994; M. 
Graham and Khosravi 1997; Waxman 2001; Sparrow 2005; Hyndman and McLean 2006; 
Casimiro, Hancock, and Northcote 2007; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Qasmiyeh 2010).  With 
the increasing number of Iraqi refugees arriving to the United States since 2005-2006, 
there is an opening for exploring the experiences of a new Arab refugee population 
arriving to the United States.  Works focusing specifically on Arab immigrants in the 
United States touch upon many important points which are not easily distinguishable 
within refugee and broader migration studies such as identity, political activism, 
transnationalism, integration, and citizenship (Y. Y. Haddad 2004; C. Nagel and Staeheli 
2004; Caroline R. Nagel and Staeheli 2005b; Ajrouch and Jamal 2007; Wald 2008). The 
point that there is overlap among analytical analyses between refugee studies and 
migration studies broadly has created some debates among migration/refugee researchers.  
One of these debates has to do with the use of/lack of theory within refugee studies 
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(which will be covered in the next chapter), while another has to do with the definition of 
a refugee and the question of, is a refugee any different than a so-called economic 
migrant. 
It is clear from the typologies discussed in the previous section that people who 
are forced from their homes (for whatever reason) deserve a place in even the earliest 
models on migration such as Fairchild’s (1918)3.  In Ravenstein’s (1889) “Laws of 
Migration” he makes no reference to forced migration, refugees, or displacement.  
Whether because of historical or cultural context, this idea for him was not significant 
enough for him to include it in his paper.  Fairchild, on the other hand discusses the term 
“forced migration”, albeit as more of a side note (1918: 23-24).  Lee (1966) and Petersen 
(1958) both discuss forced migration.  Gonzalez (1961) identified five types of migration 
based on her research in the Caribbean and they were: seasonal, temporary non seasonal, 
recurrent, continuous, and permanent.  It was not until 1989 that she added “conflict 
migration” as one of her primary types (Gonzalez 1989).  Kunz (1973) responds both the 
Lee and Petersen in developing his own, more nuanced, model of different refugee types.   
These points raise issues and questions as to the differences between forced 
migrants/refugees and other types of migrants.  Researchers within academia, 
government bureaucrats, and employees for various non-governmental organizations 
cannot seem to agree on a single definition for the term refugee (L. H. Malkki 1996; 
                                                             
3 Indeed, there were a number of examples of forced migration around this time.  Notably among 
them was the great “population exchange” between Turkey and Greece which began after the Treaty 
of Lausanne in 1923 and resulted in the forced displacement of around 2 million people.  
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Bascom 1998; D. A. Martin 2005).  Related to this point, many scholars researching 
aspects of migration claim the differences between refugees and other types of migrants 
are becoming increasingly unclear (Black and Robinson 1993; Daley 1993; Hyndman 
and Mountz 2007).  What has become increasingly clear, however, from the above 
typologies and classifications, especially Petersen’s (1958) and Richmond’s (1988), is 
that one should not distinguish solely between the economic and political factors of 
migration.  This distinction is far too ambiguous.  And surely, an “economic” 
migrant/refugee, defined as someone who is fleeing their home because of severe 
economic conditions and who is experiencing high levels of poverty, could be just as 
desperate to migrate as someone fleeing from violence or persecution.  Sassen brings up 
important questions when she states: 
Within the framework of West European states, the question “Who is a 
refugee?” is finally complicated by the growing belief that these are 
economic migrants masquerading as political victims.  Who is a refugee?  
Are those driven by economic despair which may come from war and 
generalized oppression as was the case with the 2.5 million Jews who left 
Russia and East Europe between 1880 and World War I “legitimate” 
refugees?  Does such a broadening of the definition undermine the status of 
refugee?  Is control by the state over the definition of refugees tenable in the 
new political and economic reality of Western Europe, one characterized by 
growing transnationalization? (1999, 5–6) 
 
Another group of authors make the point that the debate surrounding the question of 
“who is a refugee?” should go much further than the economic/political migrant 
dichotomy.  One now also needs to consider the possibility of redefining the term refugee 
by including those who are displaced by natural disasters and/or who are internally 
displaced within the category. Putting it more bluntly they offer: 
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It may be difficult to ascertain whether asylum seekers, economic migrants, 
and those displaced by war and in need of protection are ‘voluntary’ or 
‘involuntary’ migrants.  Moreover, it is possible for individuals to become 
displaced within their own country, to be uprooted…by a natural disaster, by 
civil strife…, or by the militarization of the economy conducted or facilitated 
by their own state…The globalization of economy also turns farmers and/or 
indigenous populations into internally displaced people when a government 
expropriates them in order to allocate space to multinational companies or to 
developers… (Hajdukowski-Ahmed 2008, 33) 
 
Some organizations have even gone so far as to develop a new definition of who can or 
should be included as a refugee and one example comes from the World Council of 
Churches (WCC) who have chosen to adopt the term “uprooted people” rather than 
focusing solely on the UNHCR’s more narrow definition of refugees.  In their discussion 
of uprooted people, the WCC recognizes the variety of ways that peoples are forcibly 
displaced from their home, whether it is inside or outside their country of nationality.  In 
addition to those forcibly displaced by war and persecution who end up outside their 
country of nationality (i.e. refugees defined by the 1951 Refugee Convention), the WCC 
places equal emphasis and importance onto those displaced for reasons such as sexual 
trafficking, natural disasters, and anyone whose livelihood has been threatened or 
destroyed due to the broad and far-reaching effects of globalization4.    
So, is there a difference between an economic migrant and a political refugee?  The 
answer is no and yes and it is largely based on the type of refugee to which one is 
referring and the definition under which one is currently working.  While the legal 




definition of a refugee under the terminology developed by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees 1951 Convention relating to the status of Refugees and the 
following 1967 protocols reads as, “a person who owing to a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country”, there 
are many other ways in which organizations and researchers view and define refugees.  
Some prefer to use a very broad definition of the term.  Zolberg et al, for example, states 
that refugees are “persons whose presence abroad is attributable to a well-founded fear of 
violence” (Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo 1989, 33).  Others use a more detailed approach 
when thinking about how to define a refugee.  Joly et al (Joly, Nettleton, and Poulton 
1992), when discussing refugee and asylum issues in Europe, categorize refugee types in 
a way that is similar to some of the models discussed above.  They develop five specific 
types of refugees: 1) ‘convention refugees’ who are recognized by the terminology of the 
1951 Geneva Convention relating to the status of refugees; 2) ‘mandate refugees’ which 
is the category that indicates that refugees are recognized by UNHCR but not by the host 
government; 3) ‘humanitarian refugees’ are those granted the right to stay in a country on 
humanitarian grounds but which implies less rights than full refugee status or ‘convention 
status’; 4) ‘de facto refugees’ which is the category referring to those who are refugees in 
practice, but have not sought refugee status for various reasons; and 5) ‘refugees in orbit’, 
those who move between different (European) countries in search of a more permanent 
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status (Joly, Nettleton, and Poulton 1992).  Bascom in finding a definition for refugees 
cites Richmond’s continuum (discussed above) stating, “Refugee movements ought to be 
viewed on a continuum stretching from proactive migrants...to reactive migrants” (1998, 
4).  Some groups have gone so far as to create their own working definition of who 
should be included in the category of refugee      
Researchers now take it as a given that it is unnecessary and ambiguous to make 
the distinction between political and economic migrants since so many of the questions 
they ask about these two types of migrants are the same.  This coupled with the fact that 
people fleeing severe economic conditions may be just as “desperate” as an individual 
fleeing violence and persecution makes the exercise of trying to distinguish between the 
two quite difficult.  In this sense, the answer is no, there is not much difference between 
an economic migrant and political refugee.  However, in a political-international and 
national framework the answer is yes.  Whether it is fair or not, international political 
organizations such as the UN and national governments such as the US do distinguish 
between these two types of migrants, however ambiguous the process of distinguishing 
may be.  And therefore, from the moment that an individual is “legally” defined as a 
refugee (either by the UN or the State) and when he/she reaches their subsequent 
destination, they become eligible (and this varies from country to country) for a number 
of federal/state/local benefits which many other migrants do not enjoy.  So while Malkii 
states that, “refugees do not constitute a naturally self-delimiting domain of 
anthropological knowledge”, she is both right and wrong: right in that anyone who is 
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forced from their home when they do not want to leave should be able to be grouped 
within the same term, and for whom many of the same questions having to do with 
migration can be asked; but wrong in that the experience of a certain type of refugee 
(specifically a “legally” designated one) is not different from other migrants in their 
migratory experience.   
Legally designated refugees sometimes take part in the humanitarian enterprise of 
international third-country refugee resettlement.  This is a particularly new form of 
international migration primarily beginning after WWII and on a much larger scale 
during and after the Vietnam War (Martin 2005). While there are many thousands of 
“legally documented” refugees languishing in refugee camps and cities in border 
countries around the world, living primarily off of their own resources and meager 
humanitarian aid, there are also many refugees, who by process of selection take part in 
the process of “third country resettlement”.  These refugees have their travel organized 
and paid for them through a coordinated effort of international governmental and non-
governmental organizations, they often have little choice of where they migrate to, they 
receive federal benefits in the country of resettlement for a given time depending on the 
country in which they resettle, and they often follow different rules in terms of eventually 
acquiring (if they choose not to return to their country of origin) citizenship in the 
country of resettlement.  These aspects alone are significantly different from other types 
of migrants in terms of the refugees travelling experience, choice of destination (or lack 
thereof), and integration experience.  In this regard, it can be very useful to conduct 
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research on refugees, whether they be in the second or third country of asylum, asking 
very different questions than one would with other types of migrants.  And the answers 
may be different as well as they speak to general issues of the validity/usefulness of 
human rights and the humanitarian enterprise (Terry 2002; Helton 2002; Ilana 2007; 
Herzog 2009), the “crisis” of the nation-state (Hein 1993; Sassen 1999; Benhabib 2004; 
Appadurai 2006), and the questionable process of state selection and exclusion of 
refugees and asylees (Loescher and Scanlan 1986; Keely 1996; Grewal 2005; Khanna 
2006; Hyndman and Mountz 2007; Varsanyi 2008).  At an individual or human level the 
answers may also be different in terms of psychological issues (Shoeb, Weinstein, and 
Halpern 2007; Savy and Sawyer 2008) and all types of integration whether it be social, 
economic, etc. (Black 1993; Mestheneos and Loannidi 2002; Lamba 2003).  Whether at 
the international level of human rights, the level of the State, or the level of the 
household/individual, researching refugees is useful for understanding an important 
aspect of international migration in the present historical, geopolitical and geographical 
context.  Furthermore, this aspect makes a unique contribution to migration studies as a 
whole as the “legal” third-country refugee is different from other types of migrants, even 
as this categorization is contextual itself.  Because so much of refugee movement is 
controlled by international political entities and at the level of the State, refugee 
movement is and has become an extremely politicized type of migration.  And it is in this 
framework that it is necessary then to turn to the subfields of geopolitics and political 
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geography to help place refugee studies within its proper contextual and thematic 
boundaries. 
 
2.2 POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY, GEOPOLITICS, AND THE REFUGEE 
 Geopolitics as a concept and idea has gained popularity in its usage over the past 
couple of decades, often to the point of ubiquity.  Nonetheless, the concept has its roots in 
the field of geography and with the present global connectedness of political conflict and 
violence, refugee issues and movements have largely become characterized as being 
“geopolitical”.  It is indeed characterized as such in this paper.  Therefore, a definition of 
the term is necessary.  Below I will reflect on the various meanings and critiques of 
geopolitics, how they fit into the broader disciplinary boundaries of political geography, 
and finally, how the concept of geopolitics informs “problems” of mobility and the 
refugee. 
 
2.2.1 Political Geography 
 Political geography is not a neatly defined or well-organized sub-field within the 
overall discipline of geography.  As Ó Tuathail and Shelley clearly state, “the intellectual 
domain called ‘political geography’ is a convenient fiction around which some scholars 
identify themselves while others do not” (Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Shelley 2003, 165).  
In their attempt at reviewing the sub-field, they focus on what they call “untidy political 
geographies”; relevant research clusters that are, of course, both political and 
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geographical.  Geopolitics informs a number of the works the authors cite in a variety of 
the research clusters which they identify as having particular importance to political 
geography at the beginning of the 21st century.  Some of these clusters include: political 
economic geographies, electoral geography and representation, politics of the body, 
politics of the environment, techno-political geographies, cultural political geographies, 
and critical geopolitics.  Although critical geopolitics is one of the clusters Ó Tuathail 
and Shelley (2003) identify, geopolitics as an idea finds significant prominence 
throughout the chapter.  While this may be due to the fact that the main author of the 
chapter is the author of Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space 
(Gearóid Ó Tuathail 1996), it is probably more concerned with the reality that aspects of 
globalization and technological advancements in transportation and modes of information 
have allowed for increased communication and interaction between states and peoples 
across space.  Geopolitics is thus becoming an inevitable part of studies in political 
geography.   
Looking at other introductions to political geography is insightful as they show 
differences and similarities to Ó Tuathail and Shelley’s (2003) review of the sub-field.  It 
is also helpful then for getting a broad overview of the field and how it relates to and 
intersects with geopolitics.  Agnew et al (J. A. Agnew, Mitchell, and Toal 2003), for 
example, have a similar view, albeit more comprehensive than the chapter in Geography 
in America .  This could stem (again) partly from Ó Tuathail’s influence (he is one of the 
three editors) but it is more likely that the collection of works represents a phase in the 
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discipline of geography which hovers around postmodern and post-positivist critiques.  
Unlike Ó Tuathail and Shelley (2003), however, Agnew et al try to define the field 
(departing slightly from Ó Tuathail and Shelley’s comment about political geography 
being a “convenient fiction”), neatly organizing it around a few themes that they claim 
have been prevalent throughout its history: 
As an area of study, “political geography” has changed historically but the 
theme of borders and orders, power, and resistance are always central to its 
operation.  For us, political geography is about how barriers between people 
and their political communities are put up and come down; how world orders 
based on different geographic organizing principles (such as empires, state 
systems, and ideological-material relationships) arise and collapse; and how 
material processes and political movements are re-making how we inhabit 
and imagine the “world political map” (Agnew et al 2003: 2). 
Agnew et al first traverse what they identify to be the main “modes of thinking” in 
political geography today which includes one chapter on “Geopolitical Themes and 
Postmodern Thought” (Slater 2003).  Later in the book there is an entire section of 
chapters dedicated to critical geopolitics.  There are of course numerous other 
contributions in the book dealing with issues the editors consider to be representative of 
political geography: territory, boundaries, scale, identity, the nation-state, citizenship, 
sexual politics, and the politics of nature.  Left out seem to be issues of domestic and 
global political economy, effects of technological and informational advancements, and 
issues of internal and international migration.  Additionally, there are no examples of a 
positivist or humanist outlook on (geo)political geographic issues.   
Cox (2002) on the other hand has quite a different idea of what political 
geography entails.  Without a single mention of geopolitics throughout the book, Cox 
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states in his introduction, “Above all, political geography focuses on the twin ideas of 
territory and territoriality” (2002: 1).  Cox’s text concentrates largely on the ties between 
political geography and economy, development, and difference, but almost always in the 
context of the dual ideas of territory and territoriality.  He spends two chapters at the 
beginning of the book, for example, chronicling and analyzing “The Political Geography 
of Capitalist Development” (63-140).  Cox’s omission of geopolitics as a major theme 
within political geography is instructive as it points to a subtle debate within the sub-field 
over the importance and value of the concept.   
A more balanced approach to reviewing political geography may be through 
Blacksell (2005) who makes due note of geopolitics but does not make it a major section 
of the book.  Moreover, Blacksell focuses on political geographic issues that are more 
national/local in scope and are not inherently geopolitical.  Such issues include electoral 
geographies, civil society, political parties, and the local state system.  These issues can 
be found elsewhere (Erlingsson 2008; Warf 2009) of course owing to the fact that not all 
political geography is geopolitical geography.  Although it could be argued otherwise, 
issues such as the Electoral College and U.S. voting patterns which Warf (2009) 
discusses have less influence on and, similarly, are less influenced by, international 
relations and world politics.  Examples such as these serve to illustrate that while the 
relationship between political geography and geopolitics is strong, it is not always 
present.   
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These examples (Agnew et al 2003; Ó Tuathail and Shelley 2003; Cox 2002; 
Blacksell 2005) highlight not only the differences in definitions and conceptions of 
political geography, but also the subtle contestations and debates over geopolitics within 
political geography.  They show that geopolitics continues to be a controversial term, 
even into the 21st century, when it has experienced somewhat of a “revival” (J. A. 
Agnew 1998).  The histories, meanings, and “revival” of geopolitics will be explored 
below, as well as how it fits into the overall subfield of political geography.      
 
2.2.2 Geopolitics 
Geopolitics as a concept and a term is contested within academia.  How 
geopolitics has been studied in academia, especially geography, has also been heavily 
debated and contested.  The term has a century-long history in which it has fallen in and 
out of favor, not only within academia but also in the media and in its popular usage.  In 
attempting to come to a definition of the term, Mamadouh chooses the simplest of 
definitions; “Although the term ‘geopolitics’ covers many different approaches, it can 
broadly be seen as a synonym for the political geography of international relations” 
(2005, 45).  This definition is problematic not only because it is so vague, but also 
because it supports the common-sense usage of the term when it is actually, especially 
within academia, a complicated idea with multiple meanings and histories.  In contrast, 
Flint (2006) states that to understand and analyze world politics (geopolitics) one must 
operate with more than one definition.  To do this he focuses on four aspects of 
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geopolitics: 1) statesmanship, or the territorial strategies of states, 2) geopolitics as a way 
of “seeing the world”, 3) the importance of the idea of “situated knowledges”, and 4) the 
significance of the development of critical geopolitics (Flint 2006, 13–16).  Flint attempts 
to encapsulate these competing notions in a single definition stating, “Contemporary 
geopolitics identifies the sources, practices, and representations that allow for the control 
of territory and the extraction of resources” (2006:16).   
Agnew (1998) also has trouble defining the term.  He first states that while 
geopolitics has long been used to refer to practices that emphasize world politics, the 
term has experienced a “revival” in recent years.  Agnew thus states that geopolitics, “is 
now used freely to refer to such phenomena as international boundary disputes, the 
structure of global finance, and geographical patterns of election results” (Agnew 1998: 
2).  Despite these claims, Agnew himself chooses to work from a slightly different 
definition which states that geopolitics is the, “examination of the geographical 
assumptions, designations, and understandings that enter into the making of world 
politics” (1998:2).  Reflection on these definitions reveal, however, that Agnew and Flint 
are not so much defining geopolitics as a concept, but rather they are defining ways to 
study, understand, or contribute to geopolitics.  If one can assume that a basic definition 
of geopolitics is essentially its “classical” definition which emphasizes statesmanship or 
the practices of states gaining/maintaining territory and sovereignty, then that leaves 
geographers with various and unique options for understanding these practices.  
Geographers are thus in an advantageous position to reflect on how and why these 
 51 
practices are carried out and, more importantly, the outcomes and effects of these 
practices upon borders, populations, and identity. 
 Finally, in reaching a better understanding of geopolitics, it is useful to look at 
the introductions to the first and second editions of Ó Tuathail et al’s The Geopolitics 
Reader (1998; 2006).  In the first edition Ó Tuathail states: 
 
All concepts have histories and geographies, and the term ‘Geopolitics’ is no 
exception.  The word ‘geopolitics’ has had a long and varied history in the 
twentieth century, moving well beyond its original meanings…Coming up 
with a specific definition of geopolitics is notoriously difficult, for the 
meanings of concepts like geopolitics tends to change as historical periods 
and structures of world order change.  Geopolitics is best understood in its 
historical and discursive context of use (Gearóid Ó Tuathail 1998, as quoted 
in; Dodds and Atkinson 2000, 8) 
 
In the introduction to the second edition of the book, however, Ó Tuathail scraps the 
earlier statement almost entirely (except for the first sentence) and states, “the 
conventional understanding today is that geopolitics is discourse about world politics, 
with a particular emphasis on state competition and the geographical dimensions of 
power” (2006, 1).  The differences between the two definitions are striking; one 
highlights a temporal aspect of geopolitics while the second concentrates on its spatial 
characteristics.  When Ó Tuathail states that it is best to understand geopolitics “in its 
historical and discursive context of use”, he is emphasizing an earlier and less “critical” 
form of the concept.  In the second definition, however, he is not only nodding towards a 
more critical/postmodern critique of geopolitics, but also illuminating the spatial 
dimensions of the concept.  Although it would be contradictory to include both these 
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quotations within the same chapter, they are equally useful for coming to a better 
understanding of what geopolitics is and also why it is a contested term.  Only by looking 
at both the geographical aspects and historical dimensions of geopolitical works and 
scholarship can this be done.    
Geography’s role in geopolitics runs deep as the term was coined in 1899 by 
Rudolf Kjellen, a Swedish geographer/political scientist whose work was greatly 
influenced by that of Friedrich Ratzel who wrote Politische Geographie (Political 
Geography) (G. J. Martin 2005; Dodds and Atkinson 2000; Gearóid Ó Tuathail 1996).  It 
is also important to mention here Kjellen’s contemporary, Sir Halford Mackinder whose 
Heartland theory was influential for future British and American foreign policy decisions 
(Martin 2005b).  Kjellen’s work, on the other hand, is thought to have influenced Nazi 
geopoliticians of the 1930’s, namely Karl Haushofer, who believed that racial hierarchies 
combined with notions of state vitality could be used to defend Germany’s territorial 
expansion (Agnew 1998).  This use of “geopolitik” in 1930’s Germany made the term 
unpopular and even taboo in the following two decades until it started to be used again 
during the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union.   
Although the practice of geopolitics had been in place before the term was 
actually coined, it was at the time of and because of scholars such as Kjellen and 
Mackinder that Agnew and others stress the importance of this moment, when Western 
(mainly European) powers began to “view the world as a whole” (Gregory 1994; J. A. 
Agnew 1998; Flint 2006).  This aspect of late 19th/early 20th century geographical 
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imaginations has been widely discussed by those writing critical geopolitics as it stresses 
for these authors the “situated knowledges” of scholars such as Kjellen and Mackinder 
(Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Agnew 1992; Ryan 1994).  Present works on early 
geopoliticians like Mackinder are usually more than descriptions of his scholarship; they 
at once contextualize and problematize his early writings as part of a discourse justifying 
and arguing for territorial expansion and control.  Taking this a step further, Dodds and 
Atkinson state that these types of political geographical imaginations, i.e. “seeing the 
world as a whole” and territoriality, sustain “the distinctions drawn between the domestic 
Self and external Others…and the moral and physical boundaries that divide the world 
into ‘our’ space and ‘their’ spaces” (2000, 10).  These types of critiques are examples of 
studies which can be categorized under what is termed “critical geopolitics”.   
As Ó Tuathail and Shelley accurately observe of political geography in a general 
sense, it is, “increasingly defined and dominated by critical post-positivist approaches 
and perspectives” (2003, 165).  This certainly holds true for geopolitical studies as well 
and can be identified as one of the reasons for the emergence and burgeoning of critical 
geopolitics.  Critical geopolitics, according to Ó Tuathail (1996) has four main sub-areas 
under which research is conducted.  These four areas are formal, practical, popular, and 
structural (G. Ó Tuathail 1999).  Formal geopolitics refers to the deconstructions of 
earlier geopolitical thought such as those mentioned above which critique the “situated 
knowledges” of Mackinder and Kjellen.  Practical geopolitics concerns critiques of the 
more current and everyday geopolitical actions of state foreign policy (Mercille 2008).  
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Popular geopolitics has to do with the outcomes and meanings of the geographical 
politics represented through the media and popular culture (Adams 2004; 2007).  Finally, 
structural geopolitics refers to the broad processes that structure the way states practice 
and conduct foreign policy such as globalization, migration, international corporatization, 
and social movements (Dahlman 2005; Sassen 1999). 
Critical geopolitics sits in contrast to classical or “orthodox” geopolitics.  O 
Tuathail and Shelley overstate the differences between these two main areas: 
 
Within political geography there has always been a tradition of skepticism 
towards orthodox geopolitics, the intellectual and political practice of 
interpreting the earth and global political transformations for the benefit of 
one’s own state and its leaders.  Orthodox geopolitics is problem-solving 
geopolitics for state strategy and foreign policy practice…Critical geopolitics, 
by contrast, is a problematizing theoretical enterprise that places the existing 
structures of power and knowledge into question (Ó Tuathail 2003: 173). 
 
This statement essentializes any type of geopolitics other than a critical one.  It suggests 
that any type of contribution to geopolitics which would not be classified as “critical” is 
suspect as it is developed specifically for the precarious goals of Western foreign policy.  
While this may have been true for Kjellen or Mackinder (and that is also disputable), 
geopolitical studies done in a tradition other than a critical geopolitical one can be useful 
for more than just the benefit of state strategy and foreign policy practice.  And they can 
certainly be theoretically sound for an academic audience while still being beneficial for 
state strategy.  Moreover, even if a study is carried out which can be categorized, as the 
authors put it above, “for the benefit of one’s own state and its leaders”, it does not 
necessarily mean that the study will be carried out for malicious purposes.  Is it not the 
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hope and goal of many (geo)political geographers that their work will make a difference 
outside of academia and possibly to stimulate a change in their government’s 
domestic/foreign policy for the better?  This is certainly the case with Wood, Chief 
Geographer at the US Department of State, who has written on complex emergencies, 
war crimes investigations, and the use of GIS in enhancing knowledge (and that includes 
the knowledge of government leaders and policy makers) of these important geopolitical 
issues (Wood 1996; 2000; Wood and Smith 1997).  Wood’s examples of “applied 
political geography” illustrate the fact that works exemplifying classical geopolitics can 
be useful and beneficial inside and outside of academia. 
 Another more recent example of a collection of (geo)political and geographical 
works not engaging with critical geopolitics is Flint’s edited text (2005).  Flint states 
pointedly in the introduction:  
Before I outline the themes, it should be stated that this book is not another 
example of critical geopolitics.  Critical geopolitics has been an essential, 
provocative, and informative component of political geography.  Its aim and 
ability to deconstruct the spatial ingredient of political tropes to illustrate the 
power relations that lie behind the ‘naturalization’ of political spaces have 
produced some of the most compelling contemporary political geography.  In 
addition, critical geopolitics has spawned a large number of books, book 
chapters, and journal articles.  In this book, analyses of war rely less on 
deconstruction and more on the explanation of political processes of war and 
their spatial expression.  In other words, this book will provide constructions 
of theoretically derived geographies that explain war to complement critical 
geopolitics that deconstruct discourses (Flint 2005, 5). 
 
This is a salient comment about and aimed at critical geopolitics.  Although Flint affirms 
the positive aspects of critical geopolitics, he also signals its possible overuse and thus its 
bent towards becoming an all-encompassing meta-narrative for thinking about the 
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political geography of world politics.  With this compilation, Flint steps back towards a 
more “traditional” yet nonetheless significant type of geopolitics.  The examples of 
O’Loughlin (2005) and Dahlman (2005), both of whom have contributed to critical 
geopolitics, in this text show that there is more than one way to view, research, and write 
about geopolitics.  Still, this collection of works focuses on many of the classic, yet 
broad, concepts of political geography and geopolitics such as territory, borders, 
political/social movements, and diplomacy.  It is missing, however, any kind of 
humanistic contribution illustrating the effects of war and peace on individuals, and how 
those individuals negotiate their experience locally, regionally, nationally, or globally.  
While it is doubtful that Flint’s collection signals a departure from the dominance of 
critical geopolitics and postmodern discourses in general in political geography, it is a 
useful example of the continuance of alternative voices and paradigms within the 
subfield.  Furthermore, Flint’s compilation and the other texts mentioned in this section 
strive to illustrate the interconnections between geopolitics and political geography, 
showing their relationships and correlations, yet not representing them as one in the same 
or as two completely different entities.  
2.3 CONCLUSION 
While issues of migration and mobility are receiving more attention from 
geographers working within the subfields of political geography and geopolitics, it should 
still have a much more prominent role given the topic’s influence and effect upon 
political affairs at all scales.  Studying the political aspects of migration and refugees 
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should be an interdisciplinary enterprise in which geography plays a major role.  
Questions about refugee movements should be of specific concern to political 
geographers as the number of refugees around the world rises along with increasing 
political conflicts and sectarian violence.   
One of the major ways geographers have contributed to the geopolitics of refugee 
studies is through the debate within the discipline on the argument over the blurring lines 
between economic and political refugees.  As Gober and Tyner point out, “Research 
reveals the ambiguity of separating refugees, strictly defined as those people living 
outside the country of their nationality and unwilling to return because of a ‘well-founded 
fear of persecution,’ from economic migrants.  Refugees are in fact motivated by a set of 
forces similar to those that influence other migrants…” (2003: 189).  Arguing along these 
same lines, Jones (1989) shows how Salvadoran refugees cited economic issues over 
political violence as their main reasons for migrating to the US.  Bascom (1993; 1998) 
concentrates on how the refugee movement and resettlement of Eritreans was linked 
largely to agricultural processes in that region, not necessarily to political violence.   
While these examples are useful for understanding the larger debate about the 
official and unofficial meanings of a refugee, there should be more contributions from 
geographers along two separate but interconnected angles: 1) the refugee process as a 
political/institutional/exclusive/selective one where refugees are controlled and often 
marginalized in the humanitarian process of resettlement and integration in host 
societies and; 2) an increased humanistic and ethnographic approach studying these 
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processes as a human experience which the refugees negotiate over time and space.  The 
latter approach signals a call for a more ethnographic qualitative approach to 
geographical refugee research focusing on the stories and experiences of individual 
refugees and migrants.  This approach has been discussed by others inside and outside of 
geography (McHugh 2000; V. A. Lawson 2000; Ghorashi 2008).  
 As it is evident from this chapter, contributions from political geography focusing 
on issues of migration and mobility are fairly “new”.  And while contributions on refugee 
issues in particular can be found over the last two decades, they are often restricted to 
very specific regions or refugee situations, such as those which took place in the Horn of 
Africa.  In this regard there have not been numerous critiques leveled against political 
geographical works dealing with migration and refugee processes.  As one can see from 
Spencer (2003) and Hollifield (2008), discussions about the role and relationship between 
the State and processes of migration are growing and becoming more relevant as the 
world becomes “smaller”.  There have, however, been a number critiques within the sub-
field of population geography which call for more theoretical and political works on 
migration processes (P. White and Jackson 1995; E. Graham and Boyle 2001).  
Answering this call are scholars doing work in the burgeoning field of feminist 
geopolitics (Dowler and Sharp 2001; Hyndman 2001; Staeheli, Kofman, and Peake 2004; 
Grewal 2005).  These works, especially in the case of Hyndman and Grewal, discuss 
issues of mobility and migration from a feminist perspective, stressing the very gendered 
nature of certain migration processes and policies. 
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With a few exceptions of works that attempt to bridge the gap between broader 
theoretical processes and qualitative humanistic ethnographic research such as Lawson 
(1999), most geographers and other social scientists have yet to find a balance between 
these two approaches.  So while geopolitical and political economic discussions about 
migration are growing in response to earlier trends in migration studies and population 
geography, there are still a number of directions in which migration studies, especially 
refugee studies, can continue to grow within the discipline.  Hopefully, more political 
geographers will enter into the discussions about migration and refugee issues, 
highlighting the importance of political trends, discourses, movements, policies, and 







Chapter 3: Context of Iraqi Population Characteristics and Major 
Events of the Current Iraqi Refugee Crisis 
 
 The purpose of this section is to provide context for the social and demographic 
makeup of Iraq and to the events which brought Iraqi refugees to the United States 
beginning in 2006.  One cannot understand the full extent of the Iraqi refugee crisis or 
their resettlement in the United States without understanding some of the social, cultural, 
and political characteristics of the country.  Giving a detailed account, however, of the 
current Iraqi refugee crisis is beyond the scope of this work and has been well-
documented by others (see Sassoon 2009; Amos 2010).  This section will however give a 
synopsis of some of the main events which caused the large-scale movement of Iraqis 
within Iraq and to neighboring countries throughout the Middle East as well as some of 
the aspects and debates surrounding the so-called ethno-sectarian divisions in Iraq which 
are often cited as one of the main reasons for large-scale displacement in Iraq. 
 
3.1 POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS, DISPLACEMENT, AND ETHNO-SECTARIAN VIOLENCE IN 
IRAQ 
The American-led 2003 invasion of Iraq is not the first instance causing large-
scale refugee migration within the country.  Due to multiple international conflicts since 
1980 (the Iran-Iraq War from 1980-88, the first American-led Gulf War in 1991, and the 
recently ended American-led military endeavor starting in 2003) along with other internal 
skirmishes over the years, large segments of the Iraqi population have either fled from 
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their homes as refugees crossing international borders or have become internally 
displaced peoples (IDP’s) within Iraq.   
 One important instance of refugee movement in Iraq prior to 2005 is the Kurdish 
refugee crisis beginning in 1991.  After the Iraqi army had been expelled from Kuwait by 
coalition forces in Operation Desert Storm, a variety of groups used this moment of 
weakness of Saddam Hussein’s power to attempt to overturn the government.  The first 
uprisings to be crushed by Saddam’s forces however, were in the south of the country and 
were primarily Shiite acts of revolt.  After defeating the Shiite uprisings in the south, 
Saddam moved his forces to the north where Kurdish revolts were taking place.  The 
brutal tactics of Saddam’s Republican Guards forced many Kurds out of the cities and 
into the mountains along the Iran and Turkey border.  Because of previous large-scale 
attacks on Kurdish populations, it was not just Kurdish fighters to flee the cities, but also 
many civilians who feared for their lives.  Despite the actions of the United Nations in 
passing UN Resolution 688 which approved humanitarian assistance to the Kurds who 
had fled and the imposition of Iraqi no-fly zones north of the 36th parallel (fearing 
another attack on Kurdish civilian populations), nearly 2 million Kurds were displaced in 
a matter of days and an estimated one million had reached the Turkish border alone 
(Stansfield 2007, 134; Tripp 2007, 248).  Even after the central government was satisfied 
that the Kurdish uprisings in the north were over, Saddam imposed a domestic economic 
embargo on the Kurdish population denying them economic interaction with Arab Iraq 
(Stansfield 2007, 135). 
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 This is only a single example not only of refugee movement inside and outside of 
Iraq but also of government engineered ethno-sectarian tensions within Iraq, which is 
now cited as one of the main causes of refugee migration there in the current Iraqi 
refugee crisis.  There is an ongoing debate, however, as to whether current ethno-
sectarian tensions in Iraq are real or perceived or simply play a marginal role in the 
ongoing violence within the country.  Understanding the demographic makeup of Iraq 
and some of the history of its population is key to understanding what is happening in 
that country today and why so many Iraqis have thus been resettled in the United States.    
Estimates of Iraq’s overall population today range from 28.9  to 32  million 
people although there has not been an official census taken in Iraq since 1997 and that 
census is contested and considered to be of little value to demographers and the Iraqi 
population at large (Anderson and Stansfield 2009).  The main reason the 1997 census is 
viewed as inadequate is largely because data was not compiled (and thus not included) 
for three of the country’s northern provinces.  Taking this into consideration, the 1987 
census was the last complete census carried out by the Iraqi government.  This census, 
however, as are all censuses conducted during the rule of the Ba’ath regime, is also 
considered to be of little use due to the government’s tampering with the data and 
demographic engineering of whole regions and cities.  With this in mind, the last census 
which is considered to be useful for demographers is the 1957 census which was 
conducted prior to the fall of the Hashemite monarchy in 1958.  Finding and making 
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sense of population statistics for the various ethnic and religious groups in Iraq, however, 
is challenging and always controversial.   
In Iraq ethnic groups are primarily clustered into four main groupings: Arabs, 
Kurds, Turkmen, and Chaldo-Assyrians.  Even these groupings do not encompass the 
extent of the various minority groups within Iraq which include, albeit on a very small 
scale: Syriacs, Armenians, Sabaen-Mandeans, Yazidis, and Bahais.  While population 
statistics are not presently available for the different ethnic and sectarian groupings in 
Iraq, many analysts do estimate on the numbers.  Looking at the various ethnicities within 
Iraq, the US government estimates that Arabs make up approximately 75-80 per cent of 
the population while Kurds account for 15-20 per cent5.  Turkmen, Chaldo-Assyrian, and 
other minority groups make up an estimated 5 per cent of the overall population.  
According to Stansfield, although Turkmen scholars put the Turkmen population at 10-15 
per cent of the total, it is more likely that the actual Turkmen population is under 5 per 
cent (2007, 71).  In terms of religious groups within Iraq, it is estimated that Muslims 
compose about 97 per cent of the population with approximately 60-65 per cent of those 
Muslims being Shiite and 32-37 per cent being comprised of Sunnis.  The Christian 
community in Iraq is rather small and becoming smaller due to the ongoing violence.  It 
is estimated that the number of Christians in Iraq number no more than one million 
although the number now may be far lower due to large scale refugee outmigration of 
Christian populations.  Within the Christian community, the two main groups are the 
                                                             
5 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html 
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Chaldeans and the Assyrians with as much as 70 per cent of Iraq’s Christians belonging 
to the Chaldean Catholic Church (Stansfield 2007, 73). 
 Ethno-sectarian is a word often used when describing Iraq.  In this work, it is used 
broadly and inclusively as the intricate associations and linkages between and among 
groups in Iraq makes it misleading to use only one term or the other.  The term multi- 
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Figure 3.1 Map of Iraqi ethnic groups 
 
Source: Columbia Univ. Gulf/2000 project, http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/maps.shtml 
ethnic, for example, disregards the existence of different religions such as Islam and 
Christianity.  The term multi-ethnic also ignores different sects within religions such as 
the differences between Sunni and Shiite Muslims or between Chaldean and Assyrian 
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Christians.  This becomes a bit more complicated when one considers that those members 
within a specific ethnicity may also belong to different religious sects.  This is 
exemplified by the fact that 80 percent of Kurds are Sunni while approximately 15 
percent are Shiite (Stansfield 2007, 217).  The challenges of finding a viable and lasting 
solution for the future of Iraq are more easily understood when considering the diversity 
and complexity of the Iraqi population.  Lastly, it should be noted that when discussing 
various ethnic groups and/or religious sects in this chapter, they are in no way meant to 
be conveyed as homogenous, stable groups with a uniform set of characteristics.  In fact, 
the different ethnic and religious groups in Iraq are fluid, dynamic, often changing and 
differing politically, socially, and culturally even within a single group. 
 Understanding the ethno-sectarian divisions in Iraq is important for understanding 
the broader Iraqi refugee crisis as it is these divisions that are often blamed for the 
widespread refugee outmigration from Iraq as well as the internal displacement within the 
country.  Large-scale refugee movement was expected and warned against during the 
lead up to the war in 2003.  Either because of fears of biological or chemical weapons use 
by Saddam Hussein’s regime, violence between US and Iraqi forces, or possible sectarian 
strife, millions of dollars of aid and resources were sent to Iraqi border regions and 
international aid organizations increased their efforts to prepare for an eventual “flood” of 
refugees across the border.  This flood never materialized and contrary to the worries of 
many analysts and organizations, many thousands of Iraqis began to actually return to 
Iraq who had been away for years for fear of reprisals from Saddam’s Ba’ath regime 
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(Sassoon 2009, 11).  Refugee movement out of Iraq and internally did not begin in 
earnest until the bombing of the Al-Askari mosque in February of 2006.  One of the 
holiest sites for Shia’ Muslims in the world, the mosque sits in Samarra, less than 100 
miles from Baghdad.  The bombing of the Al-Askari mosque was a watershed moment in 
the increasing violence between the Sunni and Shia’ sects in Iraq and for the large-scale 
outflow of refugees from Iraq into neighboring countries such as Syria and Jordan.  A 
report from the International Organization for Migration (IOM) underscored the 
importance of this event, stating: “The Samarra bombing represents one of the most 
significant catalysts for migration in recent Iraqi history.  The magnitude and nature of 
the displacement that followed still pose serious humanitarian and developmental 
challenges for the country today” (IOM 2011).   
Even before the bombing of the Al-Askari mosque, reports of increasing sectarian 
divisions were prevalent in the media (see for example Tavernise 2005).  In the wake of 
the Al-Askari bombings, however, sectarian tensions intensified and became a focal point 
not only for the media but also for policy makers, human rights groups, and academic 
scholars.  It is debated, however, as to whether the current tensions between sects and 
ethnicities in Iraq is real or perceived, ingrained or manufactured.  The discourse over the 
political future of Iraq revolves primarily around this dual issue of perceived ethnic and 
sectarian divisions within the country.  Early on during the American-led invasion of 
Iraq, one popular strategy for Iraq’s future which was advocated by analysts and high 
level government officials in the U.S. was to make Iraq a federal democracy along ethnic 
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lines, dividing the country into three states mirroring the vilayets (provinces) of the 
Ottoman period: a predominantly Kurdish state in the north, a central Sunni-dominated 
state, and a Shi’ite state in the south of the country (Biden Jr. 2006; Joseph and O’Hanlon 
2007).  This viewpoint was strongly debated as it was based on the notion that those three 
regions of Iraq are comprised of stable, mostly homogenous groups (Cole 2004; Williams 
and Simpson 2008; Cordesman 2006).  Not only does the idea disregard the existence of 
other minority groups within the country but it also discounts the notion that these 
regions and the populations residing within them are quite heterogeneous.  Furthermore, 
the approach disregards other possible demographic ramifications such as the eventual 
need for major population transfers.  To be sure, demographic considerations play a 
major role in the future of Iraqi unity and attention to history shows how government 
sponsored demographic engineering, large-scale migratory patterns, or foreign military 
intervention can not only change the demographic composition of a city or region but 
also fuel ethno-sectarian divisions. 
It needs to be stated here that over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries during Ottoman rule Iraq became a majority Shi’a country ruled by an Ottoman 
Sunni minority (Cole 2003).  Throughout the remainder of Iraq’s history, until the fall of 
Saddam’s regime, this power structure remained firmly in place.  This imbalance of 
power has been a historical source for tensions between Muslim sects in the country.  
This point can be exemplified by looking at the structure of Iraq’s military throughout the 
middle decades of the twentieth century.  While recruits for the Iraqi army during these 
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decades were made up primarily of Arab Shiites, the officer corps consisted almost 
wholly of Arab Sunnis.  The military thus became the main mode of political and social 
progression for Sunni Arabs at this time (Stansfield 2007, 83). Moreover, the military 
played a large part in carrying out ethnic violence and forced displacement in the 
following decades. 
  Additionally, as stated above, Arab Sunni governments in Iraq have taken part in 
the demographic engineering of whole regions and cities for political purposes since the 
1930’s.  Whether to subdue recalcitrant populations, crush rising opposition movements, 
takeover fertile agricultural or oil-rich land, or to attempt to “Arabize” minority non-Arab 
populations, these practices of displacement have been ongoing even after the American-
led invasion in 2003.  One of the first instances of Arabization in the post-WWI period 
involved the northern regions of Iraq, especially the city of Kirkuk.  Outlined in detail in 
Anderson and Stansfield, the Arabization of Kirkuk underwent five successive phases all 
of which were an attempt to increase the Arab population in the city relative to the 
Kurdish population.  This would mean the government could lay claim to Kirkuk in the 
face of Kurdish assertions that the city is predominantly Kurdish and should be 
incorporated into a future independent Kurdistan (2009, 30–42).  The main cause of 
importance of Kirkuk for the Iraqi government and subsequently, for all parties laying 
claim to Kirkuk is the vast oil reserves found there.  The first phase of Arabization thus 
took place shortly after independence when Kirkuk became one of Iraq’s most important 
economic centers due to its immense oil reserves.  By 1935, Iraq had become one of the 
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world’s major exporters of oil and the monarchy, aware of ongoing Kurdish hostility due 
to a succession of Kurdish revolts, “moved to socially engineer Kirkuk in order to 
weaken the Kurdish presence there” (Anderson and Stansfield 2009, 32). 
Policies of Arabization in the 1930’s were just the beginning of a long series of 
events in the demographic engineering of Kirkuk and other regions which were 
comprised of a combination of natural resources and diverse ethnic and religious 
populations.  Anderson and Stansfield describe the intensity during the second phase of 
Arabization between 1963-1968 stating: 
Kurdish neighborhoods in Kirkuk were demolished; Kurdish villages near the 
city were destroyed; Kurds in Dibis were expelled and replaced with Arab 
tribes, in some thirty-five villages; similar numbers of villages were Arabized 
in Sargaran and Kandinawa districts; Kurds working in the oil industry were 
expelled or transferred outside the province; Arabs were brought into the 
local police force; names of schools and streets were changed from Kurdish 
to Arabic; and a large-scale militarization of the province was undertaken, 
including the establishment of security zones around oil facilities (2009, 35-
36) 
 
Although it is generally thought that the oppression and marginalization of the Kurdish 
population was carried out primarily by Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath regime, these 
examples highlight that Arabization policies had been taking place at least since Iraq’s 
independence in 1932. 
Unfortunately, displacement policies did not ease after 1968 or after Saddam 
Hussein took power in 1979.  As Cohen states, forced displacement during Saddam’s 
regime was one of “deliberate state policy” (Cohen 2008, 302).  One report goes so far as 
to claim that, “In Iraq, over the last thirty years, there has never been a time when one 
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group or another was not being expelled from their homes” (Fawcett and Tanner 2002, 
1).  One Human Rights Watch Report documents the expulsion of ethnic minorities from 
areas of northern Iraq between 1991 and 2002 (Mufti and Bouckaert 2003).  This report is 
similarly troublesome.  Estimates of those Iraqis forcibly displaced between 1991 and 
2002 due to Arabization policies range from 58,000 to 140,000.  These estimates include 
not only Kurds but also Turkmen and Assyrians who were expelled from their homes 
(Mufti and Bouckaert 2003, 4).  Changing the demographic makeup of Kirkuk and 
surrounding areas was not carried out only by the forcible expulsion of people from their 
homes but later by Decree 199 which was passed by Iraq’s Revolutionary Command 
Council which “allowed” non-Arab Iraqis over eighteen years of age to change their 
official ethnic identity by applying to register as Arabs (Mufti and Bouckaert 2003, 6).  
Many ethnic minorities who refused to officially change their ethnicity faced harassment 
by the Iraqi police until they either left on their own accord or until they were forcibly 
expelled from their homes and moved to specific locations inside of Iraq.  These attempts 
at changing the demographic and ethnic makeup of areas in Iraq since the country’s 
independence for political purposes has aided in creating longstanding controversies over 
population statistics as well as fueling sectarian divisions.   Aside from these attempts 
however, many other theories exist as to the reasons for the current ethno-sectarian 
tension and violence in post-Saddam Iraq.  
One of the dominant approaches for explaining the current violence in Iraq, 
especially among policy-makers and analysts in Washington, is to simply, “impose a 
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primordial template onto the political and societal complexities of the situation” (Dodge 
2007, 24).  Proponents of this argument insist that there are three sectarian communities 
in Iraq (Sunni, Shiite, and Kurds) which are mostly homogenous, and have been forced 
into geographical proximity with one another under a Sunni authoritarian dictatorship, 
and have been and always will be hostile towards each other due primarily to long held 
sectarian or ethnic hatred.  This argument, however influential it may be, essentializes 
Iraqi society and culture as a static and unchanging entity.  The ethno-sectarian fighting 
occurring in Iraq today is most likely not caused by long held antipathies between 
homogenous groups.  As stressed earlier, the various ethnic and sectarian groups in Iraq 
are far from homogenous.  Nor is the current violence due to any one single explanation 
such as this, but is in all probability due to a combination and merging of different events, 
processes, and developments.   
While many analysts, journalists, and observers have blamed the United States’ 
invasion of Iraq for the current ethno-sectarian violence, this event cannot be held solely 
accountable either.  Other forces, events, and processes must be and are offered in 
explaining the violence reported in Iraq on an almost daily basis.  First, a number of 
scholars and analysts point to the legacy of colonialism in Iraq as being a cause of 
tensions within the country which are still present today (Dodge 2003; R. Khalidi 2004).  
Certainly the imposition of artificial boundaries in the creation of the Iraqi state as well as 
other effects of post-World War I British colonialism had dire consequences for the 
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future of the country.  The creation of the state of Iraq by the British leads to what 
Stansfield calls, “the artificiality debate”.  Stansfield describes this debate as follows: 
The territory of Iraq, so this argument would tend to go, was brought together 
in the aftermath of World War I because of the geopolitical and economic 
needs of victorious Western powers, and most notably those of Britain.  From 
a constellation of dissociated peoples living in different geographical spaces, 
the modern state of Iraq was doomed to succumb to various manifestations of 
authoritarian rule because this was the only mechanism by which the 
fractious country could be held together (Stansfield 2007, 28-29). 
 
This argument thus presupposes that the various ethnic and religious groups in 
Iraq cannot live together without an authoritarian ruler holding them together and 
therefore, when Saddam Hussein’s regime fell in 2003, there was nothing left to keep the 
groups from competing for power.  These groups of people had been living in 
geographical proximity to one another long before British colonialism, however.  The 
difference implied in this argument is that for the first time under the British, the 
population was brought together under the rule of a foreign-imposed central government 
located in Baghdad, the Hashemite monarchy.  Moreover, the Iraqi population was 
expected to adhere to the new rules of governance which were to serve British economic 
interests and, moreover, which shattered previous notions of government, society, and 
identity among the population at large.  As Tripp states, “It (the new British regime of 
power) demanded new forms of identity and new strategies to exploit the opportunities 
that presented themselves” (Tripp 2007, 30).  
It wasn’t simply the rules of governance that the Iraqis were subjected to by the 
new British regime of power, however.  After the mandate was passed to piece together 
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the three Ottoman provinces of Iraq into a single country under a central government, 
there was, not surprisingly, an armed revolt by the Iraqis against British forces which 
broke out in June of 1920.  British forces crushed the revolt in what can be seen as a 
prelude to the “shock and awe” military power of the Americans over 80 years later.  
While tens of thousands of British ground troops were deployed to help squelch the 
revolt, the British military also relied heavily on airpower.  In Gregory’s discussion of the 
rebellion and the British response, he states, “Britain deployed a formidable arsenal, 
against which the tribespeople had little or no defense.  There were pulverizing bombing 
raids, heavy artillery bombardments, and gas attacks…and by the end of these counter-
insurgency operations more than 9,000 people had been killed” (2004, 148). 
This revolt and the British response to it is also cited in a letter written to The 
Times by T.E. Lawrence in August of 1920.  In this article Lawrence, the British army 
officer known as Lawrence of Arabia and famous for his work The Seven Pillars of 
Wisdom, derides the British for their handling of foreign policy in the Middle East 
concerning specifically the revolt in Iraq.  In this “Report on Mesopotamia”, Lawrence 
starts by stating, “The people of England have been led in Mesopotamia into a trap from 
which it will be hard to escape with dignity and honour.”  Strikingly, he ends the article 
with some important and familiar questions:   
We say we are in Mesopotamia to develop it for the benefit of the world.  All 
experts say that the labour supply is the ruling factor in its development.  
How far will the killing of ten thousand villagers and townspeople this 
summer hinder the production of wheat, cotton, and oil?  How long will we 
permit millions of pounds, thousands of imperial troops, and tens of 
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thousands of Arabs to be sacrificed on behalf of colonial administration 
which can benefit nobody but its administrators? (Lawrence 1920)            
 
It is not difficult to see the similarities between Lawrence’s descriptions of the British 
response to the rebellion and that of the American military later in the century and in 
2003.  Many would argue that the processes of British colonialism in Iraq have continued 
into the present through modern forms of colonialism.  It is to these arguments that we 
will turn next.  
While British colonialism in Iraq is often cited in discussions of the country’s 
ongoing violence, other authors point to continuing forms of colonialism or imperialism, 
referring primarily to the actions of the United States in Iraq before and after 2003 (Ali 
2003; Gregory 2004; R. Khalidi 2004).  These authors argue that even before the US-led 
invasion in 2003, America was playing an imperial-like role in Iraq.  The invasion in 
2003 was simply an extension of previous American actions in the country and one which 
solidified it, for these authors, as an imperial power in the Middle East.  While the US 
may have been involved in the politics and economy of Iraq before 2003, America 
certainly became even more heavily involved in political, social, and economic issues in 
the country after the invasion as it was a primary player in the formation of Iraq’s new 
government.  
The 2003 invasion and the events that occurred afterward are often viewed 
through the lenses of failed American policy and military planning with an emphasis that 
the US went into Iraq with little understanding of and unprepared for the cultural, 
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political, and societal complexities of the country. Many have criticized and blamed 
America’s planning (or lack of planning) in the lead up to the war for the current violence 
in Iraq (Cole 2003; Sidahmed 2007, 79).  Writing about the influential Sadrist movement 
not long after the initial invasion of Iraq, Middle East historian Juan Cole writes, “in 
planning the war on Iraq, the American Defense Departments and intelligence 
organizations appear to have been unaware that millions of Iraqi Shi’ites had joined a 
militant and puritanical movement dedicated to the establishment of an Iran-style Islamic 
Republic in Iraq…” (Cole 2003, 543).  Cole’s article illustrates first, that the US 
government may indeed have been unprepared for the complex sectarian dynamics which 
led to the violence which began and intensified after the invasion.  Secondly, Cole’s 
article highlights the fact that many of the movements and groups which have since taken 
part in the ethno-sectarian violence were not created in a vacuum but instead were in 
existence and organized long before the fall of Saddam.  This is not meant to evoke the 
idea, however, that these groups have been organized and waiting to inflict violence upon 
one another at the first given opportunity.  While tensions have existed in varying degrees 
between certain ethnicities and sects within Iraq (at times more than others), Cole argues 
that the ethno-sectarian violence observed in Iraq today is due more to the economic and 
political influence in Iraq by the US government.  As Cole states, “Iraq’s problems have 
for the most part derived from the extreme concentration of wealth and power in the 
hands of a succession of minority cliques-a state of affairs that the Americans may be in 
the process of fostering once again by their extreme economic liberalization policies” 
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(Cole 2004, 31).  Although Cole argues that accumulation of the country’s wealth and 
power in the hands a small minority group is a primary reason for the current problems 
Iraq faces, one cannot discount the effects of 30 years of authoritarian dictatorship. 
The strategies and effects of Saddam Hussein’s regime upon the Iraqi population 
are well-documented in Makiya’s landmark work, Republic of Fear (1998).  This work 
illustrates the way Hussein used fear and violence as a primary tactic in securing control 
over the population.  Further, many of Hussein’s policies have directly affected the 
existence of ethno-sectarian violence seen in Iraq today.  According to Sidahmed, the 
effects of Saddam’s regime on the current situation are two-fold.  First, Saddam’s 
strategy of suppressing all organizations and movements that were not explicitly tied to 
the Iraqi Baath Party meant that there were few, if any, alternative groups to play a role in 
post-Saddam Iraqi politics.  As Sidahmed states, “Years of systematic oppression and 
prohibition of independent political or organizational activity resulted in the gradual 
destruction of national and secular platforms, whether political parties, trades unions, or 
other civil society organizations” (2007, 74).  Many of the religious groups and 
organizations were able to continue to exist, albeit under circumstances of high levels of 
oppression and discrimination, and became some of the only alternatives for political 
mobilization during Saddam’s rule.  Along with the continued existence of religious 
organizations, the ideological approach of Saddam’s regime became overtly more 
religious after the failed invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the onset of the devastating UN 
sanctions which lasted for more than a decade.  With the subsequent drop in Saddam’s 
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popularity as a result of these events, the regime began to employ religion, Islam, as a 
way to regain legitimacy and popularity.  Throughout the 1990’s and until the 2003 
invasion of Iraq, there was a growing tendency among the Iraqi population towards Islam 
due to the hardships of the time.  Religion thus started to play a greater role not only 
within the political ideology of the regime, but in the lives of the population at large 
(Sidahmed 2007, 75–76). 
Alongside the importance of the 30 years of authoritarian rule in Iraq is the issue 
of the country’s vast reserves of natural resources.  The interest of imperial powers such 
as Britain and the United States in Iraq has since the First World War revolved partially 
around the vast amount of oil the country possesses.  A number of authors have drawn 
attention to the role of oil in influencing the US to invade Iraq in 2003 (R. Khalidi 2004; 
Jhaveri 2004).  It is important to point out, however, that Iraq’s oil wealth also played a 
major role internally in shifting the political culture within Iraq in the 1970’s.  The 
exponential growth in oil revenues in the 1970’s allowed Saddam’s regime to rely much 
less on tax revenue and also to employ much of the population with government jobs.  
This created a greater dependency of the population upon the central government for their 
health, safety, and welfare (Stansfield 2007, 95–96).  Tripp identifies the importance of 
the political economy of oil in Iraq as well, illustrating its effect and influence on the 
relationships between those in control of state revenues and various sectors of the 
population (Tripp 2007, 6). 
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Those relationships are playing out currently along ethnic and sectarian lines as 
specific regions and/or provinces in Iraq which are either majority Kurdish, Shiite, or 
Sunni are calling for control over the natural resources present in their specific areas. One 
example of this, reported in the New York Times, is currently taking place in Anbar 
province, traditionally a majority Sunni province, where local Sunni politicians are 
challenging the central government’s control and expropriation of a natural gas field in 
the province.  As the Times reporters write, “The conflict — which pits a Sunni province 
against a mostly Shiite administration — adds a new battle line in one of the country’s 
most divisive and volatile issues: who controls the vast untapped oil and gas reserves that 
are necessary to restart Iraq’s crippled economy” (Leland and Ali 2010). Similar conflicts 
have been playing out in the Kurdish dominated north and the Shiite south and is now a 
major issue confronting the central government.      
While oil wealth may have played a part in creating a dependence of the general 
population upon Saddam’s regime in the 1970’s, the UN sanctions on the country played 
a much different role.  The UN sanctions which were imposed on Iraq from 1990-2003 
created a reliance among sectors of the population upon their affiliated religious and/or 
ethnic communities and invariably played a part in the strengthening of ethno-sectarian 
identities and thus in the current ethno-sectarian violence observed in the country.  The 
sanctions of Iraq had dire consequences on much of the Iraqi population and by 1995, it 
was estimated that approximately 20 per cent of the population was living in conditions 
of extreme poverty (Stansfield 2007, 140). Certainly, the sanctions were influential in the 
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deteriorating levels of nutrition among the population and more generally among their 
welfare and well-being.  Due to the dismal conditions during the era of the sanctions, the 
population was forced to rely more on groups and organizations affiliated with religion or 
ethnicity rather than the central government, to which they were accustomed (Sidahmed 
2007, 76).  This point may have facilitated not only the allegiances among sectors of the 
populations and specific organizations, but may have also aided in increasing the power 
of those groups. 
A final explanation as to why intense ethno-sectarian violence is occurring at this 
specific moment has to do with theories relating to state collapse.  Even before the US-
led invasion in 2003, the Iraqi state was on the verge of collapse due to two devastating 
wars and debilitating international sanctions which led to rampant crime throughout the 
country.  After the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, the US-led coalition was unable to 
gain control of the country or to instill a legitimate or accepted central government.  
According to Dodge, this lack of reliable administrative state institutions can have dire 
consequences on a population.  In the aftermath of state collapse, “Politics becomes both 
international and highly local…public goods, services, economic subsistence, and 
ultimately physical survival are to be found through ad hoc and informal channels” 
(Dodge 2007, 26).  These channels, in the aftermath of state collapse in Iraq, have led to 
membership and affiliation among broad sectors of the population with “industrial 
strength” criminal gangs, independent militias, and organizations of the insurgency 
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whose main purpose was to fight the US-led occupation and the Iraqi government (Dodge 
2007, 31-32). 
These combined various historical events and processes: the legacy of 
colonialism, decades of minority Sunni control over the country, three wars, 30 years of 
authoritarian dictatorship, extreme state violence against large sectors of the population 
as a form of control and coercion, debilitating UN sanctions, rising Islamist tendencies, 
infighting over natural resources, foreign military intervention, and a collapsed state 
which has yet to be fully reestablished, have all played an indelible role in structuring and 
restructuring collective societal identities in Iraq.  When these characteristics are linked 
with specific and significant demographic trends such as an increasingly large youth 
population, increasing urbanization and urban poverty, extremely high mortality rates due 
to violence, and large-scale refugee outmigration after 2005, the future of Iraq appears 
bleak and one begins to get a sense of why ethno-sectarian violence continues in Iraq 
today and finally, why there has been little to no return migration among Iraqi refugees 
since 2005.    
 
3.2 THE BEGINNINGS OF A REFUGEE CRISIS IN IRAQ 
3.2.1 Internal Displacement in Iraq after the 2003 invasion 
 
After the al-Askari bombing in 2006 and the rise in sectarian violence, the war in 
Iraq saw its first major flows of refugees, both within the country and across borders.  
 82 
Major internal displacement was a precursor to large numbers of refugees crossing 
borders to neighboring countries not long afterward.  Neither internal displacement nor 
refugee outflows were a new phenomenon for Iraq however.  Even before the 2003 
invasion, Iraq had one of the largest populations of internally displaced peoples (IDP’s) 
and refugee populations in the world (Fawcett and Tanner 2002; Cohen 2008).  
According to the United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants’ (USCRI) World 
Refugee Survey-Iraq in 2002 it was estimated that there were approximately one million 
internally displaced people in Iraq and an additional one to two million Iraqis living 
outside of the country due to a fear of persecution.  Out of this one to two million 
however, only about 400,000 were formally recognized as refugees or asylum seekers 
(USCRI 2003).  Reasons for the high number of internally displaced even before 2003 
was, as explained above, largely due to the Arabization policies of the state.  Fawcett and 
Tanner, however, take this reasoning a bit further stating that internal displacement goes 
to “the heart of the struggle for power in Iraq, to the fundamental issues of Iraqi politics: 
water, land, oil, minority and majority rights, citizenship and national allegiance” 
(Fawcett and Tanner 2002, 42). 
The struggle for power in Iraq presently mirrors many of these same issues and 
internal displacement remains a serious issue, even more serious after 2006.  Sassoon 
categorizes three main phases of internal displacement after the 2003 invasion: from May 
2003 to February 2006 when the al-Askari mosque was bombed; February 2006 to the 
summer of 2007; and lastly, from the “surge” of American troops which led to a decrease 
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in violence until 2009 (the time of writing of his book) (Sassoon 2009, 10).  
Displacement during the initial phase was caused simultaneously by US-led campaigns 
against Iraqi insurgents (such as the siege of Falluja in November 2004), early tensions 
between ethno-sectarian groups, and returning Iraqi refugees (who had left Iraq during 
Saddam’s era) who found their homes either destroyed, taken over by other families, or 
who simply found the situation in Iraq to be too unstable to stay in their original home 
(Sassoon 2009, 10-11). 
Early ethno-sectarian tensions were taking place between sects and even within 
them.  After the fall of the Ba’ath regime, power vacuums arose to try to win over 
followers among the Iraqi population.  As Cole states, “When the Ba'ath fell on April 9, 
2003, Shi'ite militias seemed suddenly to emerge and take control of many urban areas in 
the south of the country, as well as in the desperately poor slums of East Baghdad” (2003, 
544).  Winning the power struggle among those Shi’ite militias that were emerging after 
the fall of Saddam was the Sadr movement.  A puritanical and xenophobic group known 
for its popularity among the youth and poor Shi’ites in Iraq, the Sadr movement and 
militias played a major role in not only increasing anti-American rhetoric and distrust, but 
also in the Sunni-Shi’a violence in the country.  By 2005, sectarian violence was growing 
worse, culminating in the bombing of the al-Askari mosque by Sunni militants.  From 
this event the second phase of internal displacement (according to Sassoon) begins as 
sectarian violence becomes the main cause of forced movement within the country.  This 
phase is markedly different from the first not only in the increased level of violence and 
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sheer numbers of those fleeing their homes, but primarily by the notion that the 
displacement at this time was no longer temporary (as it often was in the earlier years of 
the war with many returning to their homes after fighting had subsided).  The scale of the 
violence and mistrust between sects was so polarizing that residents began selling their 
homes or fleeing with the realization that they may never be able to return (Sassoon 2009, 
12).  The scale of sectarian violence in this “second phase” and its effects on internal 
displacement at the time is highlighted by al-Khalidi and Tanner’s report, “Sectarian 
Violence: Radical Groups Drive Internal Displacement in Iraq” (2006).  The authors of 
the report claim that there are five main categories of people who were displaced due to 
sectarian violence at this time (2006): 1)Sunnis being expelled from Shi’a areas; 2)Shi’a 
from Sunni areas; 3)Arabs (Sunni and Shi’a being expelled from Kurdish areas; 
4)minority groups from Sunni and Shi’a areas and; 5)Sunni Arabs from conflict areas (A. 
Al-Khalidi and Tanner 2006, 21–25). 
After 2007, sectarian (and overall) violence subsided in Iraq due largely to 
increased US ground troops, alliances between the US and some Sunni tribes, and to a six 
month break in military actions by the Sadr militias (Sassoon 2009, 13).  It is at this point 
that what Sassoon characterizes as the third phase of internal displacement begins.  It 
ends, however in 2009, when his book was published.  Since 2009, internal displacement 
in Iraq has not improved and remains a contentious and challenging issue.  One report, 
published in October 2011 by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (established 
in 1998 by the Norwegian Refugee Council) has a heading which reads, “Response still 
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centered on return despite increasing IDP demands for local integration” (IDMC 2011).  
This point highlights that the issue of permanent internal displacement remains a realistic 
one within the country and the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MoDM) 
would do well to put as much effort in integrating the displaced into their new towns and 
cities rather than just focus on trying to aid the displaced to returning to places in which 
they either do not feel safe or whose home has been taken over by others in their absence. 
Numbers of internally displaced at present (2012) are high, although (as are all 
population statistics in Iraq) highly contested as well.  Statistics for displaced populations 
within Iraq are provided by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the 
UNHCR, the Iraqi MoDM, and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).  Each group 
has different methods and guidelines for reporting on the numbers but those from the 
UNHCR and IOM (while quite disparate) are generally considered to be the most 
reliable.  It is estimated that the total number of IDP’s in Iraq is between 2,040,000 and 
2,750,000.  IOM reports that out of the 2,750,000, 1,660,000 have been internally 
displaced since 2006 (IOM 2011).   
 
3.2.2 Movement across international borders after 2003 
While internal displacement remains a serious problem inside of Iraq, many Iraqis 
began to cross international borders in 2005-2006 as well, giving them access (in theory, 
at least) to a legal and internationally recognized refugee status.  Many Iraqis crossing 
into other Arab countries in the Middle East did not seek refugee status from United 
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Nations offices for various reasons which will be explored below.  Additionally, 
however, Iraqis leaving the country found themselves in a challenging and somewhat 
unique refugee situation. 
In the lead up to the 2003 American-led invasion of Iraq, the humanitarian regime 
prepared for a massive outflow of refugees from Iraq into neighboring countries.  
Numerous “experts” had predicted the invasion of Baghdad could create up to or more 
than a million refugees coming out of Iraq.  The UNHCR and a myriad of non-
governmental organizations (NGO’s) made preparations to receive tens of thousands of 
Iraqis at camps along the borders of Jordan, Syria, and Iran. After the initial invasion, 
however, there was little to no refugee outmigration from Iraq. The expected “wave of 
humanity” was more like a trickle of a few hundred Palestinian-Iraqis, Iraqis from Tikrit, 
the hometown of Saddam Hussein, and other third country nationals fleeing the 
bombings.  Why had there been such a major miscalculation on the part of the 
humanitarian organizations?  As Chatty explains, for most Iraqis, the invasion by the 
American-led coalition was not viewed as one of liberation, but one of neo-colonialism.  
Additionally, she correctly notes, that the protracted Palestinian refugee issue is deeply 
ingrained in the minds of Iraqis and all those throughout the Arab world: that if you leave 
your home, when you return, you may not be able to get it back (Chatty 2003). 
In 2005 and 2006, after the initial invasion was long over, as explained above, 
sectarian violence increased drastically throughout Iraq.  This violence is what led to the 
massive outflow of Iraqi refugees that had been expected in 2003.  The main receiving 
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locations of these refugees were Syria, especially Damascus and its surroundings suburbs 
and villages, Jordan, namely the cities of Amman and Irbid, and Lebanon.  Others fled, 
albeit in smaller numbers, to Iran, Turkey, Egypt, the Gulf States and elsewhere in the 
Middle East.  Focusing here on Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon (since that is where the vast 
majority of Iraqi refugees fled), the remainder of this section will review the numbers of 
Iraqis settling in these places, aspects of the situation in these countries for the Iraqis, and 
(lack of) return migration to Iraq.   
Once sectarian violence began in 2005 and especially after the bombing of the al-
Askari mosque in February 2006, large numbers of Iraqis began to flow out of the 
country.  The actual number of refugees in Syria, Jordan, (and to a lesser extent) Lebanon 
are highly contested.  By early 2007, the UNHCR estimated that there were over one 
million Iraqi refugees in Syria, at least 500,000 in Jordan and close to 100,000 in 
Lebanon.  Although cited by the UNHCR, these numbers were taken from host country 
estimates.  These estimates provided by the governments of Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon 
were seemingly adopted without question by the media as well as numerous aid 
organizations working on the refugee crisis (see figure 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 for examples). 
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Figure 3.1 Map of Iraqi Refugee Outmigration 2007 
 
Source: American Friends Service Committee – www.afsc.org/iraq 
  
 89 
Figure 3.2 Displaced Iraqis in the Middle East 2007 
 
Source: Migration Policy Institute 
While there was no doubt that an increasingly large number of people were steadily 
moving out of Iraq and being displaced within the country, these numbers stand in stark 
contrast to the actual numbers of Iraqis registering for refugee status at UN offices set up 
in Damascus, Amman, and elsewhere.  In 2009, for example, when the Iraqi refugee 
crisis was still in full swing, the UNHCR posted their statistics on their website of the 
total numbers of Iraqis in countries in the Middle East and then the actual number of 
Iraqis being assisted in those countries by the UNHCR.  According to this table, the total 
number of Iraqis in Syria was 1.2 million of which 236,000 had registered and were 
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being assisted by the UN.  In Jordan, the discrepancy was stark as well: total in country 
was estimated at 450,000 while the number registered was only 65,000.  Lebanon thus 
had an estimated 50,000 Iraqi refugees living in the country with only 12,000 legally 
registered as refugees (Marfleet and Chatty 2009).  
Figure 3.3 Map of Iraqi refugee movement from USA Today 2007 
 
Source: USA Today/Associated Press 
Critics used this disparity to point out that the Iraqi refugee crisis was not as much of a 
“crisis” as the UN and the media had made it out to be and that the UNHCR and other 
NGO’s on the ground working with the refugees (inside or outside of Iraq) were using it 
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as a bid to get more funds from potential donors.  But why was there such a disparity in 
the first place?  Was the Iraq refugee situation not as bad as it was made out to be?   
 According to Marfleet and Chatty’s report for Oxford University’s Refugee 
Studies Centre, there are a number of reasons for the disparity and the most accurate 
numbers of Iraqis in Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon at the time were likely somewhere in the 
middle.  One of the reasons it is so difficult to gauge the number of Iraqi refugees in 
countries throughout the Middle East is that there is a history of Iraqi migration to these 
countries (especially to Syria and Jordan) over the past few decades.  Whether that 
migration be previous refugee migration or Iraqis migrating to cities like Amman and 
Damascus for work, business, or education, it makes it difficult to determine which Iraqis 
are there as refugees (Chatelard 2009).  As demonstrated in the first chapter, human 
movements are complex and difficult to understand and assess.  Many of the Iraqis living 
and/or working in Damascus before 2003 were able to move easily back and forth from 
one country to another.  Once the violence increased in Iraq in 2005-2006, do those Iraqis 
who were already living in Syria become refugees because they don’t feel it is safe to 
return to Iraq?  Secondly, neither Syria, Jordan, nor Lebanon are signatories to the 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees or the 1967 Protocol.  Thus these countries 
do not have a formalized and legal process for registering or counting refugees within 
their borders.  Iraqis in these countries then, are not officially recognized as refugees but 
rather as “visitors” or “guests”.  Additionally, the vast majority of Iraqis fleeing the 
violence in their country did not find refuge in the makeshift UNHCR camps in the 
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border regions.  Instead, they settled within the vast urban complexes of cities such as 
Damascus, Amman, and Beirut.  Urban refugees is not a new phenomenon for refugee 
aid organizations but it does make it much harder to locate, track, address the needs of, 
and administer aid to those who have found refuge in cities with the use of their own 
resources.  Finally, as Marfleet and Chatty point out, the way that Iraqi “visitors” are 
counted by the governmental authorities in countries such as Syria need to be treated with 
caution.  They state: 
Statistics for ‘Iraqi residents’ of these states include people who, during 
recent phases of mass displacement, have undertaken repeated cross-border 
journeys and who are recorded by immigration services as unique individuals 
on the occasion of each entry; in addition, at some borders all Iraqis are 
counted on entry but only family units are counted on exit (Marfleet and 
Chatty 2009, 13). 
 
Looking at the way these figures were calculated shows the caution that should be taken 
when using them as official estimates.   
 While “official” government estimates and the way they were calculated illustrate 
how there may be far less Iraqis in these countries than originally thought, there are also 
reasons to believe that there are far more Iraqis in these countries than is evident simply 
by looking at the number of Iraqis registered and receiving assistance from the UNHCR 
in those same countries.  In 2009, there were (as noted above) 236,000 Iraqis registered 
and receiving assistance from the UNHCR in Syria.  While the government estimate may 
have been an extreme overestimate at 1.2 million at the time, it is widely believed that 
there are more than 236,000 in the country. One of the reasons Iraqis may not want to 
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apply for refugee status from a UN office in Syria, Jordan, or Lebanon is because these 
countries, as noted earlier, are not signatories to the 1951/1967 Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees and thus those Iraqis seeking asylum in those countries are not 
afforded the rights that refugees/asylees might have elsewhere.  Syria, for example, is not 
required to house, educate, or give any type of assistance to Iraqi “visitors” in its country.  
Additionally, there are widespread reports that Iraqi refugees residing in those countries 
have been poorly mistreated by the authorities and other “native” residents there 
(Ridderbos 2007; ICG 2008).  In fear then of mistreatment, detainment, or of refoulement 
(forced deportation back to Iraq), many Iraqis prefer to keep their identity as Iraqis and/or 
refugees hidden.   
 Another reason to assume that there are more Iraqis in countries bordering Iraq 
than just the number of those registered by the UNHCR is due to the sectarian nature of 
the violence in Iraq.  The increasing lack of trust between and among Iraqis and between 
different religious and ethnic groups has spread to some degree to surrounding countries 
in the Middle East, especially Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon which already have their own 
internal ethno-sectarian issues.  So in hopes of not being targeted by specific Islamist or 
governmental groups, many Iraqis have chosen to remain anonymous.   
 Finally, many refugees are unaware or have misconceptions about the role of the 
UNHCR and what it means to be registered with such a political body.  The existence of 
perceptions that once registered you will be forced to relocate in another country is a 
common misconception relating to registering with the UNHCR (Marfleet and Chatty 
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2009, 13).  It also believed by some that if they register with the UNHCR in a city such 
as Damascus, then government authorities will have knowledge of them and thus access 
to them if they wish to harass, detain, or deport them.  There are numerous reasons then 
that an Iraqi refugee may not wish to formally register as a refugee in many countries in 
the Middle East. 
 Looking at the controversy over the numbers of Iraqi refugees in Syria, Jordan, 
and Lebanon from 2006-2010 provides a window into the dire situation for refugees in 
these countries, i.e. not formally recognized by governmental authorities as refugees; lack 
of rights if harassed or detained; fear not only of authorities in their respective country of 
refuge but sometimes even of their own countrymen because of the severe ethno-
sectarian animosity.  Unfortunately, these are not the only difficulties of seeking refuge in 
these countries.  A number of other hardships exist as well. 
 Numerous reports by humanitarian aid and relief organizations started being 
published in 2007 documenting the difficulties and challenges of Iraqis living in other 
Arab countries as refugees or “visitors”.  The main countries under review were Syria, 
Jordan, Lebanon, and Egypt, the main receiving centers of Iraqi refugees.  Reports 
detailing the situation for refugees in these countries give a fairly bleak view of many 
aspects of life for Iraqi families, children, women, and individuals.  Although many 
aspects of life are grueling for Iraqis in these countries and there are many necessary 
changes and improvements that need to be made in places such as Syria to enhance the 
quality of life for refugees, these countries should nonetheless be commended to a degree 
 95 
for allowing to Iraqis to find refuge within their borders, even if their assistance and even 
acknowledgment of the refugees is minimal.   
One of the main issues facing Iraqis in these countries is that of healthcare.  
Citizens and non-citizens have free access to healthcare in Syria so ostensibly even Iraqis 
should be able to receive medical treatment there.  However, because of the high number 
of Iraqis who need medical attention and the severity of the medical issues of so many of 
the Iraqis, that care is often neglected or unavailable (ICG 2008; Amnesty 2008).  In 
Jordan, the healthcare situation is even worse.  Jordan does not have free access to 
healthcare for non-citizens. It does claim to offer free services to all for emergency 
medical attention but, as in Syria, this leaves many Iraqis needing better quality medical 
attention and better access to medical services. Those suffering from chronic illnesses 
such as diabetes, cancer, etc. have an especially difficult time receiving the necessary 
attention (Amnesty 2008). 
 Another major issue in all countries of refuge for Iraqis is education for refugee 
children.  While Syria and Jordan allow Iraqis to enroll in the public school system, there 
are many barriers for Iraqi children to receive quality education in these countries.  
Surveys done in Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon all showed low school enrollment for Iraqi 
children and increasingly high dropout rates (Ipsos 2007).  Some of the reasons for this 
include: families needing children to work to help support the family financially; 
extremely overcrowded schools exacerbated by the high number of Iraqis seeking 
education; bullying; inability to afford simple materials and resources for education such 
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as uniforms, books, etc.; and difficulty for children to acclimate to new educational 
curriculum (Amnesty 2008).    
 Iraqi refugees are not legally allowed to gain employment in any of the major 
receiving countries.  This is a major problem and it has forced many Iraqis into informal 
sector positions where they are often exploited and treated poorly.  Because so many 
Iraqi males have either been killed in Iraq or have stayed behind in Iraq for work, many 
women are left vulnerable in these countries.  This rule has also had the disastrous 
consequences of forcing many Iraqi women into prostitution (Amos 2010).  Because 
Iraqis are unable to legally work in these countries, they rely almost wholly on their 
savings and on remittances from family members located elsewhere.  Because so many 
Iraqis have sought refuge in in urban centers in Arab countries, however, rent prices even 
for dilapidated structures have skyrocketed and Iraqis’ savings are being quickly 
depleted.  This has led to an increasingly impoverished and desperate refugee population 
which can in turn increase tensions between them and members of the host society.  The 
increasing impoverishment creates tension around resources such as food, water, and 
labor.  Those Iraqis who registered with the UNHCR were able to receive some 
assistance in the way of food stuffs, but much less so in terms of monetary assistance 
(Amnesty 2008, 11).  As the 2008 report “Rhetoric and Reality: The Iraqi Refugee 
Crisis” from the humanitarian relief organization Amnesty International states, “New 
protection concerns are emerging because of the growing level of poverty and lack of 
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hope among the refugees that the crisis will soon be over. Among these concerns are 
child labour, prostitution and increased domestic violence” (Amnesty 2008, 12). 
 Lebanon, while having many of the same issues as the other countries of refuge 
such as employment, education, healthcare, and housing, also has an additional downfall 
that has kept many Iraqis from seeking refuge there, and actually has “forced” many 
Iraqis to return to Iraq: that of detention (Ridderbos 2007).  Amnesty reported that the 
issue of detaining and imprisoning Iraqi refugees improved considerably from 2007 to 
2008 under the pressure of the UNHCR and other NGO’s like Amnesty, but it continues 
to be an issue.  In the 2008 report, Amnesty described the situation this way: 
Until February 2008, Iraqi refugees in Lebanon were not given a secure legal 
status nor recognized as refugees by the state. They were liable to arrest and 
indefinite detention in an attempt to coerce them to return to Iraq. As of 
January 2008, 600 Iraqi refugees, 323 of them registered with UNHCR, were 
being detained in harsh conditions in overcrowded prisons, living alongside 
criminals. In early 2008 it was reported that 104 Iraqis had “voluntarily” 
returned to Iraq after spending several months in detention. Faced with a 
choice of imprisonment or return to Iraq, the voluntariness of such returns 
must be questioned (Amnesty 2008, 20). 
 
While these reports all do well to point out the dire situation in host countries for Iraqi 
refugees, they also do well to not put all the blame on the governments of these countries.  
Much of the responsibility rest on the shoulders of the Iraqi government for helping to 
“take care” of its citizens abroad, but also on the international community.  Essential 
programs run by the UNHCR are not possible or sustainable without contributions from 
the international community and it is made clear in the reports that without this funding, 
many of the programs will be cut off. 
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 Another important aspect of the Iraqi refugee crisis which needs to be noted here 
is that of a specific group of Iraqis who were thrust into a much different and very 
difficult refugee situation: Palestinians in Iraq.  At the time of the invasion in 2003, there 
were between 25 and 35,000 Palestinians living in Iraq, primarily Baghdad (Enders 2008, 
194).  Many Palestinians fled to Iraq first in 1948-49 and then again in 1967.  Over the 
years, more Palestinians settled in Iraq because of the high quality of life and potential 
business opportunities there.  Furthermore, in an effort to appear to be a champion of the 
Palestinian cause, Saddam Hussein gave Palestinians living in Iraq some benefits, which 
amounted primarily to rent controlled apartments in certain areas of Baghdad.  With the 
fall of Saddam, however, many Palestinians were thrown out of their apartments by 
disgruntled landlords and they were some of the first to be targeted by Shiite militia 
groups within the country (HRW 2006; IDMC 2011, 35).   
 Many Palestinians in Iraq were killed in the early years of the war and those who 
escaped were not allowed into Syria or Jordan (as were other Iraqi refugees) due to their 
lack of documentation (such as passports).  Iraq has no path to citizenship for migrants 
such as those from Palestine; neither for the immigrant parents, nor for the children who 
were born in Iraq.  Without official documentation showing any type of nationality, 
Palestinians who were able to escape the violence in Iraq were put into makeshift UN 
refugee camps (the main ones being the al-Tanf camp and the al-Walid camp) in “no 
man’s land” along the Syrian-Iraqi border.  These camps in the middle of the desert were 
without electricity, running water, or regular supplies of food.  The severe conditions of 
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the camps were well documented on the United Nations website as that organization 
searched for host countries willing to resettle this “nation-less” refugee population.  Not 
until 2009 did the US and a few other countries agree to begin resettling Palestinian 
Iraqis from the camps along the border. 
Figure 3.4 Palestinians from Iraq after a flood in al-Tanf camp 
 
Source: UNHCR/B. Auger (http://www.unhcr.org/)  
While the al-Tanf camp was finally shut down in 2010, the al-Hol camp and the al-Walid 
camp continue to house Palestinian refugees from Iraq.  More about their numbers and 
their resettlement to third countries will be covered in the next chapter.  
 Today, Iraqi refugees still exist in countries around the Middle East.  There has, 
however, been a major shift in some of the populations, which is at the time of this 
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writing, very difficult to assess.  What started as a part of the “Arab Spring” in Syria in 
2011 has since disintegrated into a brutal and violent civil war.  With fighting and 
bombing taking place in many parts of the country, including Damascus, the situation has 
worsened to the point where tens of thousands of Iraqi refugees who were residing there 
have chosen to return to an unstable but possibly more secure situation in Iraq.  Still, 
other Iraqis have left Syria to seek refuge elsewhere, like Lebanon or Jordan.  According 
to the UNHCR, there are still an estimated 65,000 Iraqi refugees in Syria and since June 
2012, over 50,00 Iraqis have fled back to Iraq to find their houses either gone or taken 
over by another family.  Thus the number of internally displaced within Iraq continues to 
rise as well.  With the refugee situation (Iraqis and now hundreds of thousands of 
Syrians) in Jordan swelling, sectarian tensions from Iraq and Syria spreading to other 
countries such as Lebanon, and Egypt experiencing some of the worst violence yet due to 
their governmental transition (i.e. military coup), the Arab Middle East is fast becoming 
at once a region that is producing refugees on a large scale while also being a region that 
does not have the space, infrastructure or laws, or resources to safely and successfully 
host refugees.  This catch 22 has resulted in third country resettlement for tens of 
thousands of Iraq refugees over the past 7 years and may very well be the only solution 
for the growing population of Syrian refugees.  The next chapter will explore the third 




Chapter 4: From Regional to Global Displacement: The Iraqi Refugee 
Crisis and Third Country Resettlement 
 
 After the initial mass refugee migrations of Iraqis beginning in 2005 and 
drastically increasing in 2006 from Iraq into bordering Middle Eastern countries, the 
plight of the Iraqis in these countries worsened as more and more refugees began to settle 
there.  As the war in Iraq continued and sectarian violence worsened, it was determined 
by the UNHCR that the refugee crisis would in turn only deteriorate and that there 
needed to be another solution for many of the most vulnerable Iraqis in the region.  The 
solution that was adopted, as is the case in many of the worlds protracted refugee 
situations, was third country refugee resettlement.  In this scenario, instead of donor 
funding being funneled through the UNHCR to the refugee camps and/or (in the case of 
the Iraqi refugee crisis) to UNHCR offices in urban settings where refugees have settled 
with their own resources, funding goes towards resettling vulnerable refugees in 
“willing” third countries where these families/individuals may begin anew and, if they so 
choose, start on a path to citizenship in the country in which they are sent.  
This chapter will look in detail at third country resettlement of Iraqis as a last 
resort solution to the ongoing Iraqi refugee crisis in the Middle East through 2012.  
Beginning with a theoretical context of third country resettlement as a humanitarian 
offshoot of global forced displacement, the chapter will look at the works of authors who 
have begun to theorize forced displacement.  Following from this discussion, some 
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figures and statistics will be introduced to give some background on where and under 
what programs Iraqis were being sent around the world to resettle.  Finally, the chapter 
will look in detail at the Iraqi resettlement in the United States using statistics gathered 
from the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) which is a division of the US 
Department of Health and Human Services and using my own data gathered from one on 
one interviews and participant observation while working at Refugee Services of Texas. 
4.1 MIGRATION AND FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 
 Numerous authors over the past two decades have pointed to the disconnect 
between processes of globalization and the nation-states continued determination to 
enforce its territorial boundaries in regards to the movement of people.  So while goods, 
finances, corporations and other entities are able to and often encouraged to move freely 
across borders, humans are not.  Human movement and migration and the (inter)national 
laws and processes regulating such movement have not kept up with the pace of 
globalization generally.  In this way, displaced peoples have often challenged the very 
idea and legitimacy of the nation-state.  As Castles and Miller have pointed out, 
globalization has led to the strengthening of institutions such as the World Trade 
Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank (Castles and Miller 
2009, 13).  Yet, despite this and ever-increasing rates of migration around the world, 
there is no global institution regulating migration or protecting the rights of migrants.  
The main institutions which do monitor and aid in global migration are the UNHCR, the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM), and the International Labor Office, none 
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of which have the responsibility or wherewithal to deal with cooperation between states 
or to monitor and help with the full complexity of global migration processes.   
It is somewhat ironic that as Sassen states, “there is an intimate connection 
between the formation of independent nation states and the creation of the refugee” yet,  
at the same time, the refugee has become in many instances a direct threat to the 
sovereignty of the nation state (Sassen 1999, xiii). Haddad exemplifies this when she 
writes:  
“The growth of the nation-state has implied the naming of certain peoples as 
outsiders, foreigners, unwanted.  The designation of individuals as obstacles 
to the successful formation of the nation-state has become a fundamental 
aspect of nation-state creation, and refugee flows are a likely outcome.  They 
are a truly modern phenomenon that would not exist without international 
society.  Refugees thus represent a quintessentially contemporary or 
‘modern’ political identity crisis.  In her position as an ‘outsider’ the refugee 
is a threat to state sovereignty…The refugee brings to the fore the very 
tension between the state prerogative to exclude and the human rights 
imperative to include.  How then can refugee protection be reconciled with 
state sovereignty if the two are logically in opposition?” (2008, 69–70) 
 
Along with the apparent opposition between nation state sovereignty and refugee 
movement and protection, there is also the disconnect between current thinking about the 
movement of goods, services, and labor, and that of human movement.  In Helton’s now 
famous work The Price of Indifference: Refugees and Humanitarian Action in the New 
Century, he reflects, “the term ‘globalization’ is often used to refer to the transnational 
movements of goods, services, and capital.  The movement of people is frequently 
neglected as an important aspect of globalization” (2002, 7–8). Seyla Benhabib has 
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eloquently laid bare this disconnect between seemingly unstoppable aspects of 
globalization and migration: 
“The Westphalian model’s efficacy and normative relevance are being 
challenged by the rise of a global economy through the formation of free 
markets in capital, finance, and labor; the increasing internationalization of 
armament, communication, and information technologies; the emergence of 
international and transnational cultural networks and electronic spheres; and 
the growth of sub- and transnational political actors.  Globalization draws the 
administrative-material functions of the state into increasingly volatile 
contexts that far exceed any one state’s capacities to influence decisions and 
outcomes.  The nation-state is too small to deal with the economic, 
ecological, immunological, and informational problems created by the new 
environment; yet it is too large to accommodate the aspirations of identity-
driven social and regionalist movements.  Under these conditions, 
territoriality has become an anachronistic delimitation of material functions 
and cultural identities; yet even in the face of the collapse of traditional 
concepts of sovereignty, monopoly over territory is exercised through 
immigration and citizenship policies” (2004, 4–5). 
 
 Third country refugee resettlement thus offers a means for nation-states to at once 
contribute to the human rights agenda while also aiding in that of global security by 
ostensibly offering new opportunities for individuals languishing in a place like 
Damascus, for example, where there is no major prospect for employment or personal 
security, nor hope for returning home either.  Moreover, third country refugee 
resettlement is a way that nation-states can maintain control of who enters their territory 
and who does not, who is excluded and who is included.  States may not have control 
over the initial refugee flight, which is why countries of secondary resettlement (such as 
Syria and Jordan in the case of the Iraqi refugee crisis) often feel threatened by the 
presence of refugees within their borders, but nonetheless countries that feel obliged or 
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even coerced into helping to settle refugees from protracted refugee situations at 
minimum are able to control the number of those allowed in as well as choose the 
nationality and ethnicity of those they allow in.  Loescher and Scanlan gave this idea of 
control of entering populations through third country refugee resettlement a different 
name: calculated kindness (1986).  In their text they deal with refugee policy in the 
United States since 1945.  While the US has allowed more refugees to enter their country 
than any other country in the world, they state, it is not without selectivity.  “For each 
statistic of welcome, there is another of exclusion, for each example of the open door, 
there is another of the door banging shut…Generosity has been real, but it has also been 
selective.  It has extended no further than politics and the law have permitted” (Loescher 
and Scanlan 1986, 209–210).  To be sure, selecting which refugees and asylees may enter 
the country and which may not is a politically charged decision.  Writing in the mid-80’s, 
Loescher and Scanlan use the example of Haitian and Salvadoran asylum seekers.  From 
the late 1970’s through the 1980’s they state, thousands of Haitians filed asylum claims, 
of which a very small number was granted.  During the same period, the authors claim, 
tens of thousands of Salvadorans were “detained in guarded camps, and tens of thousands 
more were shipped home against their will” (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 209–210).  This 
type of selectivity was not limited, however, only to the time period in which Loescher 
and Scanlan were writing their text.  Today, human movement around the world has 
reached an unprecedented level and numbers of refugees have also increased to worrying 
numbers.  More than ever though it seems that refugees are “cared for or ignored at the 
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whim of sovereign states or their surrogates based on a determination of how dangerous 
their movement is to global or Western security” (Owens 2011, 134).   
The US is not the only country guilty of this selective control, or as Loescher and 
Scanlan would say, calculated kindness.  Most developed “Western” nations resettle far 
less refugees than the US, if they resettle any at all.  Control is a central theme, however, 
surrounding not only the policies of a nation-state in terms of migration in general but of 
forced migration as well. The idea comes up again and again.  Butler pleads, “…both our 
political and ethical responsibilities are rooted in the recognition that radical forms of 
self-sufficiency and unbridled sovereignty are, by definition, disrupted by the larger 
global processes of which they are a part, that no final control can be secured, and that 
final control is not, cannot be, an ultimate value” (2004, xiii).  Nonetheless, Sassen’s 
words on immigration policy in the US in 1999 still ring with truth today, “Pulled on the 
one hand by economic globalization and on the other by the growth of civil rights and the 
international human rights regime, the US government has responded to immigration by 
invoking the same old tenets: control, including militarized, over its borders and its 
absolute unilateral sovereign power on immigration questions” (1999, xviii). With the 
current immigration debate ongoing in the US, there are still many in government who 
support increased border security and strict regulations on visas for students, workers, 
and even foreign-born spouses of American citizens.  Control over populations is 
necessary for the formation and governing of a population.  Aspects of (im)migration, 
however, and refugee movement in particular can easily make a state feel out of control 
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as refugees “represent the limits of the society of states in which populations are 
‘segmented, ordered, and governed’” (Owens 2011, 134). 
One of the writers who theorizes about the consequences of total state control 
over immigration and the displaced person in particular and whose name has become 
somewhat ubiquitous among theoretical works on refugee issues is Giorgio Agamben. 
Agamben argues that displaced people (i.e. the asylee, the refugee, etc.) are examples and 
hence embodiment of a specific type of human condition.  In his texts (1998; 2005) 
Agamben explores the state and the nature of the state, but especially those situations 
where there is a ‘state of exception” which can deprive individuals of their rights and 
transform them into what he calls homo sacer, individuals without rights of citizenship.  
Agamben attempts to illustrate that these types of situations have and continue to occur 
currently through examples of pre-war Nazi Germany in the twentieth century to the 
various immigration detention facilities located throughout the US, Europe, Australia, 
and elsewhere.  As Chatty states, “Although Agamben’s work is not directly focused on 
theories of migration, it sets out a powerful argument for recognizing the figure of the 
refugee or forced migrant as a trope for contemporary interstate politics” (2010, 12).  
Although Agamben’s work may not be directly focused on migration, it is directly 
focused on an individual’s rights, particularly rights of citizenship.  Rights of citizenship 
are of paramount concern when it comes to any kind of migration and migrant rights, but 
especially those of the displaced person, particularly the refugee.  The rights of an Iraqi 
man displaced in Beirut, Lebanon, can be used as an example.  Once arriving in Lebanon, 
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this person does not have the right to seek employment, nor to seek protection from the 
police.  In fact, as was illustrated in the previous chapter, this person could potentially be 
(as hundreds of Iraqis were) detained and imprisoned by the Lebanese police simply for 
being a refugee in that country, and moreover, he would be imprisoned without the right 
to legal representation.  Even if this person was to register for refugee status at a UNHCR 
office in Beirut, it would not be of much help to him in terms of his rights since Lebanon 
as a country is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention nor to the 1967 Protocol.  
While this example of ‘living in limbo’ – a term borrowed originally from van Gennep’s 
liminality phase from his work Rites of Passage (1909), but used in the context of refugee 
resettlement by Vrecer (2010) – may not be as dire a situation as someone in the 
concentration camp, or in the migration detention center, it is not to be taken lightly and 
deserves serious consideration for future policy construction and changes generally to 
refugee treatment and protection in the region of the Middle East. 
A particularly vulnerable refugee group, especially in the context of the Middle 
East is that of women.  Even as citizens in the Middle East (depending on the country, of 
course) women have limited rights, so as refugees, single women and single mothers can 
be especially at risk.  There are a number of works which use Agamben to discuss and to 
theorize refugee issues and gender.  Numerous edited collections explore and discuss the 
plight of the refugee woman and ways in which she could be better protected (Giles and 
Hyndman 2004; Hajdukowski-Ahmed, Khanlou, and Moussa 2008; Benhabib and Resnik 
2009).  None of these works document the terrible situation that many Iraqi refugee 
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women find themselves in in countries of second resettlement.  Deborah Amos’ Eclipse 
of the Sunnis is by far the best book to date detailing the dire circumstances many Iraqi 
women find themselves in in Syria (2010).  Not only are single Iraqi women and mothers 
dealing with extreme poverty and the many Arab/Islamic cultural issues that come with 
being a single woman, many are also forced into prostitution and the sex trade.  Amos, 
who took numerous visits to Damascus in 2007 and 2008, spoke with various Iraqi 
women involved in the sex trade there.  Giving these women voices, a section of Amos’ 
book is dedicated to telling their stories and the causes and effects of the Iraq war on Iraqi 
refugee women in Syria.  Amos writes: 
“Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of the Iraqi exiles in Syria had turned to the 
sex trade for survival.  Nearly every war brings prostitution.  But in 
Damascus, girls as young as ten were forced into the trade by parents-fathers 
or mothers, who made the deal and lived off the proceeds.  Officially, 
refugees were not permitted to hold jobs and had to manage on whatever 
savings they had.  As resources dwindled, despair and desperation set in, 
which led some to the underground economy.  Female-headed households 
accounted for almost a quarter of the refugees registered with the United 
Nations refugee agency.  Widowed, divorced, or separated from husbands by 
the war, many women had children or elderly parents to support.  Sex was 
often their only marketable asset” (2010, 84–85). 
 
Through this illustration of life for many Iraqi women in Syria, it is easy to see not only 
the consequences of sectarian violence and war inside of Iraq, but also of the costs of 
living as a refugee in countries outside of your home country, where ones rights as a 
citizen are either circumspect or simply non existent.   
 As stated earlier, the solution not only to the protracted Iraqi refugee situation in 
countries bordering Iraq, but to help these thousands of Iraqi individuals escape this state 
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of in-betweenness, this state of being in limbo with few, if any, rights, the international 
humanitarian regime turned to agencies such as the UNHCR and the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) as well as UN donor states to aid in resettling 
thousands of vulnerable Iraqi refugees to third country destinations where they can at the 
very least have more rights and start on a path to citizenship (depending on the third 
country of resettlement).  While one could argue that refugees who opt for third country 
resettlement certainly do have more rights and at the very least increased safety and 
security, it could also be argued that refugees who resettle in the West through official 
resettlement channels are still ‘living in limbo’ as residents with neither the full rights of 
a citizen but not without important rights (i.e. employment, protection, etc.) either.  Still 
in a state of marginality, however, and often times invisible within the host society, 
refugees in third countries can face grim circumstances which are only compounded by 
their traumatic past.  This has certainly been the case for many Iraqi refugees resettled in 
the United States and parts of Europe.  The following section then will give a look where, 
how many, and under what programs Iraqi refugees began to resettle in the West. 
4.2 GLOBAL RESETTLEMENT OF IRAQIS: 2006-2012 
 As Iraqis began to trickle out of Iraq in 2003 (at that time it was mostly among 
those who were loyal to Saddam Hussein’s regime) and then in 2005 as sectarian 
violence began to rise and finally in 2006 when hundreds of thousands began to flee, 
some settled in Syria, Jordan, and other countries around the Arab East (as discussed 
above), while others used their resources to settle (or attempt to settle) in much more 
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distant locales, namely countries in Europe.  Many of the thousands of Iraqi refugees who 
fled to Europe and beyond did so, not with the help or coordination of the UNHCR, but 
with the use of smugglers.  It must be noted that the journeys taken by the majority of 
Iraqis to get to many countries in Europe, for example, were of a very different order than 
those taken by Iraqis to get to the United States after 2006.  Once the UNHCR did 
determine that the Iraqi refugee crisis was one that warranted “official” third country 
resettlement, some European countries did resettle small numbers of Iraqis through that 
process.  Most Iraqis that were able to resettle in parts of Europe, however, arrived there 
themselves after difficult and dangerous (and very expensive) journeys and upon their 
arrival applied for asylum status.  Depending on the country to which they fled, they were 
either granted asylum status in that country or their asylum application was rejected and 
they were forced back to Middle East, or in some cases, forced to return to Iraq.  It should 
be stated here that there is no internationally recognized legal obligation for any country 
to accept or resettle refugees or asylees.  It is not surprising then that the rules and 
regulations vary widely from country to country in terms of who and how many may be 
granted entry to a country based on asylum or refugee claims.  
 Before 2003, there was already a fairly sizeable Iraqi diaspora in various parts of 
the world who had fled the brutal policies of the regime (discussed at length in chapter 3).  
It is estimated that the number of Iraqis who had found refuge around the world by the 
time of the fall of the regime was around one million (Sassoon 2009, 87).  The majority 
of these Iraqis were living in the United States, Western Europe (especially Sweden, 
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Germany, and the United Kingdom), and Australia.  These areas with already high 
concentrations of Iraqis played a role in determining where many Iraqis would flee from 
the Iraq war after 2003. Of these various countries to which Iraqis fled, Sweden deserves 
special attention. 
 Although Sweden did not play a role in the war in Iraq, it nevertheless played one 
of the largest roles, if not the largest, in helping to aid and resettle Iraqis fleeing the 
conflict.  Sweden has a long history and reputation of opening its doors to displaced 
peoples and for decades has maintained a liberal immigration policy (Pred 1997).  As 
Sassoon points out, while there are no official statistics, it is believed that there were 
between 90,000 and 100,000 Iraqis living in Sweden prior to the fall of Saddam’s regime 
in 2003 (Sassoon 2009, 100).  But the reason that Sweden deserves special mention in the 
context of the ongoing Iraqi refugee crisis is that since 2003 it has helped to resettle over 
50,000 Iraqis within its borders.  The high number of Iraqis making their way to Sweden 
does not come without risk or challenges, whether that risk be simply in the journey to 
get to Sweden or in gaining asylum status and attempting to successfully integrate into 
that society, which is, despite their reputation for having an open door policy, not a 
melting pot like the United States and has experienced phases of fervent xenophobic, 
anit-immigrant, and racist sentiment in its past and present (Pred 1997).  Nonetheless, by 
2007, Sweden had accepted more Iraqis than any other “Western” country in the world. 
So much so that there was a somewhat successful push by certain factions in the Swedish 
government to stop accepting nearly all Iraqi asylum applications and to forcibly return 
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hundreds of Iraqis back to Iraq (Amnesty 2008, 38–39).   On the exterior, Swedish 
officials claimed this was largely in response to the American troop surge in Iraq which 
for a brief period of time reduced the violence in Iraq and thus it was deemed by Swedish 
authorities that the situation there was not dangerous enough to grant asylum to Iraqis 
coming into the country during this time.  This was, however, largely a response from 
some of the more conservative groups and individuals in Swedish government whose 
constituents were beginning to feel threatened by the increasingly large number of Iraqis 
settling on the outskirts of Stockholm (Castle 2010). 
 The increase in rejections of Iraqi asylum applications in Sweden in 2007 was 
also in response to the lack of support from other European countries in accepting Iraqi 
asylees.  As stated above, no country is legally obligated by international law to accept 
asylees arriving on their own or refugees registered through the UNHCR.  Nonetheless, 
countries that do accept refugees and asylees for resettlement, hope that other countries 
will also “share the burden” of aiding some of the worlds most vulnerable displaced 
populations. Most countries in Europe and around the world were unwilling to “share the 
burden” of accepting and resettling Iraqis from the Iraq war in any kind of significant 
way, however (Sperl 2007).  
 The two countries which came under the most scrutiny with not aiding the 
hundreds of thousands of displaced Iraqis was, of course, the United States and Britain, 
the two main countries that initiated and participated in the initial invasion of Iraq in 
2003 and by 2007 had only resettled a few hundred Iraqis.  As Sassoon writes, “the UK, 
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like several other EU states, ruled that the situation in Iraq post-2003 does not warrant 
providing protection for refugees…Britain is also the only country in Europe that forcibly 
repatriates Iraqis in significant numbers. For those whose claims have been rejected, they 
are able to stay in Britain but live on the margins of society unable to work and in a 
constant legal limbo” (2009, 107).  A journalist for the British newspaper The Guardian 
writing in 2008 about the difficult situation of Iraqis trying to enter the UK quoted Bjarte 
Vandvik, the secretary general for the European Council on Refugees and Exiles, as 
saying, “The British government is insisting it is OK for people to go back to Iraq 
because recognizing that it is not means acknowledging that the military operation there 
has failed” (Godfrey 2008).  It is examples such as this which highlight how and when 
politics and forced displacement intersect.  Migration is often a politically charged 
subject, yet this example shows how political actors and ideologies can so easily exclude 
those needing protection.  Unfortunately, the situation in the United States for admitting 
Iraqis entry was similar to that of the UK at first, but did begin to change after 2007. 
4.2.1 Characteristics of Iraqi resettlement in the US 
 In 2006, when the refugee crisis in Iraq really started to pick up, the United States 
took on a similar approach as the UK: not to resettle Iraqis in the US.  By 2006, the US 
was not ready to admit that the war in Iraq was going to be a protracted situation and thus 
was not ready to begin accepting Iraqi refugees for resettlement.  By the end of the 2006 
fiscal year, for example, while hundreds of thousands (if not millions) of Iraqis had been 
displaced within Iraq and around the region the US had resettled a total of 400 Iraqi 
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refugees6.  Starting in fiscal year 2007, the US began to adopt policies that would allow a 
much greater number of Iraqis to resettle here through two main channels.  Those 
programs and numbers will be explored below as well as looking at some of the policies 
in the US surrounding refugee resettlement here and the resulting challenges of being a 
refugee in the US.  The following section will rely partly on secondary source 
information but will also utilize information gathered through my participant observation 
at a refugee resettlement agency in Austin, TX as well as interview data.  First, however, 
some general contextual information on the background of refugee resettlement in the 
United States.           
 According to the Refugee Council USA7, since 1975 the US has resettled over 3 
million refugees with annual admissions numbers ranging from a high of 207,000 in 1980 
to a low of 27,110 in 2002.  Since 1980, the average number of refugee admissions to the 
US is 98,000.  1980 was a benchmark year in US refugee policy as that is the year the US 
Refugee Act was enacted allowing more refugees to be admitted to the US and to 
broaden the US’s legal definition of a refugee.  Before 1980, the vast majority of refugees 
eligible to be admitted to the US were those who were escaping communist countries (D. 
A. Martin 2005, 15).  Despite Loescher and Scanlan’s claim of “calculated kindness” in 
                                                             







terms of who and how many refugees are admitted to the US every year, this country has 
a history of accepting refugees and asylum seekers and annually resettles more refugees 
than any other country in the world.  Still, it is important to point out that third country 
resettlement (the world over) is almost always the last resort in terms of aiding refugee 
populations around the world.  To put this into context, according to the UNHCR 
website, there are currently an estimated 39.2 million displaced people globally8.  10.4 
million of those are classified as refugees while the remaining 28.8 million are internally 
displaced. According to Dwyer: 
“Of the three durable solutions available to refugees (repatriation, local 
integration into the country of first asylum, and resettlement in third 
countries) the first two options are favored over resettlement by the 
international community.  The common rationale behind this preference is 
that resettlement programs are resource intensive, but assist limited numbers 
and groups.  Only 1% of worldwide refugees get resettled.  The ongoing 
argument in the industry is that resettlement funds can accomplish much 
more if they are used for refugee assistance programs aimed at local 
integration in the countries of first asylum” (Dwyer 2010, 7). 
  
Understanding that only 1% of refugees worldwide participate in third country 
resettlement is a first step to understanding why Iraqis were resettled in such low 
numbers at the outset of the Iraqi refugee crisis.  Without condoning the fact that so few 
Iraqis were resettled at that time, it is important to see here that countries do not jump at 
the option of resettling refugee populations at home, even if a crisis is at hand. 
                                                             
8 http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c11.html 
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 There are other reasons, of course, that the US and various other countries don’t 
resettle much larger populations of refugees annually and how the Iraqi refugee crisis 
plays into those concerns.  One of the main reasons is that of security.  As mentioned 
above, the lowest annual number of refugees that have been admitted to the US since 
1980 is 27,110 in 2002.  The reason for this historically low number of course was the 
9/11 attacks and the resulting security concerns over “foreigners” inside of the US, 
especially Arabs.  Out of the 9/11 attacks came the Patriot Act and the Department of 
Homeland Security, both of which have made life for Arabs and Arab-Americans living 
in the US exceedingly difficult (for more on this subject see Elaasar 2004; Jamal and 
Naber 2008; Bayoumi 2008; Cainkar 2008; Mei-Po 2008; Cainkar 2009; Nassar-
McMillan, Lambert, and Hakirn-Larson 2011).  The heightened security concerns over 
Arabs in the US resulting from the September 11th attacks thus made the case for 
admitting thousands of Iraqis politically charged and difficult to say the least.  While bi-
partisan support for refugee resettlement in the US is the norm, agreeing to resettle Iraqi 
refugees was a controversial matter. 
 Another reason countries, including the US, don’t often resort to third country 
resettlement, especially currently, is due to economic factors.  Since 2008, tensions over 
immigration and immigration policy have been rising in the US and Europe partially 
because of the economic recession.  A number of countries in Europe such as Sweden, 
Norway, Austria, Germany, Finland, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Britain have seen 
the election and, at the very least, increasing popularity of right wing political parties of 
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which curbing immigration and anti-Islamic sentiment stand as some of their major 
platforms of reform (B. Briggs 2011).  As Sassen has demonstrated, competition for labor 
is one of the major factors for increased tensions between “native” and “foreign” 
communities in the past (Sassen 1999).  Refugee populations, as she points out, are often 
in the middle of these tensions during times of economic hardships.  Even if refugees 
have legal authorization to be in a country, their status as refugees or asylees 
unfortunately does not protect them from nativism, racism, or xenophobia. 
 While those traits are unfortunately a reality to varying degrees in the US and 
Europe, another trait that has been the topic of much discussion in the media and to some 
extent in academia is that of “Islamaphobia”.  While the US governments response to the 
9/11 attacks was primarily that of the Patriot Act and formation of the Department of 
Homeland Security, there have been many more localized responses by conservative 
political groups, local governments, religious organizations, and individuals.  In 2010, for 
example, Time Magazine ran a cover article entitled “Islamaphobia: Does America have a 
Muslim Problem” (Ghosh 2010).  In this article Ghosh brings the effects of the 9/11 
attacks and subsequent American-led military efforts in the Arab/Islamic world to the 
forefront.  The effects are far reaching.  While tracing the controversy over a proposed 
Islamic Center at Ground Zero, the site of the 9/11 attacks, he shows that while that is the 
best known example, many other similar incidents are happening in other parts of the 
country.  One example Ghosh gives took place in small-town Wisconsin where a local 
Muslim doctor presented his application to open a mosque on land he owned to the local 
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planning commission.  Many of the people present on the commission began to question 
the project.  Time obtained the minutes from the meeting and Ghosh quotes some of the 
comments made: 
“‘I don’t want it in my backyard,’ says one.  Another says, ‘I just think its not 
America.’  Looking back, Mirza (the doctor) recalls that a couple of speakers 
tried to steer the conversation into calmer territory.  ‘I don’t think that we 
should be making broad sweeping generalizations,’ said one.  But such words 
barely gave pause to the blunt expressions of suspicion and hostility toward 
Islam and Muslims…Mirza kept calm when a commissioner asked if there 
would be any weapons or military training at the mosque.  But, afterward, 
Pakistani-born Mirza, 38, was shaken.  ‘I never expected that the same people 
who came to me at the hospital and treated me with respect would talk to me 
like this.’” (Ghosh 2010) 
  
Other incidents in the US and abroad have sought to deteriorate relations with Muslim 
populations as well.  The proposed burning of a Koran by a pastor in Florida in 2011, 
while seen largely as an isolated incident here in the US by a member of a far right 
religious group, drew a strong and angry international response by Muslims throughout 
the Arab and Islamic worlds.  The “accidental” burning of Korans by the US Marines at a 
military base in Afghanistan led to mass protests and demonstrations in that country 
(Bumiller 2012).  While these incidents illustrate examples of the Islamaphobia by 
isolated individuals, examples similar to the one that occurred in Wisconsin are 
happening often enough to where they are beginning to look like more than just a series 
of isolated events.  As Ghosh points out, in 2010, at least 6 projects to build mosques 
around the country came up against bitter opposition from the respective communities.  
The sum of all the events (and the myriad of other anti-Islamic incidents that have 
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occurred in the US since 2001) described here illustrate a particularly unwelcoming tone 
not only within the government bureaus that make decisions about incoming refugee 
populations, but also, to an extent, within American communities at large, and to an even 
larger extent, within the consciousness of the general public.  How then was it possible 
that Iraqis began to be admitted by the tens of thousands to the US?  
 As Iraqis finally started to arrive in the US in 2007, they were entering a country 
that was extremely divided on the war in Iraq.  They were also entering a country where 
much of the population was, at best, ignorant of the culture, society, and politics of the 
Arab world other than what was shown on major American news networks and, at worst, 
Islamaphobic.  Finally, Iraqis were also arriving to a country where divisions over state 
and federal immigration policies run deep.  Nonetheless, for Iraqi refugees to begin to be 
admitted to the US in relatively large numbers shows that there was enough support for 
the program in Congress.  Fortunately, refugee resettlement issues often receive broad bi-
partisan support within the US congress and despite there being segments of the general 
population (and some in government) who were wary of admitting thousands of Iraqi 
Arabs and Muslims to the United States, there was enough pressure on the US from 
various entities, organizations, and individuals to pass legislation to bring Iraqi refugees 
to this country.   One of the main, if not the main, supporters of admitting Iraqi refugees 
to the US was the late Senator Edward Kennedy.  Starting in 2006, Senator Kennedy 
began an effort to aid Iraqis displaced by the American-led war there.  One of the ways in 
which he envisioned this aid was through third country resettlement in the US.  Here is an 
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excerpt from an editorial Kennedy wrote which was published in The Washington Post in 
December of 2006: 
“The [Iraqi] refugees are witnesses to the cruelty that stains our age, and they 
cannot be overlooked.  America bears heavy responsibility for their plight.  
We have a clear obligation to stop ignoring it and help chart a sensible course 
to ease the refugee crisis.  Time is not on our side.  We must act quickly and 
effectively…There is an overwhelming need for temporary relief and 
permanent resettlement.  Last year, however, America accepted only 202 
Iraqi refugees, and next year we plan to accept approximately the same 
number.  We and other nations of the world need to do far better…Our nation 
is spending $8 billion a month to wage the war in Iraq.  Yet to meet the 
urgent humanitarian needs of the refugees who have fled the war, the State 
Department plans to spend only $20 million in the current fiscal year” 
(Kennedy 2006). 
 
Through Kennedys efforts in government as well as continuing pressure from the 
UNHCR and various national and international refugee and human rights organizations, 
namely Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Human Rights First, Refugee 
International, the Migration Policy Institute and the International Rescue Committee, 
Congress and the President Bush approved the resettlement of Iraqis in the US.   
 2007 saw a marked increase in the number of Iraqis resettled to the US.  For the 
2007 fiscal year9 a total of 1,608 Iraqi refugees were admitted.  While a drastic increase 
from the previous two years, this number was still considered far too low as the US 
government continued to be pressured by various politicians in Washington (namely 
Kennedy and his supporters) as well as by human rights organizations.  Washington came 
                                                             
9 All refugee admissions statistics are based on the fiscal year in the US which runs from October 1st 
of the previous calendar year to September 30th of the year with which it is numbered.  
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under increased pressure not just to resettle refugees from Iraq, but also those Iraqis that 
had worked for US government institutions or for US affiliated contractors in Iraq whose 
lives were in danger because of that connection.  It was estimated in 2008 by the 
Congressional Budget Office that around 142,000 Iraqis had worked as contract 
employees for the US government or with USAID funded programs.  According to 
Human Rights First 2010 report, “Living in Limbo: Iraqi Refugees and U.S. 
Resettlement”, an additional 4,000 Iraqis have worked for the US embassy in Baghdad or 
for US affiliated media companies and/or NGO’s in Iraq (Human Rights First 2010). 
These Iraqis, often referred to as “US-affiliated Iraqis” were often translators or partaking 
in other service related jobs for the US military or US based corporations operating inside 
of the country.  Kennedy called out this population as well in his Washington Post 
editorial in 2006 saying: 
“Thousands of these refugees are fleeing because they have been affiliated in 
some way with the United States. Cooks, drivers and translators have been 
called traitors for cooperating with the United States. They know all too well 
that the fate of those who work with U.S. civilians or military forces can be 
sudden death. Yet, beyond a congressionally mandated program that accepts 
50 Iraqi translators from Iraq and Afghanistan each year, the administration 
has done nothing to resettle brave Iraqis who provided assistance in some 
way to our military. This lack of conscience is fundamentally unfair. We 
need to do much more to help Iraqi refugees, especially those who have 
helped our troops” (Kennedy 2006).   
 
Many other voices echoed Kennedy’s in support of aiding Iraqis who were in 
danger because of their affiliation with the US in Iraq.  One of these voices, for example, 
was Kirk Johnson who was a former USAID worker based in Baghdad and Fallujah in 
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2005 and who later started the The List Project to Resettle Iraqi Allies.  According to the 
The List Project’s website, they were founded, “with the belief that the United States 
government has a clear and urgent moral obligation to resettle to safety Iraqis who are 
imperiled due to their affiliation with the United States of America”10.  Johnson began to 
accumulate a list of names of Iraqis whose lives were in severe danger who were either 
referred to him by other American employees in Iraq or by Iraqis affiliated with the US 
themselves.  As the List project began to garner more and more attention not just in the 
media but in governmental circles as well, the issue of US affiliated Iraqis was seriously 
considered by congress and finally in 2008, Section 1244 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 as modified by Public Law 110-242 authorized 
an allotment of up to 5,000 special immigrant visas for Iraqis for each fiscal year from 
2008 through 2012.  This program, popularly referred to as the Special Immigrant Visa 
(SIV’s) program for Afghans and Iraqis was seen as a success for advocates such as 
Johnson.  The US-affiliated Iraqis who were able to arrive in the US were given many of 
the same benefits as the refugees (which will be explained in more detail below).  One 
benefit the US affiliated Iraqis would have once they arrived to this country that refugees 
do not is that they would receive their permanent residency authorization upon arrival 
whereas refugees arriving in the US have to wait one full year before receiving this 
authorization.   
                                                             
10 http://thelistproject.org/about-the-list-project/ 
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The law that allowed the Special Immigrant Visa Program to be passed in Congress 
was part of a larger act  called the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act which was introduced as a 
bi-partisan bill in June 2007 by Senator Kennedy, a democrat from Massachusetts and 
Republican Senator Gordon Smith (Oregon).  The bill garnered the required support in 
Congress and was passed in January 2008 with President Bush signing the Act into law in 
February 2008 as part of the National Defense Authorization Act.  The act itself was 
written to provide assistance and relief to Iraqi refugees and those Iraqis who had worked 
in various capacities with the US military and its contractors.  It is important to note here, 
that in the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act was written an additional provision (other than the 
SIV program) to aid in the resettlement of US-affiliated Iraqis.  This was the Priority 2 
(P2) program which allowed Iraqis and close family relatives to apply for the US refugee 
resettlement program without a UNHCR referral.  Priority 2 cases refer, according to the 
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), to those “groups of special 
humanitarian concern identified by the U.S. refugee program”11.  Priority 2 is one of 
three main classification schemes of the US refugee program.  Priority 1, the most 
common classification of incoming refugees refers to individuals or groups that are 
identified and referred to the program by the UNHCR, a US embassy, or a designated 
NGO.  Priority 3, on the other hand, is for family reunification cases.     
The US- affiliated Iraqis coming in under the P2 program who were deemed to be 
of special humanitarian concern to the US governemnt would still have to pass the same 
                                                             
11 http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis 
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security checks and complete a similar application process to those Iraqi refugees who 
were applying for refugee status and US resettlement through UNHCR offices in Syria, 
for example.  The main difference between the P2 program in the case of Iraqis and the 
typical US resettlement program process, however, and that which is important on a more 
general scale in the refugee studies field as a whole is that P2 Iraqis were able to apply 
for US refugee resettlement only in Jordan, Egypt, and inside of Iraq.  While Iraqis 
coming to the US through the SIV program were able to apply for SIV status inside of 
Iraq and were given many of the same benefits as refugees upon arrival to the United 
States, they were not technically classified as refugees because they were admitted 
through the SIV program.  Iraqis coming through the P2 program, however, are classified 
as refugees and more interestingly were able to successfully apply for this status without 
being “outside the country of his/her nationality”, based on the legal definition provided 
by the UNHCR and the definition under which the US refugee program operates.  
Applying for the P2 program inside of Iraq is made possible through a little used process 
known as in-country processing.  According to the USCIS website, “refugees must 
generally be outside their country of origin, but we can process some individuals in their 
home countries if authorized by the President”12.   






As discussed in chapter 2, current definitions of a refugee are not only controversial 
but there is also discussion and debate over ways in which the definition of a refugee 
should be formally changed.  Internally displace persons, it is argued by some, should be 
included in an internationally recognized and accepted definition of refugees as there are 
according to the UNHCR, not only more internally displaced people worldwide but they 
are also deemed by many to be more vulnerable than displaced populations who have 
sought refuge across borders.  What “in-country processing” by the US refugee program 
shows then is not only the capacity to process families and individuals inside of the 
country where the conflict and violence is occurring, but, more importantly a willingness 
to do so by a country who admits more refugees annually than any other country in the 
world.  While the US-affiliated Iraqis who have been admitted to the US through the P2 
program may or may not have been internally displaced inside Iraq (for sure, many of 
them were), in-country processing of these Iraqis provides an argument for changing (or 
at least updating) the definition of a refugee to include those vulnerable persons who are, 
for whatever reason, still inside the country of their nationality. 
In addition to US-affiliated Iraqis, the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act was of course also 
meant for the general (and much larger) Iraqi refugee population who had fled across 
international borders.  This program followed a more typical process for admitting and 
resettling refugees to the US.  The way this process works for urban refugees (as opposed 
to refugees living in UNHCR sanctioned camps) is that the refugee must apply for legal 
refugee status typically at a UNHCR office, US embassy, or a designated NGO office.  
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After a lengthy application process and a series of interviews, the person or family must 
then be designated as a refugee by the organization and then they are referred to the US 
for resettlement.  At that time entities of the US Department of State as well as the 
Department for Homeland Security make the determination of whether or not that 
individual will be admitted to the US for resettlement. This is by no means a quick 
process (see Figure 4.1).  And there were other reasons for the delay in an expedited 
beginning to this program to resettle Iraqis to the US.  According to US Department of 
State officials at a 2008 conference entitled “The Iraqi Refugee Crisis: Law, Policy and 
Practice”, one of the reasons for the delayed resettlement of much greater numbers of 
Iraqis had to do with the countries in which they were resettling outside of Iraq.  As noted 
above, countries such as Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon are not signatories to the 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and thus when Iraqis began to flee to the 




Figure 4.1 The Refugee Maze 
 
Source: American Bar Association Journal, graphic by Jeff Dionise (Edwards 2008)  
 
in place to process and refer these refugees to the US in such high numbers.  In other 
words, US government designated NGO’s, and the UNHCR were not prepared or 
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equipped for the influx of refugees in those countries in late 2005 but especially in early 
2006.  Another logical reason is that, given the size of the US refugee program, and the 
slow pace of the bureaucracy of the US government, the implementation of any program 
this large is bound to take time.  As Martin states in his text on US refugee resettlement 
policy and specifically on the changes that were made to the US refugee program after 
the passage of the Refugee Act in 1980:  
“Over the succeeding decades, the nature of the refugee admissions program 
has evolved considerably.  The new processing techniques hastily cobbled 
together in the late 1970’s…became more routine and sophisticated, and they 
were extended to other refugee situations as well…Refugee resettlement 
became more institutionalized.  Planning mechanisms developed, officers 
began to speak of a resettlement pipeline, and NGOs added staff and 
developed an enduring network of field offices throughout the United States 
to help manage the reception and integration of arriving refugees.  This 
evolution represents a major triumph of the USRP – creating and sustaining 
such a system at reasonable cost levels, importantly involving a major public-
private partnership.  But with machinery on this scale, it is difficult to make 
sudden changes, of level or location.  Solid planning and clear benchmarks of 
performance can be of considerable use” (2005, 16–17) 
 
As Martin points out in this excerpt, the US refugee program has made vast 
improvements since 1980 but because of the size of the “machinery” of the program, it is 
not very flexible.  It is unfortunate that a program whose mission is to serve vulnerable 
populations, many of whom are at immediate risk, is not equipped to deal with 
humanitarian refugee crises at a swift pace. Nonetheless, there were many critics who 
believed that the US and the international community should have been better prepared 
for this refugee situation and that there was too much red tape that was putting peoples’ 
lives at further risk who were already facing dangerous situations.  As we will see below, 
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that same red tape and sluggish pace of the bureaucracy continues to hinder both the 
program admitting Iraqi refugees and the Special Immigrant Visa program bringing in 
US-affiliated Iraqis. 
 After 2007, and particularly after the passing of the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act in 
early 2008, the numbers of Iraqi refugees admitted to the US did increase dramatically.  
Figure 4.2 below shows the number of Iraqi refugees (not US-affiliated Iraqis admitted 
under the SIV program) resettled in the US from fiscal year 2007 to April 30, 2013. 


















12,098 28,769 49,276 46,472 39,878 15,878 10,950 203,321 
USCIS 
Interviews 
4,437 23,862 29,096 27,277 26,831 20,073 11,094 142,670 
Approved 
by USCIS 
2,909 18,674 25,238 24,021 22,323 16,992 9,045 199,202 
Admitted 
to US 
1,608 13,823 18,838 18,016 9,388 12,163 11,066 84,902 
Source: USCIS Iraqi Refugee Processing Fact Sheet - http://www.uscis.gov/ 
 
Looking at this table, one can see the increase in numbers.  These numbers include, of 
course, those US-affiliated Iraqis coming through the P2 program.  One point that is 
evident from these numbers is that there is a far greater number of referrals and 
interviews than there are actual admissions of Iraqis to the US.  Looking at the total 
number of referrals to admittance ratio, less than half of those referred to the USCIS by 
the UNHCR were granted admission to the US for resettlement.  The primary reason for 
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this is, of course, security clearances.  The process for security clearance for Iraqi 
refugees to be admitted to the US is lengthy and thorough almost to a fault and from 2007 
to present, that process was overhauled and has become even lengthier and more time 
consuming, thus lengthening the processing times for refugee applicants.  Here is the 
description of the security screening process given by the USCIS on their “Iraqi Refugee 
Processing Fact Sheet”: 
Eligibility for refugee status is decided on a case-by-case basis. A USCIS 
officer conducts a personal interview of the applicant designed to elicit 
information about the applicant's admissibility and claim for refugee status. 
During the interview, the officer confirms the basic biographical data of the 
applicant; verifies that the applicant was properly given access to the 
USRAP; determines whether the applicant has suffered past persecution or 
has a well-founded fear of future persecution on the basis of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion in 
his or her home country; determines whether the applicant is admissible to 
the United States and whether he or she has been firmly resettled in another 
country; and assesses the credibility of the applicant. 
 
We are committed to conducting the most rigorous screening in order to 
ensure that those being admitted through the refugee program are not seeking 
to harm the United States. In May 2007, DHS announced and implemented 
an Administration-coordinated, enhanced background and security check 
process for Iraqi refugees applying for resettlement in the United States. The 
security check regime, including both biographic and biometric checks, has 
been enhanced periodically over the last several years as new opportunities 
and interagency partnerships with the law enforcement and intelligence 
communities have been identified. These enhancements are a reflection of the 
commitment of DHS and other agencies to conduct the most thorough checks 
possible to prevent dangerous individuals from gaining access to the United 
States through the refugee program.  No case is finally approved until results 
from all security checks have been received and analyzed (USCIS 2013).   
 
In reading this excerpt, the USCIS is explicitly showing that there is a separate and 
specialized security screening process specifically for Iraqi refugees which demonstrates 
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the political nature of resettling this refugee group.  The numbers from Figure 4.2 along 
with the information about the enhanced security screening illustrate at once the US 
government’s wariness at resettling an Arab/Islamic population on a large scale as well as 
exemplifying the aspect of exclusion when it comes to resettling refugee populations to 
this country more generally.  The increase in the number of Iraqis admitted to the US 
from 2007 to 2009 was certainly a positive development yet the number of rejections of 
Iraqis attempting to enter the country is staggering.   
I do not wish to downplay the importance of having a security screening program 
in place for refugee resettlement to the US, especially in a country/region where much of 
the population is known to have negative sentiment to the US government.  Nevertheless 
the screening process has been criticized to a degree as it undermines the very mission 
the USRP seeks to accomplish: to resettle refugees facing immediate danger both inside 
and outside of Iraq.  Returning to Human Rights First detailed 2010 report, “Living in 
Limbo: Iraqi Refugees and U.S. Resettlement”, almost all of the key findings and policy 
recommendations listed in this report have to do with slow processing times, whether 
they be the processing of initial applications, security checks, or background checks.  The 
report details some of the inefficiencies that have caused these various delays such as 
lack of sufficient manpower to process the applications.  In regards to the security 
screening process specifically the report states: 
“The conduct of effective security checks is an essential step in the screening 
of any individual who enters the United States.  The security check process 
necessarily requires time and attention, including to analyze applicants who 
may have common names.  However, the average time for conducting a 
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security advisory opinion is five months for Iraqi refugees – meaning that 
many Iraqis wait longer than five months for their checks to clear.  Human 
Rights First researchers interviewed a number of refugee families in Jordan, 
Lebanon, and Egypt who had been waiting for nine or ten months-or even 
longer-after other processing had been completed, for their security 
processing to be concluded” (Human Rights First 2010, 4).  
 
 It turns out that the lengthy security processes and concerns were at once 
extremely flawed yet substantiated in 2011.  Looking back at figure 4.2, one will notice 
the drastic decrease in Iraqi arrivals to the US from 2010 to 2011.  The main reason for 
this was due to a case in early 2011 where two Iraqi refugees who had been admitted to 
the US and resettled in Bowling Green, KY were charged with sending cash, explosives 
and missiles to Iraq for use against American troops (Bennett and Memoli 2011).  This 
case severely affected both the speed and number of Iraqis who were in the process of 
having their applications reviewed and even may Iraqis who had already had their 
applications accepted.  George Packer, a well-known journalist and the author of a 
number of articles on the Iraqi refugee crisis and the resulting American answer to that 
crisis, wrote on his blog after the case had begun to affect the Iraqi refugee “pipeline”.  
Packer said, “The Kentucky case has spooked the agencies and removed any incentive for 
jittery officials to do right by the Iraqis who, at unbelievable risk to themselves and their 
families, supported the U.S. during the long years of war” (Packer 2011).  Just before the 
Iraqi case came out in the media, the US government overhauled their security screening 
process of refugees coming to the US.  It is difficult to know whether the Departments of 
State and Homeland Security overhauled this process because of the case in Kentucky or 
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if the authorities already knew of the two Iraqis when the new system was put in place.  
Either way, the overall effect of the new security screening system was that it greatly 
reduced the number of Iraqis (US-affiliated and others) who were waiting to gain 
admission to the US resettlement program.  For a period of a few months actually, the 
Iraqi resettlement program came almost to a complete halt.  Iraqis inside of Iraq, Jordan, 
and Syria, who had gained admission to the US and had sold all their belongings and 
were prepared for departure were put on hold and forced to wait indefinitely because of 
the new security screening system in place.  Stories such as this abound (Human Rights 
First 2010; Arango 2011; Packer 2011).  Packer states, “Multiply these brief stories by 
the thousands, and you have one of the most disgraceful legacies of the decade since 
September 11th – a scandal that has only grown worse during the Obama years” (Packer 
2011).       
 While the new security screening system affected the admission rates of Iraqi 
refugee resettlement US-affiliated resettlement, there were other factors that affected the 
success of the Special Immigrant Visa Program.  When the SIV program was passed in 
2008 allotting 5000 slots per year (for five years) through 2012, it was viewed as a major 
achievement in the effort to aid as many of the US-affiliated Iraqis as possible.  The 
success of the Special Immigrant Visa program, however, was premeditated.  Of the 
25,000 available slots offered through 2012, only 8,626 have been granted through June 
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of 201313.  Part of the reason for this staggeringly low number is, of course, the 
sluggishness and inadequacies of the new security screening process, but, more 
importantly, the program is hindered by the byzantine application process. The 
application process itself consists of five major steps, each of them taking weeks and/or 
months to complete: 1) approval from the Chief of Mission (COM) at the US embassy in 
Baghdad; 2) submission of DHS-USCIS application by regular mail to the DHS’s 
Nebraska Service Center where, if it is approved, must be adjudicated by USCIS officials 
and then it is sent to the State Department’s National Visa Center; 3) National Visa 
Center Processing which requires multiple original documents from the applicant in Iraq 
including Iraqi military records, evidence the individual worked for the US government, a 
police certificate from the locality where the individual lived if they resided outside of 
Iraq for more than 6 months, photographs, and additional documents if they want to 
receive benefits in the US; 4) Visa interview at the local US consulate where the 
applicant must have all the original documents mentioned above; and 5) security 
clearance which, as described previously, requires the attention of multiple US agencies 
and can take up to a year to clear (Human Rights First 2010, 32).   
 This process, as well as the security screening process, is a reminder of the 
extreme tactics of control and exclusion of the US government upon the US refugee 
program.  Without undermining the fact that the US was helping to resettle thousands of 
                                                             
13 Iraqi SIV arrival data provided by the Refugee Processing Center which is operated by the U.S. 
Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, 
http://www.wrapsnet.org/Home/tabid/52/Default.aspx 
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Iraqi refugees, in the case of US-affiliated Iraqis, the US was not coming close to 
accepting and resettling the numbers promised.  Among Iraqi refugees being referred 
through the UNHCR, rejections were high as well.  While security is obviously an 
important element in resettling any individual to the US, the US has failed to aid 
thousands of innocent Iraqis, both US-affiliated Iraqis and non-affiliated ones, whose 
lives are in danger because of a war waged by the US itself.  Security is important but 
this is a case where a country’s security fears and desire for control over human mobility 
are out of sync with the realities and dangers on the ground for Iraqi refugees.   
 Mobility is also an issue that plays a major role in the lives of Iraqis who did 
arrive to the US through either the SIV or USRP programs.  Aspects of mobility, or lack 
thereof, will be covered in more detail in the next chapter but first, it is important to look 
at where Iraqis were being resettled within the US.  One of the changes brought about by 
the US Refugee Act in 1980 was the expansion of networks of non-profit organizations 
assisting refugees from around the world with resettlement in the US.  Therefore, while 
many refugees arriving to this country throughout the 1970’s resettled to major urban 
centers such as New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago, refugees are now being dispersed 
around the country to much smaller locales where a non-profit refugee resettlement 
organization is located.  The system is deigned this way much for the same reason that 
Sweden was discouraged that other countries in Europe and around the world weren’t 
accepting Iraqi refugees: to help shoulder the responsibility and cost of admitting 
thousands of displaced people.  So, in the context of US resettlement, instead of a few 
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major cities resettling hundreds or possibly thousands of refugees, many smaller cities 
can begin to share in this process and admit and aid refugees in the resettlement process 
in their own communities.   
 The process for determining where in the US a refugee will be placed is, of 
course, complex.  Despite popular belief, most refugees coming to the US actually have 
very little say as to where in the country they will be resettled.  After an individual’s full 
screening process is completed by the various agencies and the US has agreed to admit 
that person to the US for resettlement, the names of all the individuals who will be 
arriving are sent to a group of US based (and often religiously affiliated) organizations 
which are referred to as voluntary agencies (volags).  There are currently nine voluntary 
agencies that have a cooperative agreement with the US government to aid in the 
resettlement process.  Examples of these agencies are Church World Service (CWS), 
Episcopal Migration Ministries (EMM), Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Services 
(LIRS), International Rescue Committee (IRC), and the United States Conference of 
Catholic Bishops (USCCB), to name a few.  These voluntary agencies in turn contract 
with various local resettlement organizations throughout the US (like Refugee Services of 
Texas, see figure 4.3) which work with the actual refugees on the ground from their date 
of arrival to the end of their allotted service period (to be covered further in the next 
chapter).  Each year the voluntary agencies determine a number of refugees that is within 
their capacity to resettle based on the number of local agencies they work with, the 
number of staff and programs within each of the local offices, etc.  These annual 
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resettlement numbers are provided to the US Department of State’s Bureau of Population, 
Refugees and Migration as well as the Department of Health and Human Service’s Office 
of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), which then helps the US government determine how 
many refugees from around the world they will be able to resettle annually. 
Figure 4.3 Map of Volag Affiliate Sites in the US  
 
There is a weekly meeting held between members of each of these voluntary 
agencies and officials from the Department of State with a list of names of refugees who 
have been granted admission to be resettled in the US.  During this meeting, each case is 
reviewed individually and certain important characteristics are taken into consideration 
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on the part of the refugee as well as on the part of the local agencies with which each of 
these volags works.  Examples of these considerations include existing family members 
in the US, possible pre-determined sponsorship of a refugee, medical issues, etc.  The 
only time a refugee is able to “choose” his/her location of resettlement is if that person 
has a “sponsor” – someone they know in the US who has agreed by contract to help in the 
resettlement of that individual – or if that person has immediate family members already 
living in the US.  In that case, the arriving refugee will be sent to wherever their 
immediate family members are living.  Amazingly, extended family living in the US is 
often not considered when deciding where to place a refugee individual or family.   
After the specific characteristics of the refugee individual/family are explored and 
considered, the volags then look to the characteristics of their local agencies “in the 
field”.  For example, at Refugee Services of Texas in Austin, there is a program named 
Greenleaf, which is funded to support the mental health of refugees being resettled by 
that agency, if they choose to use it.  So, when reviewing a case that has been admitted to 
the US for resettlement, if, in that individual’s case file there is evidence of mental or 
psychological issues, RST would be considered as a destination for that person due to the 
existence of the Greenleaf program.  There are a number of advantages and disadvantages 
to this system that will be explored in more detail in the next chapter but, on a whole, the 
placement system often puts refugees in unexpected and unknown locations while at the 
same time greatly reducing their mobility once they are in the US and their ability to 
successfully integrate into the society/community to which they have been sent. 
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Finally, in regards to the journey to the US from the country of asylum (or, in the 
case of some Iraqis, from Iraq itself), there is a system set up to help refugees actually 
travel to the US.  After a refugee case has been accepted for admittance by the US 
refugee program, travel arrangements are then made in coordination with the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) who acts in this case much like a travel 
agency for the refugees.  The IOM will receive the new refugee admissions information 
and begin to book travel for the refugees and their families.  IOM has staff at many major 
international airports to help groups of refugees reach their final destination.  When 
booking the airline tickets for each new refugee traveling to the US, the IOM pays for the 
tickets.  Upon arrival to the US, however, refugees are expected to pay back the travel 
loans (interest free) to the IOM.  While paying back this loan is can in many situations be 
yet one more major barrier during the resettlement process, the system set up for 
refugees’ journey to the US in coordination with the IOM has some benefits.  Unlike 
most refugees in Europe, who arrive as asylum seekers and who must use their own 
resources and who often have to employ the use of smugglers to make the very dangerous 
journey, refugees coming to the US with IOM travel grants are able to arrive in this 
country relatively safely.  While the US should invest more in its resettlement program to 
help pay for journey to this country, it is beneficial that the journey itself is not one full of 
unnecessary dangers. 
Regardless of the process by which refugees are placed spatially within the US, 
Iraqis, while being resettled in cities and towns throughout the country, have been 
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clustered in a few different areas.  Some of this has to do with the high level of 
sponsorship for US-affiliated Iraqis (as they worked with Americans while in Iraq) but 
also with the location of immediate family members.  Many others, however, were placed 
wherever there were open spots available.  Figure 4.4 illustrates the spatial variation of 
how Iraqis are dispersed throughout the US.  
Figure 4.4 numbers of Iraqi refugees resettled in the US by state from FY 2007-FY 2013 (q3)  
 
Refugee SIV 
Alabama 365 43 
Alaska 22 2 
Arizona 5,587 378 
Arkansas 37 9 
California 20,242 1,001 
Colorado 1,132 294 
Connecticut 713 78 




Florida 1,638 254 
Georgia 1,804 143 
Hawaii 4 0 
Idaho 961 46 
Illinois 5,293 404 
Indiana 305 63 




Kentucky 1,552 135 
Louisiana 336 45 
Maine 390 36 
Maryland 1,007 206 
Massachusetts 2,903 172 
Michigan 13,836 412 
Minnesota 605 85 
 
 142 
Figure 4.4 (continued) 
Mississippi 13 13 
Missouri 1,242 229 
Montana 8 0 
Nebraska 336 147 




New Jersey 573 46 
New Mexico 339 41 
New York 2,447 196 
North Carolina 1,252 284 
North Dakota 441 23 
Ohio 1,696 149 
Oklahoma 177 47 
Oregon 765 99 
Pennsylvania 1,820 188 
Rhode Island 125 9 
South Carolina 169 50 
South Dakota 237 12 
Tennessee 1,817 437 
Texas 7,072 1,792 
Utah 1,133 82 
Vermont 132 6 
Virginia 2,777 515 
Washington 2,202 286 
West Virginia 40 6 
Wisconsin 621 57 
Total 87,857 8,626 
Source: Refugee Processing Center, http://www.wrapsnet.org 
By looking at this table, one can see that while Iraqis were resettled in every state (except 
for Wyoming, which resettles an extremely small number of refugees), California, 
Michigan, Texas, Illinois, and Arizona are the main destinations for this refugee 
population.  Interestingly, out of the 20,000 Iraqis resettling in California, almost half of 
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those are Chaldean Christian Iraqis who have resettled in a suburb of San Diego called El 
Cajon.  Michigan, the state with the second highest number of Iraqi refugees, has a long 
history of Arab populations moving and/or resettling there.  Texas has the third highest 
number of Iraqi refugees since 2007 and the vast majority have settled in either Houston, 
Dallas/Ft. Worth, San Antonio, and Austin.    
Before a more detailed discussion in the next chapter about the policies and 
processes of the local resettlement agency, Refugee Services of Texas in Austin, it is 
important to note that the resettlement experience of refugees is highly diverse from one 
state to another and one city to another.  Part of this experience depends on the refugees 
themselves of course and the specific skills they bring with them, but it also depends on 
the largely on the place/community to which they resettle and the local agency.  While 
the main government funding programs that provide the local agencies with the necessary 
grants are, for the most part, standard from one state to another (with slight exceptions), 
the inner workings of the agencies themselves are quite different.   
 With so many Iraqis resettling in diverse locales across the US, their experience 
of resettlement and integration are extremely diverse as well.  While this chapter has 
striven to illustrate issues of state control and exclusion when it comes to forcibly 
displaced populations, and specifically how those characteristics play out in the 
admissions process of Iraqis to the US, the next chapter will turn to the issue of 
integration.  Specifically, it will deal with the experiences of integration and resettlement 
of Iraqi refugees arriving to Austin, Texas from 2007-2012.  
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Figure 4.5  Map of Iraqi Refugee Arrivals to US, 2007-2013
 





Figure 4.6 Map of Iraqi SIV arrivals to US, 2007-2013
 










Chapter 5: “Finding Your Own Way”: Local Integration of Iraqi 
Refugees in Austin, Texas 
 
 With over 85,000 Iraqi refugees having resettled in the US since 2005, there still 
has been very little published on their experiences in this country.  Much can be learned 
however from their stories as local governments, local communities, and even the federal 
government has much to gain from a better understanding not just of refugee integration 
in general terms, but specifically of the integration of large Arab/Muslim populations 
during a time of upheaval in the Arab world and of concern and misunderstandings of 
Arab/Islamic culture and society here at home. The type of refugee for which this study 
pertains is one who differs in various ways from other types of migrants and even from 
other types of refugees, those who sought asylum in Europe and travelled there using 
their own resources, for example.  As detailed in the previous chapter, this study deals 
with refugees who have been referred to the United States from overseas and, after being 
admitted, takes part in the state controlled and multi-agency coordinated process of third 
country resettlement.  In this context, refugees coming to the US have vastly different 
migratory experiences than other types of migrants.  These differences lie primarily in 
three distinct realms: 1) the actual process of migrating or the travelling experience, 2) 
the decision making process concerning their destination, and 3) their experience of 
integrating into the host society as they often (depending on the policies of the host 
country) qualify for and receive special types of resettlement benefits and welfare, 
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particularly because they carry the status of refugees.  Integration is a controversial term, 
however, which requires defining. 
This chapter will look in detail at the concept of integration and how it pertains 
first to refugees and then specifically to other Arab/Muslim populations that have 
resettled elsewhere in the world.  The chapter will then turn to the concept of mobility 
and how it relates to US refugee policy, which can either help or hinder the experience of 
refugees resettling here.  Finally, the chapter will utilize primary data collected for this 
project to analyze the resettlement and integration experience of Iraqi refugees admitted 
to the US, and to Austin, Texas in particular.   
5.1 REFUGEE INTEGRATION: DEFINITIONS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1.1 A Brief Case Study of Iraqi Integration in Austin, TX 
 I have had the opportunity to observe the process of refugee resettlement and 
integration first hand through my experience volunteering with a single Iraqi refugee 
family in Austin, TX since their arrival in 2008.  Before going into a broader discussion 
about the term integration and the theories, debates, and studies surrounding it, I want to 
recount bits of my experience with this family in order to more fully elaborate the 
differences between refugee integration and the integration of other types of migrants.  It 
should be noted, however, that the experience of this particular family is not 
representative of all refugee integration experiences in the US.  While many other Iraqi 
refugees and refugees of other nationalities and ethnic groups do certainly share 
similarities to this family’s experience, it will be noted in the paper when and where other 
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legal-political refugees have very different encounters with and understandings of 
resettlement and integration.  However, outlining what this family has faced points out 
many important facets of the refugee integration and resettlement process, which are 
experienced by a wide range of refugees in the US and elsewhere. 
 The family with whom I have done volunteer work consists of four people: a 
mother, father, son, and daughter.  The son and daughter are both in their late 20’s and 
the mother and father are both in their 60’s.  The family is from Baghdad; they were part 
of the Christian community there; a community which has dwindled to very low numbers 
over the past few years.  They eventually fled Iraq in 2005 due to threats against them 
because of their religious beliefs.  From Baghdad, they fled to Amman, Jordan where 
they applied for refugee status with the United Nations and where they waited to be 
resettled for more than two years.  After using their family savings for living expenses 
and receiving financial help from other family members who live in various parts of the 
world (a number of their extended family fled Iraq during and following the first Gulf 
War and are now living in various Western countries such as Australia and Holland) they 
were resettled in the United States.  Their resettlement came about through the 
coordinated efforts of the UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration, US 
Office of Refugee Resettlement, and one of the many charitable Christian organizations 
that work in concert with a large network of local non-profit organizations around the 
US.   
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 When the family arrived at the New York airport, they were still unaware of 
where exactly they were going to be sent within the US.  They had expressed a desire to 
US and UN officials to be resettled in the Detroit area, which has a large population of 
Arabs and Iraqi refugees in particular.  For whatever reason, this was not possible and 
they were told that they were being sent to Austin, TX, a place they knew nothing about, 
not even its location in relation to other places and states in the US.  This decision was 
made even though they had family members who had already been resettled in two other 
states in the US.  Nonetheless, they were sent to Austin where there was, at the time, a 
very small population of Iraqi refugees and Arabic-speaking people in general.  At the 
time of their arrival to Austin, according to one of the employees at Caritas, one of two 
organizations helping to resettle refugees in the city, there were approximately 8-10 other 
Iraqi refugees living here. 
 Upon their arrival at the airport, for which I was present, it was apparent that none 
of the family members spoke English but for a few words.  Moreover, the father, who is 
overweight, was experiencing serious health problems.  The family was brought to their 
apartment in Austin which had been sparsely furnished and stocked with food items by 
Caritas volunteers, many of which they were unfamiliar with.  The apartment complex 
where they were placed is occupied primarily by Latino immigrants, is mediocre in terms 
of its quality, is very reasonably priced, and is in a fairly central location within the city.  
As refugees, the family is eligible for federal financial assistance for a given time and this 
assistance is handled by the resettlement organization, in this case Caritas.  Without 
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going into full detail about the aid packages (more detail will be provided below), the 
family receives full support for a total of eight months.  Thus, their rent is paid, they 
receive food stamps, the elderly parents receive state supplemental security income (SSI), 
monthly bus passes, and a small stipend for other expenses such as phone and electricity 
bills.  During this eight month period, they are expected to become “self-sufficient” (a 
key word in government sponsored refugee resettlement literature) to where, at the end of 
the eight month period, they can live without the assistance of the federal government 
and local organizations.  To help achieve self-sufficiency, the local resettlement 
organization offers free English classes three times per week, helps with finding 
employment, offers some translating services (although for Arabic, these services are 
very limited in Austin), and when possible, provides volunteers such as myself who are 
labelled “community advocates”.  These volunteers are assigned to a single family with 
whom they will work for up to a year to help them in any capacity with the ultimate goal 
being self-sufficiency.   
 Since the family’s arrival, the son has found a decent-paying hourly wage job at a 
local hotel/restaurant.  The mother and father have experienced a number of health issues 
for which they have had numerous doctors’ appointments.  Further, their age, level of 
education, and persistent health issues has, despite their best efforts, kept them from 
learning more than the most basic conversational English.  The daughter, the best 
educated member of the family, has not looked for work so as to help her mother and 
father with their health issues and to more generally be the member of the family to 
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negotiate the process of integration at all levels within the household such as scheduling 
appointments, dealing with the resettlement organization employees and processes, and 
navigating their way around town.  The daughter has in the last couple of years, however, 
secured a position as a part-time “homecare health provider” for her parents through a 
state sponsored home nursing agency.  Because of the age and health of the mother and 
the father, they continue to receive SSI checks, Medicaid, and food stamps, although the 
daughter no longer receives food stamps or has health insurance as the eight-month 
period of federal and local assistance is long over.  Although the eight month period is 
over, the family is still not totally self-sufficient.  One of the ironies of the process in 
terms of the language barrier is that to successfully learn the language, the daughter is not 
able to work, and since the son is working 40 or more hours per week, he is not able to 
successfully study the language in the classes provided by the local organization.   
 In terms of networks and connections within the community, this Iraqi family had 
none upon arrival, not counting the support of the local resettlement agency (notably their 
case worker) and myself.  Not only was the community too small, but the persistence of 
ethnic tensions from Iraq continue even here in Austin.  It was telling that the family had 
and continues to have no interest whatsoever in dealing with or forming relationships 
with Muslim Iraqi refugees in the community, or even other Christian Iraqis who have 
since made Austin their home.  There has been some slight communication between the 
family and some of the other Iraqis in the community but it has been very limited, 
consisting mostly of sparse telephone conversations.  The vast majority of their human 
 152 
capital and support networks come from their family members in other parts of the US, 
Holland, and Sweden.  The family has received financial support from family members in 
these places, in part to help in purchasing a computer which adds the monthly expense of 
internet service to their budget.  Their computer allows them to communicate on a daily 
basis with their family members around the world, including Europe and Australia.  More 
recently they have purchased a car, which allows them increased mobility and flexibility 
around the city. 
 Eight months after their arrival in the US, this family was far from the stated goal 
of self-sufficiency.  This speaks to the difficulty of successfully integrating refugees 
under the current US resettlement paradigm.  The case of this family highlights the fact 
that although refugees receive benefits for being refugees, they do not necessarily prosper 
from these benefits.  Part of the reason seems to do with the paradox of language learning 
and finding employment.  Another reason has to do with the slow, complex, and often 
ineffective state/local government bureaucracy.  Almost every month the family 
experiences an unexpected and unexplained malfunction in the government offices 
overseeing the support services for either SSI checks, food stamps, or health care.  
Finally, couple this with other factors like the requirement for all refugees to make 
monthly payments to reimburse the cost of the airfare which brought them to the US and 
it makes for a very difficult transition and decreases the chances for a swift and 
successful integration into the host society.   
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A variety of the experiences described in this brief outline of a refugee family 
resettling in the United States illustrate some of the unique qualities of refugee 
integration as opposed to other migrant type integration.  Such aspects include the 
location of resettlement, federal and local refugee assistance and services, and the wide 
and often illogical dispersal of friends and familial networks.  Nevertheless, some of the 
broader theories of integration and assimilation in geography and other disciplines can be 
applied to the refugee experience.  At the same time, scholars studying refugee issues 
have also conceived of frameworks and theories having to do specifically with refugee 
integration.  These different theories and frameworks will be discussed below.  
5.1.2 The Concept of Integration in Geography and Beyond 
 Integration can broadly be defined as, “The process through which immigrants 
and refugees become part of the receiving society” (Castles et al. 2001, 115).  This 
definition is extremely vague, however, and does not cover the many nuances and 
contested meanings of the word itself.  A number of scholars have suggested that while 
the term integration is often used, it is understood differently in different contexts 
(Robinson 1999; Castles et al. 2001).  As Castles et al. state, “There is no single, 
generally accepted definition, theory or model of immigrant and refugee integration. The 
concept continues to be controversial and hotly debated” (Castles et al. 2001, 114).  Other 
terms scholars, policy makers, and NGO workers have used in place or alongside of 
integration are assimilation, acculturation, adjustment, adaptation, incorporation, 
insertion, and inclusion.  The abundance of terms used to describe the resettlement of 
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refugees in a new place serves to highlight the contestation over the term and the idea of 
integration in general.  One idea that has become fairly integral in gaining a better 
understanding of integration, however, is that integration is a multi-dimensional two way 
process in which, to be successful, both the population arriving to a place and the host 
community must play a part in and be open to the resettlement process (Strang and Ager 
2010; Lomba 2010).  This paper ascribes to this aspect of integration; that successful 
integration (if that can be defined) requires both the participation of the host community 
(on various levels) and the refugee group as well.  It also supports the notion that 
integration is a long-term process and one in which, to be successful, refugees eventually 
gain the ability to participate in all sectors of the host society (Gray et al. 2001; Johnston, 
Vasey, and Markovic 2009).  
 Many of the works recently within the field of geography having to do with 
migrant integration are concerned with the dual issues of race and gender (Wright, Ellis, 
and Parks 2005; Ellis and Wright 2005; Cooke 2008; Winders 2008; Dannecker 2009; 
Woltman and Newbold 2009).  These issues do certainly relate to ideas and debates about 
immigrant integration and assimilation around the world.  Other important theories which 
have formed or been elaborated upon within geography having to do with migrant 
integration and assimilation are heterolocalism, transnationalism, and networks of 
ethnicity.  Heterolocalism (W. Zelinsky and Lee 1998) was formed in response to some 
of the older sociospatial theories of immigrant settlement and assimilation which came 
out of the Chicago School of Sociology in the first half of the 20th century (Park, Burgess, 
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and McKenzie 1925).  Immigrant assimilation in terms of sociospatial settlement patterns 
were originally thought to be concentrated on two key variables: knowledge of the 
English language and level and subsequent increase in socioeconomic status (Hardwick 
2008).  Spatially, it was theorised that immigrants initially settled in less wealthy 
neighbourhoods in the inner city which were more densely concentrated with ethnic 
immigrant populations and communities.  The densely populated immigrant areas would 
help increase an immigrant’s chance of successful assimilation it was thought.  The 
theory continued, stating that as their education levels and economic status rise, the 
immigrants would then move outward toward suburban areas of the city which were 
more affluent and whiter (W. Zelinsky and Lee 1998; Hardwick 2008).  It was views 
such as this, where success was often equated with assimilation to a predominantly 
“white” location and identity that gave rise to critical race studies in population 
geography.  And, breaking with the earlier sociospatial assimilation theories, Hardwick 
states, “ today’s suburban metropolis is a place where migrants from outside the US more 
often settle in a dispersed pattern during their earliest years of settlement instead of in 
immigrant-rich parts of the downtown area” (2008: 165).   
 Pointing out the various ways immigrant settlement patterns have changed in the 
US city and thus developing a new theory to explain these differences in the current 
spatial and temporal context is Zelinsky and Lee’s (1998) main concern.  As they state:  
A late 20th century phenomenon, heterolocalism is a function of the profound 
restructuring of the relationships within a globalising society among people, 
places, and social and economic entities.  The term itself refers to recent 
populations of shared ethnic identity which enter an area from distant 
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sources, then quickly adopt a dispersed pattern of residential location, all the 
while managing to remain cohesive through a variety of means (1998: 281).     
  
Zelinsky and Lee stress that this framework does not have to be considered as only a 
local one.  It can function at a regional, national, and/or international scale as well.  
Zelinsky and Lee’s idea of heterolocalism is important as it illustrates that where an 
immigrant settles is no longer as important as it once was, especially within a single city, 
because of advances in transportation and communication.  The authors point to five 
main characteristics of their model.  The third variable, which deals with the issue of 
communication, states, “Despite the absence of spatial propinquity, strong ethnic 
community ties are maintained via telecommunications, visits, and other methods at the 
metropolitan, regional, national, and even international scale” (1998, 285).  While the 
model of heterolocalsim may not be as relevant for legal-political refugees, as they do not 
usually choose their location of resettlement, it is applicable in that the wide dispersal of 
immigrant resettlement no longer necessarily has a negative impact on assimilation.  This 
point is at once true and problematic.  Heterolocalism assumes that embedded immigrant 
communities are no longer as important for immigrants as they can now connect and 
communicate over space.  This is true as technological advances have certainly increased 
the ease of communication.  It is difficult to imagine, however, that migrants (such as the 
refugee family in Austin) would not have an easier time integrating and reaching the goal 
of self-sufficiency if they were surrounded by a number of other Iraqis refugees, 
particularly Christian ones.   
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The model of heterolocalism shares a number of qualities with the theories of 
transnationalism and networks of ethnicity which also impact upon the lives of migrants 
and refugees.  Transnationalism has become an often used term and concept in studies on 
migration not only in geography but in many social science disciplines.  The idea of 
transnationalism in general, “necessitates a crossing of borders, both literal and 
epistemological” (Katharyne Mitchell 1997, 101).  In this context Mitchell goes on to 
state that transnational movement is not limited simply to people, but also to capital, 
goods, information, culture, and ideology (1997, 101).  Through this broad 
conceptualization of the term, it has become more than just a post-positivist critique of 
earlier migration studies (Smith and Bailey 2004).  It has, due largely to the 
advancements in transportation and communication that Zelinsky and Lee (1998) 
highlighted, become somewhat of a paradigm in migration studies since it is now so 
much easier for migrants to travel and communicate across borders.  In his discussion of 
transnational communities, Bailey defines them as “a set of intense, cross-border social 
relations that enable individuals to participate in the activities of daily life in two or more 
nations” (Bailey 2001, 413).  The idea of transnationalism has been increasingly 
important in geography as it points to the possibility of migrants identifying with more 
than one space, or having multiple spatial identities (Herrmann, Risse-Kappen, and 
Brewer 2004; C. Nagel and Staeheli 2004).  As Ley and Waters write, “Transnational 
migrants, who arrive at their destination without ever fully leaving their origin, represent 
another manifestation of the space of flows, for such sojourners have converted the 
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linearity of migration into the circularity of transnational movement” (Ley and Waters 
2003, 104).   
This idea of transnationalism, whether it be transnational flows of people, 
information, or money, has a profound effect upon migrant integration.  The movement 
of money and information across borders allows for a higher possibility of the successful 
integration of migrants in the host community.  The idea of “networks of ethnicity” 
which was first discussed by Mitchell (K. Mitchell 2000) is similar to the theory of 
transnationalism.  The notion of networks of ethnicity, however, draws more heavily on 
the process and importance of the transfer of information, and, of course, a shared 
ethnicity.  As Hardwick explains: 
These economic, social, and politically constructed networks may be internal 
(endogenous) social connections that are specific to one or more distinctive 
groups or external (exogenous) networks that provide newcomers linkages 
with the outside world.  Networks of ethnicity enhance the transfer of 
information among family and friends, co-workers, and co-religionists, and 
social networks shared by migrants with similar backgrounds may also help 
to cushion the impact of adjusting to life in a new place (2008, 172). 
 
It is evident through these concepts that they play an important role in discussions of 
integration within the wider field of migration studies.  They are theories that can be 
easily be used for studies of various types of migrants, refugees or otherwise.  Certainly, 
as is clear from the above case study of the Iraqi refugee family in Austin, the ideas of 
heterolocalism, transnationalism, and networks of ethnicity all play heavily into their 
integration experience.  However, while the Iraqi family in Austin may be more 
dependent on networking links across state and national borders to reach their family and 
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friends, Iraqi refugees in a place like Detroit, which has a large embedded Arab and Iraqi 
community, may be better theorized within Zelinsky and Lee’s heterolocal model.  
Although the concepts themselves overlap in certain ways, they also stress different 
important points: sociospatial patterns of settlement and assimilation, cross-border flows 
of people, capital, goods, and information, and the informational networks connecting 
migrants within a country or internationally. 
 Within refugee studies, Ager and Strang’s two part article outlining and analyzing 
their conceptual framework on integration is useful for further understanding the concept 
from the perspective of refugees in particular (Ager and Strang 2008; Strang and Ager 
2010).  The Journal of Refugee Studies has offered a space for scholars doing research on 
refugees broadly, and legal-political refugees in particular, to publish on issues of 
integration specific to refugees around the world.  Ager and Strang’s framework offers a 
helpful model for testing whether or not a refugee’s integration into a host society is 
“successful”.  After reviewing previous attempts to define the term and reviewing its 
related literature as well as doing primary fieldwork in areas of refugee resettlement in 
the United Kingdom, the authors identify a number of key elements, “central to 
perceptions of what constitutes ‘successful’ integration” (Ager and Strang 2008, 166).  
The four overall themes under which the elements of “successful” integration are 
organized are: achievement and access across the sectors of employment, housing, 
education, and health; assumptions and practice regarding citizenship and rights; 
processes of social connection within and between groups within the community; and 
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structural barriers to such connection related to language, culture, and the local 
environment.  Although Ager and Strang’s framework excludes the effect of transnational 
networks on refugee integration into host societies, it does offer a fairly comprehensive 
outline for which to measure the integration process in disparate places.  Ager and 
Strang’s focus on multiple and disparate aspects of integration allow for viewing the term 
not just as a process for policy makers to debate, but as a decisive human experience in 
the course of a refugee’s life.       
 Ager and Strang’s conceptualization of refuge integration is more detailed and 
comprehensive than Kibreab’s (1999).  The three main variables for Kibreab that affect 
refugee integration are attitudes of the host society, current policy environments, and 
employment opportunities.  The interesting difference between Kibreab’s integration 
framework and Ager and Strang’s is that Kibreab’s focuses much more on structure and 
much less on agency.  It is evident from the first three aspects of Ager and Strang’s 
model that they give the refugee much more credit in their (in)ability to make for 
themselves a successful integration experience.  The last of the four characteristics of 
Ager and Strang’s model, does account for “structural barriers” as they state, but the 
authors do not go in depth on the exact meanings of such barriers or the different varieties 
of barriers that may be faced by refugees.  Furthermore, Ager and Strang’s use of the 
word “barriers” implies that the structures in place in the host society are strictly 
negative.  They do not consider any structures that may happen to be beneficial for 
refugee integration.   
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 Kibreab’s integration framework also has its positive and negative attributes.  By 
focusing on structures, it stresses the importance of the role of place (particularly the 
place to which the refugee/migrant resettles) in affecting the integration process of the 
refugee.  Other than the inclusion of employment opportunities, Kibreab’s framework is 
vastly different from Ager and Strang’s.  His addition of current policy environments puts 
needed emphasis on one of the most important factors of legal-political refugee 
resettlement: the role of the state in those refugees’ integration experience.  Moreover, 
attitudes of the host society do play a role in the experiences and opportunities of 
incoming refugees.  This can be exemplified currently in the United States concerning the 
issue of the Iraqi refugee crisis.   
Inclusion of Iraqi refugees as one of the refugee groups to be admitted by the US 
was and continues to be an extremely slow process, largely due to the current post-9/11 
geopolitical context that the US finds itself in concerning the war in Iraq, terrorism, and 
an overall public mistrust of Arab populations.  This situation thus plays a role not only 
in number of Iraqi refugees who eventually are admitted to the US but also how they are 
subsequently (mis)treated by local populations in places of resettlement.  Therefore, 
Kibreab’s inclusion of this factor is useful as it provides another important variable left 
out of Ager and Strang’s equation.  However, Kibreab’s framework omits elements 
which can often be crucial in a refugee’s integration into the host society.  The most 
important variable omitted here has to do with social networks, not only within the 
community but also around the country and internationally.  Ager and Strang do mention 
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the importance of processes of social connection within and between groups in the 
community, but they limit their discussion to community networks and connections only.  
Both frameworks (Ager and Strang 2008; Kibreab 1999) need a more elaborate 
discussion on the various other types of connections and networks and their subsequent 
relevance towards refugee/migrant assimilation.  These networks and communications 
can be crucial for the successful integration of refugees in a given place.  
 Two of the few geographers working on refugee integration/resettlement in the 
US, are Hume and Hardwick (Hume and Hardwick 2005).  They use Kibreab’s 
integration framework to investigate the resettlement and integration experiences of a 
variety of refugee groups in Portland, Oregon.  One of their main concerns is the 
availability of networking and communication possibilities for these refugees in the 
Pacific Northwest.  One main difference, however, in terms of their research participants 
is that they chose: 
…refugees from sub-Saharan Africa, Ukraine, and the Russian Federation as 
the focus of this study because their migration decision making has not been 
constrained by the US government’s direct absorption policy, whereby 
certain groups of refugees were directed to particular settlement destinations.  
As such, these groups often make independent choices about migration and 
residential locations in consort with sponsors, resettlement agencies, social, 
political, and religious networks, and families and friends from home (Hume 
and Hardwick 2005, 191). 
     
In doing this, Hume and Hardwick, while still studying refugee populations here in the 
US, are researching populations with much more spatial agency then other more recent 
refugee groups being admitted to the US.  Through their study Hume and Hardwick find 
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that various types of networks within the community and internationally impact the 
resettlement experience of refugees.  They stress the importance of ethno-religious 
networks, networks with the local social service agencies, and other community networks 
in not only helping the refugee to find employment and housing, but also in simply 
finding “the strength to carry on” (Hume and Hardwick 2005, 205). 
 There are many other works within the refugee studies literature which deal with 
the various aspects of the refugee integration experience.  In 2010 a special issue of the 
Journal of Refugee Studies focused specifically on integration.  Within the issue, the 
articles dealt with topics such as citizenship and belonging (Strang and Ager 2010; 
Lomba 2010); policy as a structural barrier to integration in the UK (Mulvey 2010); 
marginalization and persistence of inequalities of refugee populations in Scandinavia 
(Valenta and Bunar 2010); deprofessionalization of skilled refugees (Smyth and Kum 
2010); and challenges with health care (McKeary and Newbold 2010).  There are 
numerous other works outside of this special journal issue that deal with the topic of 
refugee integration of course.  Mestheneos and Loannindi (2002) discuss refugee 
integration in the European Union.  Based on interviews with refugees in a number of 
different member states, they found that one of the major obstacles refugees faced in 
successfully integrating was the pronounced racism and ignorance of many Europeans 
towards the refugees.  This point relates to one of the characteristics of Kibreab’s 
integration framework which stresses the importance of the attitudes of the host society.  
Phillimore and Goodson (2008) use Ager and Strang’s conceptual framework of 
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integration to show how integration indicators rarely stand alone, but rather impact one 
another and are interrelated.  For example, they found in a number of instances 
throughout their research in the UK, that the inability to obtain good housing or the 
existence of health problems severely impacted a refugee’s ability to progress in terms of 
employment or education.  Dwyer (2010) was commissioned by the voluntary agency 
Church World Service (CWS) to write a paper about refugee integration in the United 
States.  Interviewing numerous CWS staff members as well as staff at selected local 
resettlement agencies, Dwyer attempts to build towards a more comprehensive definition 
of integration in the context of refugees resettling within the current American 
resettlement paradigm and then provides numerous recommendations for a more sound 
resettlement and integration framework.  Meanwhile, Fix (2007), writing about 
immigrant integration in general in the US, could easily be referring specifically to 
refugee integration when he states, “The integration of immigrants remains an 
afterthought in immigration policy discussions; in fact, integration remains one of the 
most overlooked issues in American governance.  As a result, there is a mismatch 
between the nation’s immigration policies – which, however broken, are on the whole 
comparatively generous – and the United State’s immigrant integration policies that are 
ad hoc, under-funded, and skeletal.  So today, as it has historically, the integration of 
newcomers is carried out by families, employers, churches, non-governmental 
organizations, and by an increasingly restive set of state and local governments” (2007, 
iii-iv).  This ad hoc underfunded system of immigrant integration that Fix describes is 
 165 
precisely the stated public-private partnership that the US refugee program is built upon.  
While some refugees do succeed under this system, there are many who fail to integrate 
under this paradigm.   
It is interesting to note that the United States, unlike many “Western” 
counterparts, has no true national immigrant/refugee integration policy or procedures.  As 
Dwyer states, “Despite decades of resettling refugees, the U.S. does not have a national 
policy on refugee integration that would outline clear goals, benchmarks and funding 
requirements, and even establish a formally accepted definition for integration” (2010, 3).   
The current US refugee integration paradigm is built upon the concept of self-sufficiency, 
which largely pertains to economic self-sufficiency.  While economic independence is 
certainly an important characteristic to strive for, for any individual, it leaves much to be 
desired in terms of feeling and becoming a part of a country/city/community.  Below, we 
will look in more detail at the idea of integration and self-sufficiency through the lens of 
a local resettlement agency in Austin and just a few of the Iraqi refugees who have 




Chapter 6: Structure, Agency, and the Receiving Institutional 
Environment 
  
As pointed out in the introductory chapter, I had the opportunity to work for 16 
months at a local refugee resettlement agency in Austin, TX from mid-2009 to the end of 
2010.  Through this experience I was able to gain an in-depth knowledge of the policies 
and procedures of the United States Refugee Program on the “ground level”.  What I 
found, and what was echoed to me through multiple interviews with directors and staff 
from various local refugee agencies in Austin and through refugees themselves, was an 
extremely flawed and in some instances failing program where refugees and agency staff 
alike were facing seemingly insurmountable obstacles.   
One of the words people often use to describe refugees is “survivors”.  Surviving 
war, violence, and discrimination in their home country and then surviving in refugee 
camps or (as is the case with many Iraqis) as refugees in urban areas is certainly 
remarkable.  Resettlement in third countries, especially the US, is also about survival, 
albeit a different type of survival.  Surviving in the US is a different game, the rules of 
which are largely unfamiliar to Iraqis and other refugee populations from different 
cultures and societies.  In the refugee resettlement community, the ubiquitous term “self-
sufficiency” has largely become synonymous with survival.  Pipher, in her thoughtful 
work on refugee resettlement in the US, notes, “refugees may arrive penniless but they 
don’t arrive resourceless.  They carry their individual attributes, their histories, their 
families and their cultures” (2002, 69).  Pipher then goes on to list what she calls the “12 
 167 
attributes of resilience” which include factors such as energy and good health, ambition 
and initiative, and flexibility.  These, as noted however, are individual attributes which 
are not carried by all and vary from one person to another.  Resettlement experiences in 
the US, and surely the world over, are thus extremely variegated from person to person.  
Surviving, achieving self-sufficiency, and successfully integrating into a country, city, 
and community differs from person to person and therefore cannot be easily assessed or 
defined.  What can be assessed however, is, first, the structure of the policy environment 
to which all refugees are resettling.  Refugee benefits are the same for everyone no matter 
their background or the specific attributes they bring with them.  A second characteristic 
that can be assessed and analyzed in the variegated process are the stories of refugees.  
While every story is different to an extent, themes and patterns do begin to present 
themselves.  While some of these stories come from one on one interviews with the 
refugees themselves, they also come from daily journals kept during the period in which I 
was working at the local resettlement agency.   
6.1 ALI’S STORY14    
 In the middle of 2010, RST received assurances for 3 single Iraqi males to arrive 
in Austin.  One of these Iraqis, according to his biographical data, suffered from some 
mental health issues but no real details were given on the state of his disorder.  When Ali 
arrived with the other two Iraqis, RST set up an apartment for the three of them to live as 
                                                             
14 All names have been changed to protect respondents’ privacy and confidentiality 
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roommates.  Ali was a Palestinian from Iraq (see chapter 3 for a discussion of the refugee 
situation of the Palestinian population in Iraq) and he was known to some of the other 
Palestinian Iraqis who had resettled in Austin as they had lived with him in the camp.  
They had heard through friends that he was to be resettled in Austin and before his arrival 
had often joked about the thought of his living in the US and attempting to integrate to 
life here.  
 Ali was certainly not the first refugee to come through RST’s doors with a mental 
health disorder.  For sure, many refugees from all different backgrounds suffer from 
mental health issues, whether those issues are related to past traumatic events or to the 
difficult transition to life in the US, or both.  Additionally, RST as a resettlement agency 
was somewhat unique from other agencies in that it houses a program formerly called the 
Greenleaf Program which was funded from outside grants (not federal grants) to provide 
mental health counseling services to refugees.  Because of the presence of the Greenleaf 
program, RST receives assurances for a disproportionally large amount of refugees with 
known mental health issues.  While the Greenleaf program is extremely valuable and 
necessary for many refugees, mental health issues unfortunately do not warrant increased 
benefits or services which are not available to all other refugee clients.  Furthermore, 
many refugees, even if they struggle with mental health disorders, refuse to utilize the 
services and counseling offered by Greenleaf because of extreme differences in the way 
that mental health treatment is viewed and treated in other cultures and societies.  Finally, 
because benefits or services do not differ for the most part for those that suffer from 
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mental health issues, RST resettlement and employment program workers are still 
expected to help these refugees achieve self sufficiency the same as any other refugee, 
which can be challenging to say the least.   
 After Ali’s arrival, RST immediately started getting complaints from his 
roommates about strange behavior which they did not know how to deal with.  Ali 
himself did not speak English, had no employment history, did not come with any family 
members, had little to no education, and then, of course, had known mental health issues 
which would certainly make life more difficult for anyone, no matter their background or 
nationality.  Ali received the full amount of benefits and services from RST and went 
through the program without success in finding a job.  When I left RST Ali was being 
enrolled in the Extended Case Management program at RST, which, according to RST’s 
website, “provides long-term case management services for clients with emergency needs 
and difficulties acclimating to their new environment.  The program focuses on resolving 
barriers to self-sufficiency by promoting self-reliance, accessing services within the 
community, and advocating on behalf of clients”15.  I knew this would be a difficult task 
for the extended case management team.  While there are services in Austin for low 
income populations with mental health disorders, the availability of services for those 
who don’t speak English is limited.  Those services become even more limited when it is 
for clients who only speak Arabic, not to mention that Ali speaks the Iraqi dialect of 
colloquial Arabic, not a dialect every Arabic speaking person is able to fully speak or 
                                                             
15 http://refugeeservicesoftexas.org/locations/austin/ 
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understand.  Moreover, most non profit organizations in Austin and certainly throughout 
the US, do not have the funding for translating services for clients such as Ali.  This 
leaves Ali with very few options for services outside of RST and with extremely limited 
funding.  The Extended Case Management program at RST, while it does provide 
advocacy and help in navigating other services in the community does not offer 
additional funding for refugees in need unfortunately.  And, like most other programs at 
refugee resettlement agencies nationwide, the Extended Case Management team consists 
only of one person with possibly hundreds of refugees who have applied for its services.   
 By the time Ali’s services with RST were coming to an end, his roommates were 
moving out of the apartment (as they had fulfilled their lease agreement) and finding new 
living arrangements on their own.  Upon leaving RST and in the days and months that 
followed I often wondered what happened to Ali.  Only a few months ago, while serving 
food to the homeless at a local church, I saw Ali come through the line to receive food.  I 
have since seen him interacting with other homeless individuals downtown.  
 The purpose of conveying this story is not to argue that the US should not have 
resettled this individual or other individuals like him.  Indeed, they should admit him for 
resettlement in the US.  The purpose of this story is instead to expose some of the failings 
in the American resettlement system which, I believe, could be resolved.  Additionally, I 
would argue not that the resettlement agency failed him, as he may believe it did, but that 
he was failed by a flawed national resettlement paradigm.  I would argue as well that 
RST did everything possible for Ali with the resources that they had and even going 
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above and beyond in searching for more resources that RST did not have.  There are 
many anti-immigration refugee-focused blogs that seize on stories such as Ali’s and use 
them to promote views which often center around the idea that the refugee resettlement 
program is broken to the point that it should be cut off from government funding streams 
and, more importantly from tax payers pockets.  In no way am I suggesting that this 
example should lead to cutting off the US Refugee Program, nor to decreasing the 
number of refugees in order to more adequately fund the refugees that do come here.  
Ali’s story is meant to highlight the fact that there are many refugees that come to the US 
with little to no “attributes of resilience”.  There are some, whether individuals or 
families, that need more than the allotted government benefits, that need extra help to 
survive.  Even refugees who arrive to the US with skills, language, and other various 
attributes often need more time and more funding to gain self sufficiency and to 
successfully integrate into the receiving society.  Many refugees need realistic long term 
services to have a chance at successful integration, not simply services based upon a short 
term, “in and out” resettlement program.  With this example in mind, let us turn now to 
the various financial benefits that refugees are eligible for upon arrival to the US.   
6.2 FINANCIAL BENEFITS FOR REFUGEES IN THE US 
 Upon arrival to the US, refugees are eligible to receive financial benefits for a 
specified amount of time.  It should be noted here that the benefits programs explained in 
this section are specific to Texas and to the way these benefits were administered to 
refugees at Refugee Services of Texas during the period that I worked there in 2009-
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2010.  Benefits programs differ slightly from state to state and even from agency to 
agency within a single state in the manner that they are administered.  The vast majority 
of funding for resettlement agencies and thus for refugees themselves comes through 
federal and state funding streams.  This, to an extent, is in opposition to the so-called 
public-private partnership in which the American refugee resettlement program is based 
upon.  While resettlement agencies do receive some support (financial and material) from 
outside grants, churches, and in some cases individuals, resettlement agencies for the 
most part are almost totally dependent on federal funding and federal programs.  As one 
local area resettlement agency employee pointed out during an interview: 
There are 371 affiliates [local resettlement agencies] now nationwide and I’m 
gonna say that roughly 85% of them operate on a budget that is 85% federal 
funds.  Private funding is just so minimal.  I know of another agency in the 
area which is 33% private funding and that is considered high.  Maybe my 
knowledge isn’t good in general in terms of non-profits and how much of 
their funding is private versus public but for refugee resettlement 
agencies…they are completely dependent on PRM and ORR. (Respondent 
12) 
 
This reliance on government funding has had a detrimental impact on refugee 
resettlement agencies as it has reduced the amount of benefits and thus the amount of 
help they are able to offer vulnerable populations here in the US.  This is not to say that 
the financial resources provided by the state and federal government isn’t necessary.  For 
sure, refugee resettlement would not be possible without the federal governments 
cooperation and financial support.  Their strict and majority control over the resettlement 
programs, however, especially at a local level can oftentimes restrict the flexibility of 
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local agencies in dealing with ever-changing realities “on the ground”.  The same agency 
employee makes note of this when asked what she needed to help her face the challenges 
of her job: 
…giving the technical training to diversify funding, coming out and talking 
about fundraising, how to do fundraisers, how to market your agency, how to 
talk to private foundations and donors in the community.  It’s still so church 
based and the church thing is from the late 70’s, it was even before the 
Refugee Act in 1980.  It’s not functional anymore. I don’t have a need for 
pots and pans and clothes and sheets anymore.  I have a need for emergency 
rent, I have a need for wheelchairs, I have a need for vocational training, I 
have a need for daycare.  I mean, its gotten a bit better with the per cap 
increase but the whole structure of the program has changed, its ever 
evolving and we are still using these really old tools.  So I just try to muddle 
through it myself and figure it out and you make a lot of mistakes along the 
way so its self-defeating and exhausting…we go to these conferences and we 
hear from the federal partners, “it’s a private public partnership, you have to 
do your part with the private sector”, but with what and how?  (Respondent 
12) 
        
What is learned from this particular passage is that not only are “we still using these 
really old tools” but there is also a lack of knowledge and training about how to diversify 
the tools, especially for funding, at the local levels.  Nevertheless, one of the main and 
most important aspects of the USRP program for newly arriving refugees are the various 
financial benefits programs.  These programs will be explored below.   
 The first type of funding which all arriving refugees are eligible for and which all 
refuges “receive” is what is known as USRP funds and is sometimes referred to as “per 
capita” funding.  Each individual that is admitted to the US as a refugee is allotted a pre-
determined amount of money the amount of which is set by the government.  When I first 
arrived to work at RST in June of 2009, the per capita income for each refugee was $450 
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per person.  This money is available to the local resettlement agency before the arrival of 
the refugee individual or family and is used by the agency for a number of goods and 
services for that individual.  For example, when the local agency receives the assurance 
from the national organizations (in RST’s case either Episcopal Migration Ministries 
(EMM) or Church World Service (CWS)) and the date of arrival, the agency must 
approve it and sign off on it stating that they will be responsible for resettling the 
individual.  This assurance is usually (but certainly not always!) received about 2-3 
months before the date of arrival.  Then, about 1-2 weeks before the refugee’s arrival, 
different members of the agency must make a number of preparations.  The main 
preparation that needs to be made is securing an apartment for the individual or group.  
Additionally, the agency must set up all services (namely electric and gas) and pay the 
deposit for all these services as well as for the apartment.  Moreover, the apartment must 
be properly furnished based on the age(s) and gender(s) of the individual or family.  All 
of these preparations are paid for using the per capita income of the refugees.  For 
example, for a married couple arriving in July of 2009, they would have a total of $900 to 
pay for their apartment deposit, electric deposit, pro-rated first month rent, food for the 
apartment upon arrival and all other items and furnishings (i.e. large furniture, towels, 
sheets, mattresses, bed frames, pots, pans, glasses, etc.) which are necessary and required 
by government contract for the apartment.  After adding up the cost of all of these 
services and items, the vast majority of the couples’ $900 would be spent before they had 
even arrived.  Oftentimes, during this period, many of the furnishings and smaller items 
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for the apartment were donated by church groups (one of the few ways in which the 
public-private partnership was actually occurring) and in these cases some of the per 
capita funding could feasibly be saved for later use.  At $450 per person, a family of six 
would be in a better financial situation than a married couple even, since they would need 
a larger apartment, if the pro-rated first month’s rent would be higher.  With $2700, 
however, as opposed to $900 the agency could do quite a bit more with that money, 
especially in having the ability to use it post-arrival on rent, food, and other necessities.   
Regardless of the size of the family and how much money they were allotted for 
the USRP per capita income, these were very difficult times for refugees resettling in the 
US due largely to the economic recession and the lack of jobs.  This was compounded by 
the fact that in the second half of 2009 refugees (especially those from Iraq) were arriving 
at an increasingly high rate.  As explained in the previous chapter, it took quite some time 
for the US refugee program to coordinate the program and process by which it would 
begin to process, admit, and resettle thousands of Iraqi refugees out of the Middle East.  
At the same time and in the same manner, it took the US refugee program quite some 
time to disperse the necessary funding to local resettlement agencies to appropriately staff 
their offices for the increase in arrivals.  At that time in 2009, for example, the RST office 
in Austin was staffed to resettle 280 refugees in that fiscal year.  Nevertheless, it resettled 
395 people.  The high number of arrivals with a low number of staff (who are underpaid) 
creates an unmanageable workload and leads, in many cases, to burn out and high staff 
turnover.  These two thinga are, of course, detrimental to the newly arrived refugees who 
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depend on their caseworkers and other agency staff members to help them through this 
very difficult and crucial period of physical, cultural, and psychological transition.  These 
characteristics, coupled with one of the worst economic recessions of the past 75 years, 
and insufficient USRP funding made refugee resettlement possibly disastrous for many of 
the refugees. This period was described by a few of the Iraqi refugees I interviewed (who 
arrived during that time).  Here is one example from an Iraqi who arrived to Austin in the 
first half of 2009: 
The time I came through RST in 2009 it was really terrible.  For example, 
there was no caseworker.  The caseworker had quit a week before I arrived.  
So the director was my caseworker.  And she was always busy.  Each time I 
had to go somewhere, they gave me a map and I was using the bus on my 
own.  Nobody showed me how to use the bus or read the map.  So each time, 
like if I was going to grocery store…and especially the refugee clinic, I had a 
terrible time finding that.  And nobody showed me how to get there. They 
would say, “just use bus #9” and I remember 3 hours walking in that 
neighborhood where the clinic is.  My wife and kid were crying.  3 hours.  I 
didn’t know how to get back to my home.  Plus there wasn’t enough money 
and food, 2 days with no food.  The food they put in the fridge was not 
enough to make a meal.  I depended on volunteers.  A volunteer lady saved 
me.  But I think it has improved a lot. (Respondent 2)   
 
This excerpt from the interview reveals the severity of the situation in 2009.  The 
combination of high arrivals and insufficient staff and funding created a situation that left 
people and families feeling lost, literally and figuratively.   
The Iraqi who I spoke to in this interview had a very small family and he spoke 
English so his outlook upon arriving to the US was possibly more optimistic than some.  
Take, for example, a Somali family I worked with who arrived to Austin in early 2009.  
The father of this family did not speak English and had eight children.  As resettlement 
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coordinator in late 2009, I was asked to meet with a number of the Somali refugees who 
had resettled through RST during that time.  They wanted to express to me some of their 
concerns about their resettlement experiences to that point.  Some of the most upsetting 
complaints came from the Somali father of 8.  He spoke about his difficulties in finding a 
job, his family often not having enough food to eat, and the poor living conditions at his 
apartment complex.  Many refugees come to the US with extremely high expectations 
about what life will be like here.  Wanting a job, food to eat, and decent housing, 
however, is not asking a lot and should have been easily accessible to all refugees 
arriving in the US. 
One of the reasons that there were refugees without enough food in 2009 was due 
in large part to what was referred to in the office as the “Texas food stamp crisis”.  One 
of the first things that has to be done upon a refugee’s arrival is to refer them to the state 
Department of Health and Human Services for food stamps and Medicaid benefits.  This 
can’t be done before their arrival, even if an individual has been assured because their 
signature is required on the application.  Once a refugee has received their food stamp 
card, the food stamps benefits for refugees in Texas are actually quite generous.  
However, in 2009, it was taking the state offices that administer the food stamp 
paperwork between 20 and 60 days to process the applications and send out the food 
stamp cards.  It usually took around 30 days.  The applications for food stamps and 
Medicaid are very long.  It is very easy either for a staff member at a resettlement agency 
or at the state office to make a mistake in filling out the application or while processing it.  
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If even a minor mistake was made it could possibly lengthen the wait for the food stamps 
dramatically.  There were a handful of cases which actually took almost six months for 
the clients to receive their benefits.  There were myriad other problems that could arise 
with the food stamps as well.  The Somali family of 9 referred to above, for example, 
received their initial food stamp cards fairly quickly.  The cards were, for some unknown 
reason, cut off earlier than they were supposed to be.  The caseworker for this family 
tried diligently to renew their food stamps in a timely manner but because of the 
unbelievably slow pace of the food stamp office bureaucracy, it took weeks.  To make 
matters worse, the father of the family could not secure employment despite the constant 
work of the employment team in attempting to help him find a job.  To survive, the 
family lived off of donated HEB grocery cards and donated food.  A number of other 
families had similar problems with the food stamp office, which created serious problems 
for the families and the agency alike.  It also caused quite a bit of tension between some 
of the refugees and the staff at the office as the resettlement agency staff was often 
blamed for the slow pace of the process.       
To provide one more example of the tensions created in 2009 between the 
resettlement agency and the refugee populations they were helping to resettle, earlier in 
the year, in July 2009, a large group of Burmese refugees protested early in the morning 
outside the RST office.  They were protesting what they deemed to be generally poor 
living conditions.  This was, of course, exacerbated by the state of the economy and the 
extremely limited funding to which the agency had access.  The director of the office 
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stated that she had already spoken to the Burmese community leader who had organized 
the protest and she had informed him that RST was sympathetic to their concerns and 
was doing everything it could with the resources it had.  For agency staff members that 
had been working with refugee resettlement for any length of time, there were no false 
notions about the flaws in the US refugee resettlement system.  As one former employee 
from the employment program at one of the resettlement agencies in Austin pointed out 
to me in an interview, “The US refugee program is not a quality of life program.”  Even 
when the state of the government funding improved at the beginning of 2010 (described 
below), this statement rings with truth.  The US refugee resettlement system is based 
largely off economic evaluations of self-sufficiency.  Keles, an anthropologist working 
on issues of refugee resettlement in the US notes, “The neoliberal, utility maximizing, 
rational decision making model of personhood adopted by the resettlement regime 
remains largely inattentive to the experiences, cultures, and capacities of incoming 
refugee cohorts” (2008, 6).   Despite this federal model, the government funded financial 
situation did improve for refugees and agencies alike at the end of 2009 and beginning of 
2010.      
In the middle of 2009, due to advocacy and complaints by local resettlement 
agencies across the nation about the (financial) state of the US refugee program, a 
delegation of government employees from the Bureau of Population, Refugees and 
Migration (PRM) and the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) went on a “fact-
finding” mission to numerous states to examine the state of the refugee program on the 
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ground level.  What they found was alarming.  They encountered agencies that were 
struggling to keep refugees in their apartments and, due to the severe economic recession 
at the time, to find refugees adequate jobs in a timely manner.  It often took (and this was 
the case in Austin as well) up to 6 months to find an individual a job (see the following 
section for more on employment issues).  The commission found that they needed to 
provide more substantial and sustainable funding not only for pre-arrival but also for the 
first few months after arrival, a crucial period in the resettlement process and for the 
refugees themselves and the local agencies to achieve short-term goals for their clients.  
The outcome of the fact-finding mission was, firstly, a doubling of the per capita income 
for each individual that is admitted to the US as a refugee.  This meant that for a single 
individual, instead of receiving $450 for pre-arrival and (maybe) some post-arrival 
necessities, the agency would now begin receiving $900 per person16.  With this extra 
money, agencies would not only be able to get all the pre-arrival services completed but 
have extra funds to spare for the client which could hopefully be used to lengthen the 
amount of time an individual’s rent could be covered, grocery gift cards, etc.   
The per capita increase went into effect at the beginning of 2010 and was seen as a 
huge success within the refugee resettlement community.  The emotional effects of the 
                                                             
16 This amount only includes the money that actually goes to the refugee or to set-up for the refugee.  
It does not include the amount that is used for administrative costs, such as staff salaries.  The full 
amount that is allotted for each refugee in full after the per capita increase was $1,875 per person.  A 
portion of this amount then goes to the administrative fees of each local resettlement agency. 
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increase was illustrated by a journal entry in late December 2009 when the staff at RST 
was informed of the change: 
There was a collective sigh of relief in our office today at the news of the per 
cap increase.  There has, for the last few months, been a lot of tension 
between the staff and clients due to lack of jobs, high arrivals, high 
caseworker-client ratios, and, as always, lack of funding.  Hearing the news 
of the increase will allow everyone some breathing room and will hopefully 
ease the tension in the office.  It should make the clients lives a bit easier, and 
will definitely help the situation of numerous programs here in the office.  
There are still certainly many things that would make the refugee 
resettlement system here more effective and efficient, but this is a great 
beginning.  (December 2009) 
 
Upon notice of this change in the funding of the program, there was a real sense of hope 
and excitement that the situation would improve over the coming months. 
 In addition to the doubling of the per capita increase, the second aspect of the 
policy change also included a financial program referred to as “flex funding”.  The way 
that flex funding worked was basically that each individual refugee was allotted $1100 
per person, not just the $900 per person.  The $900 of the $1100 was to be used 
specifically for that individual, however, and if there was any left over at the end of 90 
days, the remainder of that $900 could be distributed to the individual.  The extra $200, 
however, was meant to be “flexible” for the agency.  In other words, it did not have to be 
spent or given to the refugee with whom it was connected.  That $200 could be used at 
will by the agency for emergency situations or for other clients who were deemed to be in 
a more dire situation.  Thus the $900 was allotted to each individual and the extra $200 
was kept separately by the agency in a “pot” which could then, in theory, be used for 
 182 
those who needed extra.  While the idea of flex funding is a good one and useful for sure, 
it puts the agency in potentially difficult situations in that certain families will sometimes 
be distributed more money than other families who feel they are just as deserving.  The 
other major problem with flex funding is that it has to be used (or, at least, the check has 
to be written) within an individual/families first 90 days of arrival.  This rule greatly 
inhibits the flexibility of the program.  Most refugee families deserving of this extra 
funding, because of the per capita increase, do not need it within the first 3 months of 
arrival.  Most families or individuals who would be deserving of this extra funding tend 
to face their most difficult times at 6-9 months after arrival, shortly after their other 
funding programs have expired and they (especially as was the case in 2009 and 2010) 
may still be searching for full-time employment.   
 One of the difficulties with these guidelines is that caseworkers have to try to 
identify a “needy” family or individual within the first 80 days so that the agency can 
then write the checks that will be used in future months.  That, of course, requires quite a 
bit of guess work on the part of the resettlement program staff.  And what if a family 
leaves?  Or what if the working-age members of a family attain jobs and become 
financially self-sufficient?  They may not truly need that money then but the checks will 
have already been written.  Unfortunately, because the first 90 days after arrival are 
usually the most secure months for refugees financially, it can oftentimes be difficult to 
determine when someone may need the flex funding.  As the Resettlement Program 
Supervisor, I was technically “in control” of the flex funds and their dispersal to the 
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refugees.  I was therefore in close contact with the caseworkers in the resettlement 
program and with the staff of the employment program as to who was having medical 
issues, who was having trouble gaining employment, who did and did not have jobs, 
family emergencies, etc.  Oftentimes, flex funding dispersal was dependent upon these 
terms.  This was not the sole way in which flex funding was used at RST however.  As an 
office we also decided we could offer some refugees more funding then we ever had 
previously.  It was decided, for example, that we would pay 3 months of rent for all 
single individuals using the flex funding and thus allowing them to possibly save some 
money for future use with their unused per capita income.  It was also decided that the 
agency would use the flex funds to purchase new and nicer housewares and furnishings 
for the apartments for the new arrivals.  Previously, as stated above, many of the 
furnishings and household items placed in new arrivals apartments were used donated 
items from churches and other religious organizations.  While it would have been 
preferred to save the flex funds for future and much more necessary emergency usage, 
the limitations of the program guidelines prevented the agency from doing so.  This is 
only one of numerous examples where, because of misinformed guidelines, well-intended 
government sponsored refugee programs and policies become limited in their scope and 
ability to aid the aid the very populations they are hoping to serve.              
 Despite the much-needed increase, fortunately the USRP per capita income is not 
the only monetary benefit that refugees arriving to the US receive.  Because the per capita 
income is largely for pre-arrival services and necessities, there are two additional funding 
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programs for which recently arrived refugees are eligible.  The main purpose of these 
programs is to pay for rent, bills, and other necessary expenses such as groceries, bus 
passes, phones, and any additional expenses that may arise.  One of these programs is 
called the Match Grant (MG) program, which is administered at the federal level while 
the other is named the Refugee Cash Assistance (RCA) program and is administered at 
the state level. Individuals and/or families are not eligible to receive funding from both of 
these programs and it was up to RST to decide which family received benefits from 
which program.  Program policy dictates that all refugees should be explained both 
programs and then upon hearing the explanations and details outlining the benefits and 
guidelines of each, they are to choose which program suits them best.  During my time at 
RST, this was not being done.  RST, as an agency, decided that single individuals and 
married couples without children would be enrolled in the RCA program while families 
of three and four would be enrolled in match grant.  The reason for this is that the 
programs themselves are quite complex.  There are a number of rules and regulations 
attached to each which is very difficult to grasp upon first hearing.  Additionally, very 
few of the documents at RST and other resettlement agencies are translated into the 
native language of the refugee.  Of course, all the programs are translated to the refugee 
through an interpreter but the documents themselves rarely are. The thinking was then, to 
minimize confusion, make the process more streamlined, and enroll refugees in the 
program which was deemed to fit them and their families in the most efficient way 
possible, the agency decided the programs for the refugees.  Each of the programs have 
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their positive and negative aspects of course and each will briefly be explained below to 
better illustrate the financial context Iraqis and other refugees were resettling during this 
period.  
 For those refugees who were enrolled in the Match Grant program, they would 
receive (in addition to the USRP per capita income of course) three to six months of 
financial assistance.  The program itself starts 30 days after arrival (the first 30 days 
being covered by USRP funding) and after that point the program pays for a families rent 
for at least 3 months and up to 6 months.  Match grant recipients also receive what is 
called “pocket money”, in which twice a week they will receive a check for an amount 
which is determined by the number of people in the family.  At RST, the pocket money 
amounts were $50 per adult and $10 per child.  Pocket money is dispersed for a total of 
12 weeks and cannot be extended beyond this time frame whereas rent paid through 
match grant can be extended for longer than three months.  One of the things that makes 
the match grant program unique is that it is administered by the national agencies (i.e. 
CWS and EMM) and is based off a system where they allot a certain number of match 
grant “slots” to each local affiliate agency.  Therefore, RST, for example has a limited 
number of match grant slots it can use each year as it may receive 50 slots from EMM 
and 75 from CWS in a given fiscal year.  Because there is not an infinite number of slots 
available, the local agency has to carefully monitor how the slots are used and try not to 
run out of slots too early in the year.  Regardless, slots often do run out before the end of 
 186 
the fiscal year and in that case all of the remaining clients that arrive must be put on 
another program.   
The final important aspect to note about the match grant program is that if the 
head of the household finds full-time employment and keeps that job for at least a month, 
then the financial assistance will, according to the guidelines of the program, continue for 
an additional month and then be cut off.  This rule, of course, discourages refugees on 
match grant from finding full-time employment in the first three to four months of 
resettlement.  Many newly arrived refugees in the US lack knowledge about American 
workplace norms and expectations and many are fearful about the thought of losing their 
government sanctioned funding at such an early phase in their resettlement experience.  
This aspect of the match grant program needs to be reversed and should focus on 
rewarding refugees who find full-time work in the first 2-3 months after arrival rather 
than punishing them.  
 The other main financial aid program available to refugees is the Refugee Cash 
Assistance program.  RCA is an eight month program which is split into two main 
phases.  In the first 4-month phase, the client (based off the number of individuals in the 
family) receives the maximum amount of money, which is divided into two payments per 
month.  In the second phase of the program, the amount is basically divided in half and 
that is how much the client will receive throughout the second 4-month period.  The 
money for the program is of course meant to be used to help a newly arrived refugee pay 
rent, bills, etc.  There is no “pocket money” in the RCA program as there is in match 
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grant as that money is rolled into the bi monthly checks received by the client.  And 
unlike the match grant program, the RCA program rewards those who find employment.  
Per the rules of the program, anyone who finds full-time employment for a minimum of 
30 days will receive a bonus check of $150 without the worry of the program then being 
cut off.  No matter the amount or duration of employment, through the RCA program, 
benefits will not be cancelled.  This aspect alone makes RCA a much more desirable 
program.   
 Because the RCA program is administered and delivered by the state government, 
it is necessary for any refugee individuals with children who want to enroll in RCA to 
first apply for the Temporary Assistance for Needy Family program (TANF).  Single 
individuals or married couples without children are not required to apply for TANF.  
Thus refugee couples or individuals with children must apply for TANF.  The TANF 
benefits in Texas are not sufficient for a refugee family newly arrived in the US.  
Therefore (especially since the per capita increase) resettlement agencies are able to 
prove that their clients’ assets exceed the maximum allowed to be eligible for TANF and 
they are thus denied TANF and are then eligible to enroll in the RCA program.  Before 
the increase in the USRP per capita income, agencies sometimes had to scramble to make 
sure that refugee clients had enough assets to be denied TANF.  Large families of 5, 6, 7, 
8, or 9 were almost always enrolled in the RCA program through the TANF denial 
process in order not to take up needed match grant slots. 
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 Short-term financial funding programs are far from the only policies and 
programs that affect refugees in the United States.  While programs such as RCA and 
Match Grant are certainly necessary for a refugee’s first few months in this country, it is 
often not sufficient, even with the per capita increase which went into affect at the end of 
2009.  Moreover, various guidelines attached to the different programs run counter to 
helping and/or motivating an individual to achieve self-sufficiency.  The programs 
instead need last longer and the programs themselves should be equal in the way they are 
set up and administered, not only to make it easier for newly arrived refugees to 
understand, but also so all refugees are equally motivated and funded to progress and 
advance without the worry of losing their funding right away.  The next chapter will turn 
to some of the other structural policies that restrict and exclude refugees from achieving 
their goals, participating in the broader community, and thus from successfully 






Chapter 7: “Starting my life from zero”: additional social policy 
restricting refugee integration 
  
USRP per capita income, match grant, and RCA programs make up the extent of 
the state and federal funding available for refugees arriving in the US.  With the 
maximum amount of time a refugee may be able to receive funding being about 8 
months, there can be a lot of pressure put on individuals.  For some, eight months is more 
than enough time to begin to adequately, if not successfully, integrate into society while 
for others it takes much more time.  But job skills, language, health, family dynamics, 
past experiences, social and cultural networks, just to name a few, can all make a 
difference in the way and length of time it takes someone to feel secure, at home, and 
happy in their new environment.  Through passages from numerous interviews, this 
chapter will look at how a number of those factors are viewed and experienced by Iraqi 
refugees in the Austin, TX. 
7.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF TIME AND ATTENTION 
  Many of the refugees I interviewed, no matter their background, commented on 
how coming to the US as a refugee or SIV was like starting a completely new life.  As 
one Iraqi put it when describing his thought process before arriving in the US, “I will be 
starting from below zero. Like because I have nothing here, so I will go and try to find a 
job and start my life from zero” (Respondent 4).  Another Iraqi I interviewed stated it this 
way, “When you come here, you are like a newborn.  You don’t know the law, you don’t 
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know how to get things, you don’t know how to do all the paperwork.  People need that” 
(Respondent 6).  Another respondent when talking about expectations about living in the 
US as a refugee said, “I mean, you just start your life here.  We know it’s difficult but it’s 
a new life” (Respondent 9).  The image of being new born or starting a new life here in 
the US is a powerful one.  Even for those that came with knowledge of the English 
language (as many Iraqis do) feel that they are beginning again in the US upon 
resettlement.  Starting a new life certainly requires help, it requires support, and it 
requires time.  The current US resettlement process is lacking in some of these aspects in 
a number of ways.   
 First, the US refugee program requires that all refugees arriving in the US receive 
“core services”.  These services are carried out mostly by the refugee’s caseworker and 
include things such as picking up refugees at the airport, visiting them at their apartment 
in the first 24 hours after arrival, taking clients to the social security office to apply for 
social security cards, bus orientations (showing refugees how to ride and navigate the bus 
system), referring the client for medical screening (in Austin this is done at a clinic called 
the Refugee Screening Clinic), referring clients for food stamps and Medicaid (to be 
discussed in more detail below), enrolling them in employment services, and giving 
cultural orientations, just to name a few.  The core services are required to be completed 
in the first 30 days after arrival.  It is a long but necessary list of services to complete for 
each individual and, as stated, almost all are completed by the caseworker.  At any given 
time, caseworkers at RST had a minimum of 75 refugee clients they were actively 
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working with.  This kind of client to caseworker ratio does not allow for much time or 
space for the caseworker to do anything extra.  Additionally, the maximum length of time 
a caseworker can “help” a refugee client is 90 days.  At 90 days the caseworker must 
close the case.  Financial programs will (usually) continue after this 90 day period, as will 
employment services (if needed).  Regardless, 90 days is an extremely short amount of 
time for a newly arrived refugee to be “on their own”.  For many refugees, especially  
those that don’t speak English, the local agency is one of, if not the most important 
resource for social capital in the community.  To cut that off after such a short time is, for 
many, a scary experience especially when so many view arriving here as starting a new 
life.  Here is how it was described by one Iraqi respondent:  
A lot of Iraqis are coming here with high expectations and that is the picture 
that is drawn to their mind.  The rosy picture of America and the amazing 
life.  I was in Jordan for several years.  If I had gotten my permit to live in 
Jordan I wouldn’t have come here to America.  Why?  I don’t like it.  This is 
the life I should expect?  This is the apartment I should live in?  Where is the 
help?  How can I support myself?  What if I don’t find work?  These are the 
worries I have in my mind all the time.  How can I pass the 4 months if I 
don’t get a job.  I don’t want to be out in the street and that’s what many 
people think; after 4 to 6 months, if they don’t have a job, how can you live 
here? It’s not easy.  You have to rely on yourself. (Respondent 10)  
 
Another Iraqi respondent, who had actually worked for one of the local resettlement 
agencies as a caseworker for other Iraqis (a common and controversial practice around 
the country) also commented on the important aspect of time for Iraqis in particular and 
the possible outcome of not having enough time and support: 
I think the time of the resettlement; some people will have 4 months, or 6 
months, or 8 months.  It is very short.  Lets say 60% of them will work, they 
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will go and find resources.  But lets say 30 or 40% of them, they will have a 
hard time.  From this 30-40% some will leave and go back to the Middle East 
and some will find family or friends and go somewhere else in the US.   
 
How can those people be helped more?  I know the agencies are providing 
job specialists to help them.  But they need more attention.  If somehow they 
can spend more time with them on employment and other things, but it 
depends on the agency and how many employees they have and how many 
refugees they have. (Respondent 16) 
 
From yet another perspective, I want to include here an entire conversation from one of 
the interviews with one of the local agency employees who comments at length about the 
importance of time and the federal partners setting more realistic parameters: 
Apparently there was a 3-year resettlement program for the Vietnamese 
refugees.  And according to the CWS white paper, this worked better.  And I 
guess refugees now technically have access to 5 years of employment 
services and extended case management. Refugees have access to services 
over 5 years but do they really?  We know internally that doesn’t really 
happen.  So we’re looking at 90 days.  It used to be 180 days; in the 70’s it 
was 3 years.  So I think there is a question of the parameters being realistic.  
The other thing is they are going to start measuring outcomes. I sat in on a 
talk the other day in AZ and they [federal partners] want refugees after case 
closure, after 90 days of arrival, to be able to say “yes, I know that my current 
income exceeds my household expenses”.  They want clients to make that 
verbal statement themselves, independently.  They want clients to identify 
additional community resources where they can go and get their food stamps 
recertified if they need to.  They want them to be able to state who their PCP 
is. Many of those outcomes will be difficult to achieve.   
 
Do you think its realistic for people to say at 90 days that their household 
income exceeds expenses?  You have to acknowledge that refugees come 
here to be the working poor.  I think that’s the first barrier to overcome, to 
say point blank that you are going to be the working poor and you are going 
to live paycheck to paycheck and you are probably gong to come up short 
most months. And its clearly defined: income must exceed monthly expenses.  
Then you do the budget sheet with the client and they come up $20 short, I 
mean what are you going to do, you can’t say, well, close enough.  How do 
you have that conversation with the refugee, and then how do you have that 
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conversation with your funder.  We are supposed to be doing more in terms 
of job development and getting them living wage jobs, which is so 
impossible. It would be different if they made us go out and survey people a 
year after arrival.  And yes, then, ok, our income is finally exceeding our 
household expenses, or we are no longer on food stamps or whatever.  But 
why at 90 days? 
 
Do you think the number of refugees coming to the US every year is a 
problem [too much]?  No.  We have the capacity and the resources to resettle 
them the way they need to be resettled and address their needs.  It goes back 
to like, its like a bunch of pieces of a puzzle that are just thrown and each city 
has its pieces to make the puzzle whole but you just need the time and 
resources to put the puzzle together. It can happen. 
 
What does it look like when the puzzle is together?  Comprehensive 
streamlined services which should include time, investing time with clients. 
Time and compassion.  We have talked about compassion fatigue and people 
[refugee staff] are exhausted and they don’t have any more compassion to 
give. 
 
What about money, more funding?  The money is out there.  The private 
funds are out there, we just have to learn how to get them. So many times I 
have had clients in my office complaining to me, sometimes its about money, 
but more often then not its because they feel like their case manager isn’t 
spending enough time with them.  Like why didn’t they take me to the park, 
why didn’t they drive me to this appointment, why didn’t I get the 6th bus 
orientation because that’s what I need, I need 6 bus orientations.  It all comes 
down to time and I guess time is money and its all inevitably linked to money 
in some way…but the money is there, its just that more amazing people and 
foundations need to know about us. (Respondent 12) 
 
What these passages from the interviews all illustrate is that the process and policies for 
resettling refugees in the US needs more focus on giving additional and much needed 
time and attention to refugees that they are not receiving from the local agencies.  As a 
public-private partnership, most agencies and communities are expected to fill this gap by 
using community partners.  Some cities and communities are better than others at this of 
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course but generally, there are not a lot of additional resources for refugees to receive the 
time necessary to not only better understand their new homes but also to feel at home and 
to be truly integrated into the society. 
7.2 LANGUAGE 
 A second major factor aside from financial aid that is necessary for successful 
integration is language acquisition.  The US refugee program understands there is a need 
for learning English to achieve the goal of self-sufficiency and demonstrates this 
understanding by requiring all refugees who do not already speak English to attend 
classes.  Again, however, the classes that are required do not give most refugees nearly 
enough time to actually learn the language.  The importance of language is certainly not 
lost on the refugees themselves.  One English speaking Iraqi, unprompted, described how 
being fluent in English helped him have a sense of self-reliance in navigating his 
resettlement experience when he stated, “Language plays a big role in all this.  If you 
don’t know the language in this country, you will be lost.  There are some people who 
have been here for 16 months and they are still lost.  They don’t know where to go.  They 
ask everybody.  The language plays a huge role” (Respondent 6).  Another English 
speaking respondent when asked how he thought speaking English affected his 
resettlement experience he answered, “Oh, too much.  It’s a big difference, so big.  If you 
speak English it’s a lot a lot a lot easier.  I wouldn’t have come here if I didn’t speak 
English, no way” (Respondent 2).   
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 English as a second language classes in Austin are provided for all refugees that 
arrive here by a single organization: Interfaith Action of Central Texas (iACT).  As 
Austin has an increasingly high number of refugee arrivals, many of whom do not speak 
English, being responsible for helping all of them learn English is a challenging task to 
say the least.  iACT faces the difficulties of instructing hundreds of individuals from 
different cultural, linguistic, and educational backgrounds who live in many different 
areas of the city and who are also trying to find employment.  Despite and because of 
these challenges there are many Iraqis who feel that the classes are not useful for actually 
learning the language.  One respondent, when asked what he thought could be done to 
make the resettlement experience better in Austin he pushed for better English language 
learning services, “I think they should work at the English program.  First thing should be 
English.  The current ESL classes, not good.  I haven’t seen anybody in the current 
classes in my 2 years here get benefit from the ESL classes.  If I had the power I would 
do something to the ESL classes to make them better to do something in the refugees’ 
life” (Respondent 2).  And when asked about the ESL classes, a local agency employee 
stated, “its more social than about learning English.  Its like the beginning of integration” 
(Respondent 3).  This point is important as the classes do offer much needed social 
interaction.  Refugees from similar and diverse backgrounds who might be living in 
different areas of the city and who have arrived at different times are given the 
opportunity to meet and interact in these classes. 
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 Nonetheless, from a government standpoint of measuring outcomes, there is much 
to be desired in the time and intensity of instruction the refugees receive through these 
classes.  In an interview with the director of iACT, she fully acknowledges these issues as 
well as the ones expressed in the interviews quoted in the previous paragraph.  Here is an 
excerpt from the very beginning of her interview in which she succinctly lays bare the 
many difficulties and problems with the program: 
Yes, language is one of the most important aspects for a refugee to have a 
successful resettlement here.  To do anything successfully here.  And the way 
the refugee program seems to be set up is with this very wrong idea that all 
you have to do is go to English classes for a short period of time and your 
language problems are solved.  And we keep saying that that’s not the case 
because it takes at least 2 years to learn a language.  And that’s if you go to 
class and you have the time to do it. Maybe a year it would take if you have 
some basics.  But there is no way that you can learn in 2 or 3 months.  And 
then people are under so much pressure when they first get here with so many 
other things that the English is incidental the first month and then they have 
to find jobs and then they have no time and they are under more and more 
pressure.  So all of this affects language learning.  And the only way that I 
can see the program ever being a success, is if refugees are supported for at 
least a year.  And given the time to take English classes for a year, intensive 
English classes.  And then there is hope that they can assimilate and be 
successful.  If not, it’s all just band-aids.  I mean they are just short-term 
solutions that we’re giving them.  Like when they find them the job at 3 
months.  That’s not a solution.  They’re not self-sufficient; I mean who are 
we kidding?  Its just like we are all pretending, oh, its gonna be fine.  They 
are survivors and they are remarkable people.  But if they do do well its not 
due to us.  I mean, everyone that works with refugees are doing the best they 
can with what we are given.  I don’t believe anybody is not doing their best.  
But what we are given is so flawed.  And the expectations are ridiculous.  
And I think even the refugee programs themselves sort of word things in a 
way to make success seem possible.  For example, and I will just talk from 
my programs point of view but there are flaws everywhere, for ESL for 
refugees, all we are expected to do is offer ESL for one class session of 80 
hours and with that we will have fulfilled our requirements.  The contract is 
set by the contract with the ORR. We are only required to give that 80 hours 
(10 weeks) of instruction not necessarily to graduate people after they have 
 197 
spoken English.  But they have to have that first contact of English.  Its taken 
us years to accept the fact that we are just the first step, the brokers into the 
language and then its up to the refugees and we encourage them to go 
elsewhere.  But we are just that first facilitator of the language.  We’re really 
not teaching them much except to take the next step hopefully. (Respondent 
21)  
     
Every city and community has a different method for offering English as a second 
language classes to refugees, but this quote highlights the ubiquitous need for more time 
and more effective policies surrounding language acquisition.  Again, after the required 
services are completed, refugees, no matter their background, are required to use their 
own resources or agency to find the missing pieces of the puzzle and put them together.  
Sometimes, refugees are able to find support in that goal, and some others are not.  As 
described in the story of the Iraqi family for which I was a community advocate, 5 years 
after arrival, still none of the members of the family speak more than a beginner to 
intermediate level of English. 
7.3 CULTURAL ORIENTATIONS AND EXPECTATIONS OF LIFE IN THE US   
 A third issue that is important for refugee integration, especially in the first few 
weeks of resettlement, yet is inhibited by lack of time and sufficient resources is that of 
cultural orientation.  In accordance with USRP guidelines, all refugees in the US must 
receive a cultural orientation within 30 days after arrival.  The cultural orientation they 
receive in the US is in addition to the one that all refugees are supposed to receive 
overseas in the weeks before departing their country of asylum.  There were numerous 
complaints throughout the interviews and which could be easily observed through 
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working at RST about the effectiveness and benefits (and sometimes truthfulness!) of the 
orientations both in the US and overseas.  There is no doubt that the orientations should 
take place and could be very beneficial, regardless of the ambiguity of what a cultural 
orientation on America should entail.  In their current form, however, there were a 
number of issues with the orientations.   
 Like most other services in refugee resettlement, there is a lot of variation in how 
cultural orientations are carried out from agency to agency.  The main role of the USRP 
in the cultural orientations, is simply that they are conducted and completed and that they 
include bits of necessary information about issues like housing, bills, bank accounts, the 
use of 911, etc.  Cultural orientations in the US are packed full of useful and necessary 
information for those who are newly arrived in this country.  The orientations that took 
place overseas, however, covered (or were supposed to cover) what those who were 
about to move to the US could expect in terms of benefits, jobs, housing, laws, crime, etc. 
and how to prepare.  Upon arrival in the US, though, many Iraqis noted that the reality 
was much different than what they heard in their overseas orientations.  
 Discussing first the issues and effects of the overseas orientations, many Iraqis in 
the interviews and throughout my 16 months working at RST expressed their discontent 
about their resettlement experience based upon what they had been told in the 
orientations overseas.  Apparently, many of the orientations taking place in counties such 
as Syria, Jordan, and Turkey were fueling what were already sky-high expectations Iraqis 
held about what life in the US would be like.  In most of the interviews, when asked what 
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they knew about life in the US, or what they expected life to be like here, most Iraqis 
noted that the only perceptions they had of the US before arrival were what they had seen 
in American movies shown on Arab television channels.  Speaking specifically of the 
pre-arrival orientations, views of life in the US were apparently only glorified despite the 
state of the American economy and the realities of the US resettlement program.  
Generally, what became clear is that the pre-arrival orientations did not make clear the 
difficulties of transitioning to life in the United States.  One Iraqi noted, “I had high 
expectations but the reality is so different, so much different then I expected.”   
 It should be noted here that SIV’s and generally any Iraqis travelling straight from 
Iraq to the US, did not receive a cultural orientation before departure.  Thus many of the 
SIV’s I spoke with in interviews discussed how they would talk extensively to American 
soldiers that they knew in the Green Zone to quiz them about life in America.  One Iraqi 
SIV, for example, who had left from Baghdad but had to stay in transit in Turkey for 
about 2 months where there was already a substantial population of Iraqi refugees, said: 
To be honest with you, I might have a different idea, but a lot of people [Iraqi 
refugees] I heard, in Turkey, I spend 45-50 days there.  I had to listen to 
them.  I had to hear their stories and they were expecting to come here and 
have everything set up and have everything provided for them and jobs 
provided for them…which is crazy.  You can’t think that way.  If you want to 
move somewhere to start a new life, you gotta work harder, and think harder, 
think further because you are going to be starting from nothing even if you 
have enough money with you to survive for like a year or something.  They 
were thinking that way …who?  The Iraqis, so I was telling a lot of them 
from experience and from what I was hearing from the soldiers, I was like 
hey guys, its not like this.  Trust me, I mean, I’ve never been there so call me 
crazy but, the life in there is really…I mean you gotta be serious to survive in 
there.  They were like, no, everything is gonna be just fine, life is easy.  I said 
no, its not easy.  First you go there and you gotta be smart. You got to be able 
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to in a short time find a job, find a safe place to put your family, don’t worry 
about if you are going to see Iraqis around, it doesn’t matter, because 
everybody is going to be busy in his life, the only thing you need to focus on 
is your work and your family and how to cover your rent.  They were all like 
nah nah, you are wrong and I was like, I am telling you.  I’m not trying to 
show myself like I was smart or something, but I was just trying to learn from 
people around me and learn from their experiences. So 6 months before I got 
here, I was always asking question to my friends, the soldiers, how do you do 
this, what about work, what about kids and families, day care, so I was asking 
a lot of questions to feed my brain.  I didn’t want to be surprised and that’s 
why when I got here I wasn’t surprised… I know what the life is here.  I 
know a lot of them [Iraqis] are expecting one thing but the reality is 
something else.  But I heard that a lot of them went back to the country [to 
Iraq], but I don’t blame nobody.  They have to blame themselves because 
they had the wrong picture before they came here. (Respondent 4)  
  
This passage illustrates how this specific Iraqi who came through the SIV program used 
Americans that he knew in the military to go through what could be thought of as an 
informal cultural orientation.  The point he makes here when referring to the other Iraqis, 
however, is extremely important to remember as it is these Iraqis (those who are not 
SIV’s) who make up the majority of those that have come to the US as refugees.  And for 
various reasons, as he points out, many of these Iraqis did not have an accurate view of 
what life in the US would be like.  And for various other reasons, which are not clear, the 
Iraqi refugees he refers to in this story refused to believe him even when he shared with 
them what he had heard from his American friends about the difficulties of life in the US.  
Sometimes people believe only what they choose to believe. 
 In this quote the respondent also discusses the idea of Iraqis coming to the US and 
then choosing to go “back to the country”, back to Iraq.  This did happen with a small 
number of Iraqis in Austin and there are other documented stories from around the 
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country where Iraqis have chosen to return because they cannot or simply do not want to 
deal with the difficult transition here.  For some, it is too much to bear.  Some choose to 
leave because of lack of work, some because of language, and others simply because of 
what they perceived to be stark differences in the culture and structure of society.  
Another of the Iraqi SIV’s that I interviewed told a story of a friend that he had who was 
also an SIV, who spoke English, but still decided to return to Iraq with his family. 
I had a friend, he used to live in Michigan, he lived there because he couldn’t 
find a job and he realized that if he stayed in the states, he will have to live 
his life without seeing his family because he is going to work late and the 
problem is, his wife didn’t adjust.  I was patient with my wife.  Taught her 
how to drive, things like that.  He wouldn’t do it.  He kept his wife in the 
apartment and even the kids, he will drive them to school and bring them 
back from school and this is why he lost his job because he couldn’t leave at 
3 o’clock.  But he would leave to bring his kids anyway and this is why he 
got fired.  So he worked only weekends so he had the time to take them back 
and forth to school and he couldn’t make enough money to live so he decided 
to go back to Iraq.  It was tough.  But he was a good guy, I worked with him 
at the embassy.  But each family has its own difficulties, its own story. 
(Respondent 16)     
 
 
In this quote, the friend of the respondent had trouble balancing his own religious and 
cultural norms with the structure and culture of the receiving society.  Unable to find the 
proper balance, he decided to return to Iraq.  This is a good example of how cultural and 
societal differences need to be accounted for through policy and more generally by the 
receiving society.  The man being described in this passage obviously felt restrained and 
possibly even paralyzed in the US due to his own deep-seated cultural values and his 
direct or indirect ideological strictures.      
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Another example of an Iraqi that decided to return to Iraq is one that comes from 
my experience of working at the resettlement agency.  When I first started working at 
RST as an employment specialist, one of the first Iraqi refugees that I worked with was a 
young man from the western slums of Baghdad.  He had had a head injury at a young age 
that had impaired his mental health to an extent and thus he had neither education nor any 
work experience.  He spoke no English and the location of his family was unknown.  He 
arrived to the US at the same time as two or three other single Iraqis so he had roommates 
who he could communicate with and ostensibly get support from.  Unfortunately, he and 
his roommates fought often, to the point when they had fulfilled the lease for the 
apartment they were sharing, he was left on his own as they decided to find separate 
living arrangements.  I was tasked with trying to help this young Iraqi find employment 
here.  I helped him apply for numerous jobs of all kinds but no one would hire him.  After 
being in the US for about 6 months, with financial help from one of the local mosques, he 
returned to Iraq.  This individual did not believe that relocating to a different city or state 
would help his situation in the US and thus he decided the only way he could continue to 
survive was if he returned to the Middle East.   
This story and the one told in the excerpt from the interview above about the Iraqi 
SIV in Michigan who decided to return are not the only ones of its kind.  In 2008 and 
2009 as more and more Iraqis began to arrive in the US during the recession and into a 
resettlement system that was vastly underfunded, many Iraqis, especially those who had 
come from middle class and educated backgrounds were feeling disillusioned and 
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hopeless about what their future would be like in the US.  Figure 5.1 is a screen shot from 
an article from the Salt Lake Tribune from March 11, 2009. The article, entitled “Iraqi 
refugees returning to danger zone to escape poverty in Utah”, tells of an Iraqi lawyer who 
was resettled with his large family in Utah and after six months felt, “betrayed by the 
United Nations’ promises and the scant help offered by the American resettlement 
system.”  One of the Iraqis interviewed for the article, who was slated to return to Syria, 
states, “We feel like we’re human beings there.  We feel like here we are mice.” 
Whether it is the lack of cultural awareness here, major cultural and societal 
differences, the economy, insufficient resettlement benefits, or a combination of these, 
many refugees and Iraqis in particular can find it extremely difficult to transition to life in 
the US.  One of the disadvantages of being a male researcher and conducting interviews 
with Arab and Islamic populations is that it is difficult and often considered culturally 
inappropriate to interview women.  Only having done two interviews with female 
respondents, much of my knowledge about the resettlement experience for Iraqi women 
came through participant observation at the resettlement agency or if male respondents 
discussed their wives or other female family members’ experiences in the US.  The Iraqi 
SIV who had previously worked as a resettlement specialist at one of the local agencies 
in Austin offered a fairly detailed view of his wife’s experience in the US.  Her    
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Figure 7.1 Article from Salt Lake Tribune on refugees returning to Iraq 
 
Source: http://www.sltrib.com/news/ci_11808992 
experience, it seems, has been in stark contrast to his own.  He states: 
My wife is learning the language.  Her experience has been more difficult.  
The language was a big barrier for her.  And the culture thing.  She comes 
from a very protective family.  She doesn’t mix easily with the people here. 
She wears a scarf.  When she sees a Muslim without a scarf, she says I don’t 
want to.  So she doesn’t have this accepting thing but she is just now 
changing, because it is a different culture, you will do whatever you want to 
do and you don’t judge here. She is very protective for our daughters because 
she doesn’t want people from overseas to say you lost the culture.  But now 
she is doing OK, after she got the drivers license and the car, she felt like 
now she has the right to do almost anything.  The first year she just sat at 
home doing nothing.  I tried to take her to ESL classes but our son was very 
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young.  Now he is a little bit older and my daughters can take care of him 
maybe if we left the house for an hour or two and now she has a car she can 
go to ESL classes so she goes to a school here now every day and she is 
learning, she has a friend, and my sister in laws are her friends so she is doing 
better than the first year. (Respondent 16) 
  
Many Iraqis admitted to having unrealistic expectations however.  And while they 
were surprised at the challenges in transitioning to life after arrival in the US, most adjust 
to the changes without discussing the desire to move back to Iraq or other countries in the 
Middle East.  Concerning these expectations, another Iraqi respondent said, “The reality 
in the US is the opposite of what I was thinking.  I thought I would come here and find a 
job so easy.  That I would come here and have fun and work, not care about money 
because I will make a lot of money, build my future and buy a house, down payment, I 
will buy a car and live alone and all this stuff.  But when I came here I found it was too 
hard to do all this stuff” (Respondent 9).  Here is how yet another Iraqi described her 
experience in terms of the differences from what she was told in the overseas orientations 
and what she found life to be like once in the US: 
Yes, they gave us an orientation.  They told us when we first got to the US; 
we would get a job and work right away.  But the reality was kind of different 
then the way they were explaining it to us in the classes.  We weren’t 
expecting to face such big challenges when we first got here to the US.  They 
were saying that when we get to the US, we will get a job, and we will work, 
and we will live our life just like anybody else.  The reality was though, that 
there were a lot of challenges especially when we got to the point where we 
were going to find a job.   
 
We were assigned to RST and started receiving the government benefits.  
And then we started facing the challenges.  The rent was more expensive then 
we were expecting it.  With the jobs, we had to start going to churches and 
mosques asking for support to survive.  We were between here and there, just 
 206 
to keep going through our days and live from day to day.  People in the US 
are merciful though and helped us a lot.  A lot of people helped us.  We are 
getting there, we are in the process.  My son is disappointed though. He has 
kind of given up because he cannot find a job because it is so hard to find a 
job.  Same with my daughter but I am trying to accommodate them and I 
explain to them, you remember how we were living back in Iraq and what we 
were dealing with.  Its not always going to be like this, you have to be patient 
because it will take some time.  But I feel like all the responsibility is on me.    
 
With the language barrier, it has been difficult.  We are just trying to keep 
learning.  We try to learn from the books, we try to learn from talking with 
people.  When we first got here, we couldn’t communicate with anybody.  
But things change.  Things are getting a little bit better, my other son is in 
second grade and he is communicating and I can communicate a little better 
with people from when I first arrived.  But we were definitely feeling 
pressure.  With language and work.  Thought we would find a job easy but it 
wasn’t like that. We are just trying to catch up with life, and to live our life. 
(Respondent 23) 
 
This quote comes from an interview with a Palestinian Iraqi woman who lived for three 
years in United Nations refugee camp along the border with Syria.  As one can see from 
this passage, this individual and her family were largely unprepared for life in the US.  
While it is difficult to determine how much a cultural orientation overseas could have 
prepared them for life in this country, had the situation been explained to them more 
clearly, it might have made life here in the first few months more bearable.  Here is yet 
another example of an Iraqi refugee that was in Syria for 3 years. 
We had orientation before coming to the US.  It was 3 days long.  Man, they 
made it like the greatest country in the world.  They said you will get a job 
like this (snaps fingers), you will get a benefit for a long time, you will get 
everything, you will get your own apartment, you will get your own things, 
you will get assisted for a year.  Really, ask any of the Iraqis that came 
through Syria, or Jordan, or Turkey.  At least at that time, that is what they 
said, I don’t know if they changed the process.  But at that time, man, they 
will offer 1 2 3 4 5 6 7, everything.  The people giving the orientation were 
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Syrian, but they work with the UN.  And they had been in America here 
before to do the training and now they are back in Syria to do the orientation.  
So when I came here I was shocked. (Respondent 20) 
  
Certainly orientations, whether in the US or overseas, are not the sole answer to a 
smoother transition and integration experience for all Iraqis (and refugees in general) who 
struggle in the first months and even years in the US.  But it is part of the answer.  
Quoting again from the Iraqi SIV who worked and volunteered with the resettlement 
agency here in Austin: 
First, when I worked with the local agency here, I wanted to do something 
about cultural orientations.  The ones overseas we couldn’t do anything 
about.  If we could do something about that we wouldn’t have all the shocked 
families here.  We would have families who say, “we don’t want to go” [to 
America].  This is why we have a lot of families who are shocked.  And some 
families will have the shock time longer than other families.  It depends on 
how you will accept the change and the change is not about changing the 
religion or the culture, its just realizing how the new life is working, how 
people are thinking.  So many things are different here.  This is why Caritas 
and RST have a hard time with Iraqis, because Iraqis have high expectations. 
The minute I walked a family into an apartment [for the first time] they say, 
where is the TV, where is the satellite.  (Respondent laughing) What 
satellite?  They say, they told us back in Jordan they are going to find us 
anything.  I have families that argued with me and wrote a complaint against 
me because I didn’t go to the airplane door to pick them up.  I can’t, I’m not 
allowed.  They said that someone told them there [in Jordan], that someone 
will pick you up from the door and they will give you a house.  Just recently 
as a volunteer I settled a lady and she said where is my house?  I said, ok, you 
have an apartment, she said no, she said the minute I applied as a refugee, 
they started to build my house.  I said that’s not true. I spent 2 hours at the 
apartment talking to her and she said, no, I will not live with a roommate. I 
said, OK, just spend the night and tomorrow a case manager will come to 
you.  I am a volunteer.  I cannot do anything. So you need to talk a lot and 
just explain to them and some of them will not accept it.  But usually they 
will adjust.  I realized, I learned from my experience, they will adjust.  They 
will stay, I think only 4 or 5 families [in Austin] have left the country.  But 
almost all of them will say they are going to leave but they will stay.  I know 
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3 families that went back to Iraq and it was very difficult for them.  Life was 
too hard to adjust to. (Respondent 16)  
 
This Iraqis assessment that more direct overseas cultural orientations would result in a 
less “shocking” experience for Iraqi refugees echoes other refugees’ comments that more 
straightforward and candid orientations post-arrival would have positive long term effects 
as well.  More importantly, this Iraqi respondent is sharing some experiences he had with 
other newly arrived Iraqi refugees.  He paints a picture of numerous misinformed and 
disillusioned refugees but also illustrates that adjustment is challenging, to say the least, 
not just for the Iraqis, but also for the resettlement agency staff who are unprepared and 
unknowledgeable about Arab and Iraqi culture.  “So many things are different here.  This 
is why Caritas and RST have a hard time with Iraqis…” Surely things are different here 
for other arriving refugee groups as well.  So why do resettlement agencies, as this 
respondent notes, have a disproportionately hard time working with Iraqis?  He blames 
this partially on the “high expectations” of Iraqis.  But he also lays partial blame on the 
difficult cultural transition from Iraqi Arab culture to “how the new life is working” and 
“how people are thinking” here.  Understanding these transitions are not easy and 
guidance is necessary.  Cultural orientations, whether overseas or in the US, are 
inadequate for guiding many Iraqi refugees through the difficult navigation of “new life” 
in the US.    
 The post-arrival orientations conducted at all resettlement agencies, as noted 
above, vary in structure from agency to agency.  They are required, however, to cover a 
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number of important topics and issues for newly arrived refugees such as detailed 
financial benefit explanations, budgeting, health and wellness issues, information about 
long-term case management and immigration and citizenship documentation.  It is a lot of 
information and it is difficult to retain it all at once.  Additionally, as many refugees do 
not speak English, the information must be received through an interpreter, which can 
make the process take much longer and can make it more difficult to understand.  In one 
interview with an Iraqi refugee who spoke English, when asked what could be done in his 
opinion to improve post-arrival services, he immediately mentioned orientations.   
They need to improve orientations.  They didn’t know how to deal with 
Iraqis. They put us in another case because they said you guys speak English.  
They said you guys know what to do.  I said yes, we know English but we 
don’t know what to do.  So our reference was our [Iraqi] friend who got here 
one week before us.  We need better cultural orientation.  Most refugees 
know nothing of American culture…the uneducated people, they know 
nothing, especially the old people.  They need more orientation culturally.  
What they have to do, what they should do, what they shouldn’t do, what 
they can do, what they can’t do.  Not to push them to find a job.  Help them 
understand this first and then they will have experience to find another job. 
(Respondent 9) 
 
Another English speaking Iraqi refugee brought up orientations and the role the case 
managers should play in better preparing the new refugees for life in the US. 
I think they are doing better now because the [USRP] money has increased 
and they are using the money well, trying to make this money last for a long 
time.  So I think the current program is the best so far.  However, they [the 
local resettlement agencies] need to train the caseworker to be more 
professional.  The caseworkers are not enough trained.  How so?  In how to 
deal with the refugees.  Not culturally, but how to make the refugees realize 
the difficulties here.  Orientations are not working well. I would prefer more 
one on one conversation.  At orientation they are giving 90% of the 
information and the refugees are keeping only 5-10% of all of this 
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information. Like my orientation, I couldn’t take all the information.  Even 
though I could speak English, I’m like no way. So the one on one 
conversation will be a lot better.  Yes, the caseworkers should better prepare 
the refugees for the difficulties they are going to face.  People expect 
everything [here in the US] will be smooth and its not. (Respondent 2) 
 
Through all of these examples, it becomes clear that the current method for structuring 
and providing cultural orientations to refugees both overseas and in the US is lacking.  As 
all of these excerpts illustrate, a more candid and blunt delivery of the way of life here in 
the US is needed.  This point seems to stand out especially for the Iraqi refugees because 
of the specific historical, cultural, and political contexts from which they are entering the 
US.  While integration for refugees is difficult no matter the background or country of 
origin, Iraqi refugees, while coming from a situation of extreme violence, are also coming 
from largely middle class backgrounds.  Many of the Iraqis that arrived and are 
continuing to arrive here are educated, English speaking, and have vast professional and 
technical job experience.  Even those who do not come from middle or upper class 
backgrounds, come from a society where there were vast governmental programs 
subsidizing food, water, shelter and other basic needs.  According to a 2004 UNESCO 
report on the state of Iraqi education, “prior to the period of the Gulf War and subsequent 
economic sanctions, the country had one of the best performing education systems in the 
region” (UNESCO 2004, iii).  When comparing Iraqis as a refugee group arriving to the 
US then to other refugee groups coming from much different historical and political 
contexts, one can begin to get a sense of why expectations of Iraqis seem to be much 
higher than those of some of the other refugee populations resettling in this country.  It is 
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not just the higher expectations that make the transition challenging for Iraqis here 
however.  It is also, of course, cultural difference.  As seen from some of the passages 
above and will be seen in more detail below, deep-seated cultural values and ideological 
strictures, regardless of religion and religious views plays an important part in making the 
transition here.  In many respects, the challenge of integration and of transition to life 
here for Iraqis goes much further than language and financial benefits.  It has to do with 
the presence of true guidance and help.  Without this, the current resettlement paradigm 
runs the risk of turning a general sense of disillusionment into real depression and 
anxiety, or worse, forcing some Iraqis to return to the heart of the very conflict they tried 
so hard to escape.   
The policy structure of the US resettlement program, English language initiatives 
and cultural orientations are not the only issues facing Iraqis for successfully integrating 
into American society however.  Employment was also a major factor in the resettlement 
experience of Iraqis during this period, as it was for all refugees coming to the US of 
course.  Iraqis’ experience with finding employment in the US was somewhat unique 
however largely because of some of the contextual differences laid out above.  The next 
section then will deal with the issue of employment for Iraqi refugees in the US in 2009 






Chapter 8: “Settling into a life of poverty”: Iraqi refugee resettlement 
and employment in the US 
  
It is impossible to have a discussion about refugee employment in the United 
States in 2009 and 2010 without mentioning the state of the economy in this country at 
that time.  Even though there was quite a bit of secondary migration of Iraqi (and other 
refugee groups) refugees from other states to Texas because of perceptions of a stronger 
economy in this state, jobs were scarce, especially for newly arrived refugees.  As an 
employment specialist for Middle Eastern populations at RST and then as manager for 
the entire employment program, I was experiencing daily the difficulties of finding jobs 
for refugees in Austin, TX.   
This chapter will thus first look at the important issue of employment as it relates 
to newly arrived Iraqi refugees in 2009 and 2010.  Through data from interviews with 
both refugees and with agency staff, it covers aspects of the economic recession into 
which the refugees were resettling and the types of jobs that were typically offered to 
refugees and the initial reactions of Iraqis to those positions.  This section of the chapter 
illustrates some the cultural barriers which prevented almost all Iraqis from, at least at 
first, accepting entry level positions which are often offered to refugees.  After discussing 
employment opportunities (or lack thereof) the chapter turns briefly to issues of agency.  
While much of the last two chapters have discussed structural barriers and hurdles to 
successful integration in the US, agency is, of course, an extremely important aspect of 
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how integration happens.  The second section of this chapter will thus look at how Iraqis 
use their own agency and initiative to “catch up with life” here in the US. 
8.1 (LACK OF) A FUTURE IN THE US: EMPLOYMENT VARIABLES FOR IRAQI REFUGEES  
No matter the state of the economy and no matter what refugee group one is 
working with, there are, unfortunately, only a handful of types of jobs that refugees will 
be accepted for. Unfortunately, most of these jobs are entry level and low-paying hourly 
positions.  Depending on the city, refugees are often employed in whatever industry is 
prevalent in that place.  In some cities, for example, plants, factories, or agricultural 
positions abound and oftentimes these industries offer plentiful opportunities for newly 
arrived refugees who do not speak English.  In Austin, these types of industries are much 
more scarce.  The main employers of refugees in the Austin area are hotels and 
warehouses, with other types of businesses filling in the gaps such as grocery and 
convenience stores, restaurants, hospitals, etc. During 2009 and 2010, refugees (with or 
without knowledge of the English language) applying for positions in these industries 
were encountering increasingly high competition in an environment of decreasing job 
availability.  This only made the task of securing employment more challenging.    
In 2009, before the USRP per capita increase, and when the economy in the US 
seemed to be at a low, there was a lot of pressure on refugees and employment program 
staff alike.  As there was not sufficient emergency funding past the allotted benefits 
period, it made employment an imperative, not just as an aspect of “successful” 
integration, but simply for surviving.  Ironically enough, the types of jobs that are often 
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secured for refugees new to the US (i.e. entry level, low wage, hourly) are commonly 
referred to in the resettlement field as “survival jobs”.  For many Iraqis, these types of 
jobs presented a problem.   
For most Iraqis coming to the US, even before realizing the state of the economy 
at that time, employment was at the forefront of how they viewed their own futures here.  
Indeed, it turned out that for some, it was one of the reasons they hoped to leave Iraq 
even before the American-led invasion in 2003.  In one interview, when I asked an Iraqi 
respondent when it was that he decided he wanted to leave Iraq, it was not when he found 
his and his family’s life in danger.  Instead he stated: 
I decided I wanted to leave in the 90’s, like, when I was in college.  I couldn’t 
see any future for me in Iraq.  Most of my friends’ older brothers during that 
time [the Gulf War] left for Europe, US, they even went to Mexico.  That was 
a way for them to cross the border illegally for them to come to the United 
States.  After that time, you would go to someone’s house, see a picture of 
someone that you knew that you played cards with or played dominos with 
and think, he is doing well with a good job in like, Denmark or somewhere. 
I’m not being like him.  Why has he found a way to leave Iraq while I am 
stuck in this ditch in Iraq without future?  I couldn’t leave at that time though 
because I wasn’t 18 yet.  But I found the opportunity with the American war 
in Iraq. (Respondent 6) 
 
The Iraqi who was speaking in this interview received a college degree in Baghdad in 
computer science so he was highly educated and had vast technical expertise.  Moreover, 
while he did not sense a “future” for himself in Iraq, he hoped for that future in the US.  
The employment situation he encountered in the US, however, was much different than 
he expected, not only because of the state of the economy when he arrived but also 
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because of the types of jobs that were available to him.  Later in the interview when 
discussing employment and his experience in the US he stated: 
Employment was a challenge, yes, but the economy was in recession.  People 
born here [emphasis original] were fighting for jobs, so how about us 
[refugees]?  It was not easy.  I went six months without a job.  I worked as a 
delivery driver for a while.  The way it worked was, they call you, you go to 
the restaurant and pick up the food and then take the food to the customer.  
The whole thing, you get like $4 for.  I worked for them for like five days and 
then I quit.  You had to get your own gas, maintenance for your car.  Then I 
went to [the RST employment program] and they wrote me a good 
recommendation.  I couldn’t find a job with my degree here because it is 
almost worth nothing here.  And then I said, lets think about it, Austin is a 
computer city and a hotel city.  I couldn’t find anything with the computers 
so let’s look at the hotels part.  It took me like a week to find this job.  Except 
being a housekeeper or something, I would do anything.  I love the valet job.  
I love cars, so why not?  Within three days after applying, I got an interview 
and I got the job. (Respondent 6) 
 
There are a number of points from this quote that are important to address.  As he states 
in the passage, this man went six months without a job.  During this time period, this was 
not uncommon.  It could easily take months to find a job.  It is also worthy to make note, 
however, of when he states, “except being a housekeeper or something, I would do 
anything.”  There were certain jobs, it seemed, that almost all Iraqis refused to accept.  
These included positions such as housekeeping in hotels, being a waiter at a restaurant, 
washing dishes, etc.  While the man speaking here was, at the time of the interview, 
working as a valet driver at a hotel he was decidedly optimistic and upbeat about the 
position.  According to his interview, one factor for his upbeat attitude was due to the fact 
that he was simply happy to have a job while another factor had to do with the 
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friendships he had formed with his co-workers, an important aspect of the employment 
process and for sure, the process of true integration.   
Many educated Iraqis had similar experiences of arriving in the US and being 
forced into jobs which were far below their education level.  Not all Iraqis, however, 
were upbeat about their employment situation.  Another Iraqi refugee who spoke English 
well and had a college degree in chemistry found himself in a similar situation.  He had 
gone four months without a job as he was searching diligently for a chemistry-related 
position.  In the following quote he describes his sense of frustration at the employment 
situation here. 
When RST started looking for jobs for me, I went every week.  But at that 
time, I just wanted a job as a chemist. I have my experience as a chemist. 
Why could I not find a job as a chemist?  I know its America but nobody told 
me about the economy and I don’t want to believe this.  This is an old story, 
they talk about it because I don’t think they know someone with a 
background in chemistry and who has experience like I have.  So I need to 
work as a chemist.  I don’t want to work in a restaurant, or a warehouse, I 
don’t want this!  I just want to work as a chemist.  So in the [employment] 
class here [at RST], Amanda [RST employee] just worked with the entry 
level.  I don’t want to work in entry level and therefore I went to MRC 
[Multi-cultural Refugee Coalition] and they will help me find a job as a 
chemist with high level.  And at MRC, the guy told me that at RST they just 
want to find you a job, just to start and then you can help yourself.  But at the 
first, you just need a job.  I said I need a job as a chemist.  By March, my 
government assistance almost ended.  4 months.  Before that, Amanda came 
to me asking me, I should work either in the hospital or warehouse.  I hated 
that idea.  I wanted to work as a chemist.  But in the end I didn’t have any 
choice.  So I went to Amanda and I said find me any job.  I need a job.  She 
said OK, I will submit your resume to someone.  She submitted it to a 
warehouse and the warehouse called me and I started at the end of March.  
Amanda found that job for me.  Why do I need to work at an entry level with 
people that have a low level of education?  Why do I need to deal with them?  
But I just get used to it because I need the money.  
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I continue to look for a job as a chemist.  I never stopped.  Every week I 
apply for something.  Any time I find any chemist position I submit my 
resume to that position.  I don’t know what’s wrong.  Maybe its because I 
don’t have my green card.  Maybe they don’t want to hire an Arabic person 
named Mohammed for a chemist position.  Maybe they think he is a terrorist. 
No one calls back, no one says hi, nothing.  Even the staffing agency, I work 
with them to find a chemist job.  I make interview with them, they took all 
my papers, nothing happened.  And one of the staffing agencies called Key 
center, I think they are lying to me, because every time I call she says, there 
is no job, there is nothing.  Since February till now, she has never told me 
there is a position.  I call her back each week and she says there is nothing in 
chemistry. 
 
A lot of people are complaining about the job situation here.  I don’t know 
why they [RST] are just looking in hotels and restaurants, they need to find 
better jobs.  Someone who came from Iraq with a good job and education and 
they are offered a job at a restaurant or hotel?  Of course they will not accept 
it.  And we are not Bhutanese or African, with all my respect to them, they 
don’t have a job back home and they come here and they will accept 
anything.  So we cannot accept these kinds of jobs.  That’s what a lot of 
Iraqis say.  (Respondent 20) 
        
Because of the US resettlement program’s aggressive focus on employment as the 
primary measure of self-sufficiency, refugees are required to accept the first job that is 
offered to them.  With Iraqis, this was a constant source of tension.  It often took many 
Iraqis months to accept the jobs that the employment programs at resettlement agencies 
were offering them, and even then, there were some jobs (such as housekeeping) that 
many Iraqis refused to accept no matter what.  In another interview, an Iraqi man stated: 
The problem with the Iraqis is that 80% of them will not accept doing what 
the other refugees are doing.  This is a problem; they will think that is a 
permanent thing.  So it is difficult.  And I faced it, when I first came they 
said, can you work at a warehouse?  At first I said no.  And then my brother 
talked to me and said, its not permanent, its just work, you provide for your 
family and then you will find something else.  And then I said OK, I will 
accept it and then they didn’t accept me because they said I am overqualified.  
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They didn’t even interview me and I learned that is something that happens a 
lot.  But the problem with the employment programs is that they will only 
have one or two positions again and again which is in the housing 
[housekeeping] business.  And I know it’s very difficult to find a job for 
people that doesn’t have employment history here.  But then the refugees will 
say, “no I’ve been here 4 months, I couldn’t find a job, no one is helping me 
find a good job.”  But they don’t understand from a good job and a job that’s 
a start…the minute you will start, you will start your employment history and 
then you can go from there. (Respondent 16) 
 
Many Iraqi refugees are worried, however, that they will not be able to “go from there”.  
They are worried that without an American education or degree that they will be stuck in 
survival jobs and will thus not have the ability to realize the “future” that they envisioned 
for themselves in the US.  As the Iraqi refugee with the chemistry degree put it: 
I need to think about getting another job because the income [at his current 
job] is not good.  I have a friend from Senegal here and he said in this 
country if you don’t have a degree, you will always be working at a 
restaurant, hotel, warehouse, hospital, and your income will be for your life.  
You work here for 2 years, laid off, start again, work there for 2 years, laid 
off, and again and again.  This is not work.  He discovered that after being 
here 5 or 6 years.  And now he is student at ACC [Austin Community 
College].  You need to have a degree.  Then you will have better job, better 
income, better life.  People tell me my degree from Iraq will not work. 
(Respondent 20)  
      
For this Iraqi, his future and successful integration will not truly be realized until he is 
able to get his degree and acquire the job he wants.  While he is considered self-sufficient 
by governmental standards and USRP program measurements, his own goals and desires 
have not been met.  What this imbalance highlights is the stark contrast between the way 
the US government measures “successful” integration and the way each individual 
defines their own terms of success.  
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 There seems to be some agreement, not just from the Iraqis interviewed for this 
study, but also among Americans working in the resettlement field that under the current 
resettlement paradigm many refugees (educated or not) enter into a difficult cycle of 
poverty after arrival here.  As a staff member for one of the Austin resettlement agencies 
noted, “You have to acknowledge that refugees come here to be the working poor.  I 
think that’s the first barrier to overcome, to say point blank that you are going to be the 
working poor and you are going to live paycheck to paycheck and you are probably going 
to come up short most months.”  Clearly, from the excerpt from the Iraqi chemist above, 
this is unacceptable to many Iraqis, especially those that have bachelors, masters, and 
doctoral degrees.  In another interview with the co-founder of a community organization 
helping refugees with long-term goals and support, she stated: 
So many people [refugees] get so negative about the [local] agencies and they 
are saying you know, they’re not doing this or they’re not doing that. I say, 
well, they are federally funded and that’s sort of the only way to do this work 
at this scale so its not the agencies fault, its our federal governments faul--
…well, not fault, I mean we [the US] are certainly settling so many people 
and that’s great that they are finding refuge, but are we settling people into a 
life of poverty, because of the way that we have set up the whole system?  So 
I tell people, don’t get angry at Caritas or RST for doing the job that they do 
with the limited and restricted resources that they have. (Respondent 14) 
 
This quote illustrates that while there is a sense that there is a humanitarian aspect to the 
US refugee program in that it provides refuge to people from all over the world every 
year, the current resettlement system in the US then subscribes these individuals to a 
potential life of poverty, to being and/or becoming the “working poor”.  Arguing against 
this point, federal government partners often point to the successes of some refugees in 
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starting businesses, getting a college education, or even playing a role in starting 
important local ethnic community organizations and thus participating in important 
aspects of civil society here.  Actually, the federal government defends this model on the 
Department of State website in which they explain the reception and placement program: 
Refugees receive employment authorization and are encouraged to become 
employed as soon as possible. Based on years of experience, the U.S. refugee 
resettlement program has found that people learn English and begin to 
function comfortably much faster if they start work soon after arrival. Most 
refugees begin in entry-level jobs, even if they have high-level skills or 
education. With time, many if not most refugees move ahead professionally 
and find both success and satisfaction in the United States.17 
 
While these cases do exist and they are remarkable examples, they are also exceptional, 
in that they are not the norm.  This passage also stands out for what is not in it as much as 
what is included.  As one can see, there is no mention of integration whatsoever.  
Integration is actually not mentioned in any part of the description on the webpage. In an 
interview with a local agency employee, she gives an opposing viewpoint: 
We definitely need a ton more funding for vocational training and 
employment programs.  Like really start training people.  I hate going to a 
hotel and seeing a client that I placed there 2 years ago still in that job.  I hate 
that.  They’re not climbing the ladder, they haven’t changed, their English 
hasn’t gotten better and I promised them that it would.  It’s like saying, take 
this job, its temporary, its gonna help your English.  Well, so and so I saw the 
other day, still doesn’t speak English better then he did a year and a half ago, 
he’s still in the basement of a laundry room folding towels all day long and 
he got a 15 cent raise this year.  It breaks my heart because I told him it was 
gonna be different.  Refugees aren’t remarkable people, they are regular 
people, working regular jobs. (Respondent 12)    
 
                                                             
17 http://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/receptionplacement/index.htm 
 221 
This quote exemplifies and counters the neo-liberal, individualistic model that the 
American resettlement system is based upon.  For people to “succeed”, to reach their 
goals and dreams, it requires “regular” people to be remarkable.  This can be quite 
difficult for a refugee entering into the current structure of the US refugee resettlement 
program.  Can integration take place within this current model?  As Castles et al ask in 
their comprehensive report on integration for the British government, “can one speak of 
immigrant or refugee incorporation into an excluded underclass with little public voice 
and few chances of socio-economic mobility, as integration?” (Castles et al. 2001).  
While there needs to be much more, there are some additional resources and 
organizations that are available to refugees in some places, other than local resettlement 
agencies, that offer services and support for refugees to succeed and to meet their own 
expectations.  The following example is one such organization in Austin.   
In the first quote from the Iraqi that hopes to one day be a chemist, he refers to the 
organization, the MRC.  This organization is the Multi-cultural Refugee Coalition and is 
not a resettlement agency but instead was created, as their website states, for 
“empowering refugees settled to Austin towards self-sufficiency through education, 
community, and reconciliation”18.  The MRC hopes to offer much-needed long-term 
support (not financial support though) for refugees that cannot be provided by the 
resettlement agencies.  It is one of the few examples in Austin of integration happening as 
a two way process.  I was able to interview one of the co-founders of the MRC in 2011.  
                                                             
18 http://mrcaustin.org/ 
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In her interview, she notes the difficulty of defining and even understanding the concepts 
of integration and self-sufficiency, as they are, in her view, determined by the experience 
and expectations of each individual refugee.  She stated in her interview that she became 
interested in refugee issues after volunteering as a community advocate with the local 
agency, Caritas.  During her time as a community advocate she worked with a newly 
arrived Burundian family, aiding them in their resettlement process.  She is still in contact 
with this family and uses them as an example when giving her assessment of how the 
idea of self-sufficiency means very different things to different people.    
I mean self-sufficiency looks so different to so many different people and a 
lot of it depends on what your expectations are.  Like for her [Burundian 
refugee] family, once they were able to get into public housing and get that 
set and the parents are elders, and they’re not really working, and they have 
their space, and they go to MRC on Saturdays and they go to ESL downtown 
and they are in East Austin so they are close to our garden and that is 
something they do all the time.  And so they’re happy, they like where they 
are.  They will probably be there the rest of their lives. So, you know, they’re 
doing alright. So, for them, their life is probably quite self-sufficient.  
Whereas expectations of somebody else that is trying to be truly self-
sufficient may be a lot different.  Like I see with a lot of the Iraqi families, 
they are trying to get up to that standard of where they were before. And, I 
mean, their self-sufficiency might take years and years and years to reach. 
So it’s interesting because self-sufficiency is so different for so many people. 
I think self-sufficiency definitely comes down to expectations.  So, what are 
your expectations for living here?  I think definitely that expectations come 
into play very much because like I said, that family [the Burundian refugee 
family] I was talking about probably feels pretty self-sufficient.  They may 
never have more money than they have now, they are probably never going 
to move into a house, probably never going to have all these other things, but 
she gets around and she’s got it, and I feel quite confident that they are ok.  
Whereas others, maybe their expectations are up here. (Respondent 14) 
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The comments here on achieving self-sufficiency are interesting.  She (and through her, 
the MRC) has much different ideas than the government about how measuring an 
individual’s self-sufficiency should look.  Her measurements are based on an individual’s 
expectations, on their hopes and dreams while government standards are based almost 
solely on employment and financial outcomes.  Both are important of course, but to have 
happy, functioning, committed, and active members (and eventually citizens) of a 
community and of a country, the services and support that MRC offers are as important 
for refugee integration and resettlement as are the functions of the local (largely 
government-funded) resettlement agencies.  Unfortunately, as she notes in her interview, 
gaining sufficient funding for the MRC is a constant challenge.  There should be no 
question, however, that funding should be provided for organizations like the MRC 
whether at the city, state, and/or federal level.  Providing necessary and unrestricted 
funding for organizations and programs such as the MRC would be a step in the right 
direction for a city and community to practice true 2-way integration.  
 And it is important to note that community organizations such as MRC can 
provide much needed employment and job development support without having the 
barriers, limits and strict guidelines of the resettlement agencies.  Indeed, MRC already 
(with their current limited resources) does provide some forms of job development.  It 
offers some classes on computer skills, online job searching, and helps with degree 
certification as well.  These services are needed and local agencies, as noted above, are 
usually so overwhelmed with high caseworker to client ratios that they are not able to 
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spend a lot of time and attention on these matters with clients individually.  Local 
agencies would continue in their role then to provide refugees with help in securing 
“survival jobs”, still a necessary and important part of the process for many.  But the 
support from MRC and agencies like it around the country should not be undervalued or 
underestimated.  As the Iraqi with the chemistry degree noted: 
The MRC, they had just started up and they didn’t have many people, and 
they have volunteers that are friendly and lovely, talking in a nice way and 
showing you many things.  Man, they were like my angels.  At least there 
was someone to talk to, someone to show you how to use a Google map, 
someone to talk to you about the culture, someone to give you some 
direction, someone to give you some help, someone to show you how to 
apply for a job online. (Respondent 20)  
 
What is most important about this quote is that MRC was able to fill a gap in this 
individual’s resettlement experience as they were able to assist him in not only taking a 
step closer to gaining self-sufficiency but also in playing a role in this individual’s 
integration into the community by aiding him in reaching his goals and thus in meeting 
his own expectations. 
 Despite both the roles of the MRC and the local resettlement agencies in securing 
refugees’ jobs and helping them to “achieve” self-sufficiency, there were other barriers 
(aside from high expectations) for Iraqi refugees and resettlement agencies alike in 
securing employment.  Culturally, there were a number of positions that many observant 
Muslim refugees could not accept due to the rules of Islam.  One such example comes 
from when I was working as an employment specialist at RST.  I was working with a 
young Iraqi man who was very motivated to learn English and to secure a job.  One of the 
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jobs for which I helped him apply was as a bagger at a major chain grocery store in 
Austin.  We filled out the initial application, we were called in for a first interview and 
then a second.  After the second interview, they notified him that they wanted to offer 
him the job.  We were both excited that he had (after months of searching) finally secured 
a full-time job.  The next day I received a call from him saying that he could not accept 
the job because he realized that it would require him to potentially handle alcohol when 
bagging the groceries.  He stated his religious views prevented him from accepting the 
position because of that issue.  Thankfully, the US refugee program does not force 
refugees to accept jobs that go against their religious views. This is another aspect that 
had to be considered, however, with some Muslim refugee clients (Iraqi or others) that 
could potentially make finding a job all the more challenging.  
 Some Muslim Iraqi refugees considered their religion and/or their background to 
be a possible barrier to finding a job in the US in other ways.  When asked about being 
Iraqi and Muslim in the US as a refugee, many Iraqis stated that they didn’t think it made 
a difference, especially in Austin.  There was a general sense that Austin, as a city, was 
more “open-minded” than other places, especially Dallas.  A few of the respondents 
noted that they had heard numerous stories of discrimination in Dallas.  Others noted that 
they expected that kind of discrimination here in the US before they arrived but were 
pleasantly surprised that they didn’t actually experience it here in Austin anyway.  As one 
man stated: 
I was expecting [before coming to the US] the worse before the good.  I was 
afraid people would say what is that Middle Eastern guy doing here? What is 
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that Arab guy doing here? What is that Muslim guy doing here?  Is he setting 
up some Al Qaeda cell or something? But I found a totally different thing; 
people don’t care who you are, especially in Austin, as long as you follow the 
code, as long as you’re not doing anything to harm them, they don’t care who 
you are.  I love Austin. 
 
Especially in Austin?  Is it different in other places? Yes, in Dallas.  I know 
Iraqis who moved to Dallas and they were suffering because of the 
conservative people and discrimination.  I have a friend, his name is Assad, 
he still lives here, and he went to an interview to work as a cashier at Target.  
The guy who was interviewing him, said, “where are you from?”  He said, 
“I’m from Iraq.”  The guy stood up and he was toweling his sweat, he was 
scared of Assad, and Assad said hey, I’m not carrying any bomb on me, I’m 
just from there, if you don’t want to give me a job, others will give me a job. 
(Respondent 6) 
 
Another respondent also pointed out his perceived differences between Austin and Dallas 
when he said: 
Austin is the most liberal city and it is mixed from everywhere and the 
university is there with thousands of students. I wouldn’t feel as comfortable 
in Dallas.  Why?  It’s weird to explain but I cannot put it in words.  I feel here 
in home, I feel myself.  I met some rednecks there and in some cities you 
know and I don’t like to be around that, they are close-minded.  I like to live 
in my peaceful life.  I don’t want somebody to give me a different look and I 
don’t want to be a target for somebody. (Respondent 9) 
  
Despite many Iraqis feeling that Austin is a more open-minded locale, others still felt like 
they had experienced discrimination in Austin.  The sense of discrimination they felt 
usually came to the surface when searching for employment.  The Iraqi chemist gave an 
example: 
I was trying [to find a job] with another staffing agency and the girl there 
named Elizabeth, she says, do you have work authorization here?  I say yes, I 
am working at a warehouse.  She said ok, what do you think about what is 
happening in the Middle East? I said, what do you mean?  She said what is 
going on in Syria and Iraq, what do you think about this?  I said well, I am 
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originally from Iraq.  She said really?  Are you citizen?  I said no, I have 
work authorization though.  She said you don’t have green card?  I said no, I 
am a refugee.  She said what does that mean?  I said ugh.  She said that she 
will look if anything comes in.  So at that point I am like what do they think I 
am?  Because my name is Mohammed, I am a terrorist or what?  So I don’t 
know what’s going on whenever I call these places. (Respondent 20) 
 
While discrimination based on religion or ethnicity is impossible to prove in these 
situations, there was definitely a sense among some Iraqis that it was occurring, even in 
Austin.   
Another example of this came from my field journal while working as 
employment specialist.  When starting with RST, I was “handed” a list of Iraqi clients 
that I was tasked with helping to find a job.  Two of these clients were a married couple 
without children.  They were at the end of their benefits period and were in desperate 
need for employment.  While the husband had very little education and little, if any, 
transferrable job experience, the wife was college educated and had previously been a 
teacher in Iraq.  Neither spoke English well and the wife wore a hijab, the traditional 
Muslim head scarf.  After talking to them about their situation, I told them that I would 
try to find them a job in a hotel, possibly housekeeping, as there were usually openings in 
that industry.  When told this, the wife, immediately started crying.  I informed them 
about the difficult economy and that because of their decreasing benefits, they simply 
needed a job.  And while it did not have to be the job they had for the rest of their lives, it 
would at least be a start and with it they would begin to gain an employment history here 
in the US.  When they finally agreed, I began the task of filling out applications for them 
 228 
at hotels in the area.  Finally, we were called in for a job interview.  They would 
interview for a housekeeping position for her and a “houseman” position for him, 
basically requiring him to keep track of and deliver the necessary items to the 
housekeepers throughout the day.  On the day of the interview, before walking into the 
hotel, the wife asked me if she should take off her hijab.  I asked her why.  She answered 
that she knew that some Americans did not like Muslims and she didn’t want to be 
discriminated against.  I told her that I thought that was unnecessary.  
We met initially with the housekeeping manager and the interview went very well 
with me translating.  After the interview, the housekeeping manager showed us all around 
the hotel, describing in detail their job descriptions and what would be required and 
when.  The whole process went smoothly and when it was over I asked if the couple had, 
in fact, been selected for the position.  The housekeeping manager stated that she liked 
the couple thought they were well-qualified, and that she would go ahead and recommend 
them for the position to the manager of the hotel.  She stated that the manager was there 
that day and they would need to have a second interview with him.  We met the hotel 
manager when we first arrived as he pointed us in the direction of the office of the 
housekeeping manager.  After asking the housekeeping manager if it was possible to 
interview with the hotel manager that day since he was there and they needed to fill the 
positions, she went to his office to ask.  When she came back she informed us that he was 
busy the rest of the day and that we should call back to schedule the interview with him.  
We left the hotel and all of us felt a sense of relief that this couple may finally have 
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secured a position.  When I called back the next day to schedule, I was told by the 
housekeeping manager that the hotel manager was going on vacation and wouldn’t be 
back for a couple of weeks and that I should call back at that point.  When I called back 
again, she informed me that the position had been filled but that I was welcome to call 
back again in a couple months to see if anything else was open.  When I informed the 
Iraqi couple of the news that job had fallen through, the wife stated that she thought she 
should have removed her hijab.  Whether or not discrimination took place in that 
situation, there was certainly a sense among the Iraqi couple that, before the interview, it 
could and that afterwards, it did.  Discrimination, although more difficult to verify as a 
real barrier to self-sufficiency and integration in Austin and the US is nevertheless an 
aspect of the overall political, cultural, societal, and institutional environment to which 
Iraqis were and continue to enter. 
8.2 REFUGEE AGENCY AND ALTERNATIVE PATHWAYS TO REFUGEE INTEGRATION 
 So far, this chapter has looked almost solely at the structural and institutional 
environment to which Iraqis and other refugee populations were arriving to the US in 
2009 and 2010.  While the various structures of the receiving community and country are 
certainly important factors for a refugees’ successful integration into that society, it is by 
no means the only factor that determines their experience.  Agency is also an important 
aspect in determining how a refugee is able to integrate and to achieve self-sufficiency in 
a given place.  Refugees, like any other migrant and human being, are rational decision 
makers with the ability to forge their own path to successful resettlement and integration 
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given the numerous barriers and obstacles they face and which have already been 
discussed in this dissertation.  There are then numerous ways that Iraqi refugees use 
either individual or group agency to define their own experiences here, regardless of the 
structure to which they are limited.   
This section will thus look at some of the different ways that Iraqi refugees 
resettling to Austin in 2009 and 2010 were using (and in many cases continue to use) 
their own agency to map out their own paths to successful integration.  These examples 
include: human social capital, whether it be from the larger Iraqi community or from the 
“native” community; mobility in terms of secondary migration from the location of 
original resettlement in the US, or even (as discussed earlier in the chapter) returning to 
Iraq; transnational relationships with family or friends in other areas of the world for 
financial and/or psychological support; locating other sources of support and funding in 
the community and more broadly the role of religious institutions and organizations in the 
resettlement of refugees in Austin; and finally the idea of citizenship and the importance 
of this concept to Iraqi refugees and how it has the ability to make them not only feel 
more a part of the community and nation, but how it also is perceived to give them more 
opportunities for employment.   
8.2.1 Social Capital 
One major difference between refugees and those referred to as “economic 
migrants” is that there is usually more choice for economic migrants in deciding their 
destination.  This choice may be dictated by employment opportunities, family, friends or 
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possibly a combination of those things.  Most refugees who are admitted to the US do not 
make this choice for themselves.  They are often sent to a locale with no knowledge of 
the place, and more importantly, without knowing anyone in that place.  This was the 
case for the Iraqi family for whom I was a community advocate through Caritas.  As 
outlined in section 5.1.1, not only did they not know anything about Austin, TX before 
coming here, they knew no one here, Iraqi or otherwise.  When this family arrived to 
Austin in 2008, there was an almost non-existent Iraqi population here and they were 
among the first Iraqi refugees to arrive in Austin.  Thus, their only source of social capital 
was the refugee agency through which they resettled and myself, their community 
advocate.  This lack of existing social support upon arrival puts many refugees at a 
disadvantage, especially those that do not speak English.  It inhibits their ability to 
navigate the services, resources, opportunities, and happenings of the community in 
which they are resettling.  It thus has the potential to not only exclude them from these 
features, but it also aids in keeping them invisible from the “native” population in that 
community.   
There does seem to be a marked difference in bridging social capital between 
Iraqis who speak English and who came through the SIV program and those that did not.  
While Iraqis coming through the Special Immigrant Visa program usually, like Iraqi 
refugees, had their travel purchased for them with the help of the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), and upon arrival received the same benefits as 
refugees, many of them had more “choice” in their destination in the US.  Iraqi SIV’s 
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were able to go to a location if they had an American “sponsor” in that locale.  Therefore, 
many Iraqis who were already working with numerous Americans in Iraq were, while 
still somewhat limited, able to choose their location in the US based on the Americans 
they knew and that were willing to put their names down as potential sponsors.  Most of 
the SIV’s therefore that arrived in Austin and that I worked with at RST had a connection 
with an American citizen before arrival.  Sometimes this connection was stronger than 
others but regardless, as the interviews show, having that relationship (which was 
oftentimes a very strong friendship) was integral in allowing Iraqis to feel more at home 
and, indeed, more integrated in the society, even at such an early stage.  As one Iraqi SIV 
puts it, he chose to come to Austin based on the advice of one of the Majors that he 
worked with in Iraq, Major Davis.  When asked why/how he had come to Austin over 
other destinations in the US where he had some family or where there were more Iraqis, 
he said: 
The reason is, I mean, a lot of my family here in the US have been here like a 
short time.  I was thinking they’re not going to be able to help me with 
nothing.  I’m sure they would do, but its not like they were raised here, so I 
had one of my friends, one of the officers from one of the units I worked 
with, Major Davis, he’s one of my best friends, he lives here in Round Rock.  
And you know to go somewhere you’ve never been before; you gotta ask the 
people that lives in there.  So I was asking like all the soldiers I was working 
with in my unit, like what’s the best place to go in the US?  So a lot of them 
were recommending Texas because they said you can find a lot of job 
opportunities here and beside that, just comparing to the economy and the 
living and prices so its [Texas] cheaper than a lot places like California and 
Florida.  And Maj. Davis said if you come to Austin, you will only be about 
20 minutes away from where I live and I will be able to help you and touch 
base with you like every other day so you will be fine I’m sure.  So we 
decided to come here to Austin.  He recommended it and I came here and 
well, you know to go to somewhere where you don’t have family around.  
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You know what it feels like to be homesick right?  I miss my family and I 
miss my country but here I feel like I’m at home.  Seriously because, the 
friends I have here.  I have friends in every state in the US.  A lot have come 
to visit me.  They touch base with me every so often, maybe every week, 
every other week, by saying how are you doing, how is the family, do you 
need anything? So, that makes me feel like I am home, so I don’t feel like I 
am away from my family.  So I think here was the right place to come and I 
am happy here seriously. I think I chose the best place to come. (Respondent 
4)  
 
The importance of having a connection to the “native” community in this quote cannot be 
overlooked.  Indeed, because this man’s family had only been in the US for a “short 
time” he chose to go where he had an American friend who could help him navigate his 
new life.  This shows the importance of social capital outside one’s national or ethnic 
community.  For this man, “native” social capital, knowing someone that was “raised 
here” was paramount and instrumental in helping him “feel at home”, an integral part of 
successful integration.  In this regard, this individual, similar to many other Iraqis coming 
through the SIV program, used their own agency as a way to immediately connect with 
Americans in the communities where they would be arriving and thus to help them in 
becoming and feeling a part of those communities. 
 While numerous other Iraqis throughout the interviews stressed the importance of 
having American friends and knowing American people as positive and beneficial factors 
in their resettlement experience, many of those same respondents noted that the Iraqi 
community in Austin was neither as important nor as desired for material, financial, or 
psychological support upon arrival.  Despite much past research on immigrant and 
refugee integration and the purported importance of existing ethnic communities in that 
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integration, much of the data from the interviews from this study runs counter to the idea 
that present national and/or ethnic groups are helpful or even desired by the incoming 
Iraqi individuals and families.  This idea is largely supported by both the refugees and the 
service providers interviewed.  One proposition for this is that, as the previous quote 
highlights, Iraqis simply do not desire help from other Iraqis in navigating the 
resettlement experience.  Except for locales like Detroit and San Diego, there are not 
large and well-established Iraqi communities in many of the resettlement cities in the US 
which could even aid in the integration of newly arrived Iraqi refugees.  Another possible 
reason, however, may have to do with the context of war, violence, and sectarian 
animosity from which many Iraqis are coming.  Indeed, many of the respondents, when 
asked about how they thought the war in Iraq has affected them, they brought up points 
not only having to do with sectarian tensions, but also the ways in which they perceive 
certain characteristics of Iraqi culture have affected their resettlement here and for which 
they are uninterested in mingling with the existing Arab and Iraqi communities. 
 During one interview, when asked if he had thought about the Iraqi community 
that would be in Austin before arrival, one of the Iraqi respondents stated: 
I was thinking not to be close to the Iraqi community here because I had 
enough back there.  I didn’t know Austin had a big Iraqi community.  When I 
came here, I said wow, there are a lot of Iraqis.  But actually there is no 
communication between me and them except with the group I know.  And 
also, the group I know, they don’t like to communicate too [with other 
Iraqis].  So we are kind of a close group.   
 
Why didn’t you want to communicate with the Iraqis?  Because Iraqi people 
make a lot of troubles.  They are big mouth, they talk a lot.  This is what we 
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don’t like.  We don’t like people to talk behind us.  It’s a shame to say it but 
it’s the truth. 
 
Is the Iraqi community here close in your opinion, are they helping each 
other?  Some of them they do yeah.  But every single Iraqi, he has a very 
close friend and he is an enemy for a lot of people.  Every single Iraqi, like 
this is the Iraqi way.  It’s like they say, I like to have somebody close to me 
and then I’m not gonna like anybody else.  Even the families.  Its like this 
family likes this family but they hate this family and they don’t talk to this 
family and they talk bad about this family, you know, this happens a lot. 
(Respondent 9)  
 
This is actually one of many examples from the interviews of Iraqi refugees generally not 
wanting to associate, or at least, be assisted by the larger Iraqi community in the 
resettlement process or in the longer-term process of integrating into American society.  
Another respondent, when talking about how the violence in Iraq has potentially affected 
the Iraqi community here in the US, he said, “there is still no trust between the sects…the 
[sectarian] divide exists here but people try to keep it down a little bit because they are 
afraid, here there is law, but it exists.”19   
 For Iraqis who came to the US because of their relationship with the US military 
as translators or other employees, they were, as noted earlier, in extremely precarious 
positions inside of Iraq and as one Iraqi put it, “you couldn’t even trust your friends and 
your neighbors that you have lived next to for years.”  Working with the American 
military or contractors during the war is not the only reason for secrecy, however.  Living 
under an authoritarian dictatorship for most of their lives, some Iraqis pointed to this 
                                                             
19 It should be noted here that Lindholm discusses low corporate identity and resistance to authority 
as aspects of Middle Eastern culture which could help to explain, among various other factors, the 
reluctance of Iraqis to form community associations or organizations (Lindholm 2002).  
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aspect as a reason that many Iraqis do not trust each other, confide in each other, and 
therefore assist each other even in their new lives.  As another respondent noted when 
asked about the sense of community among Iraqis in Austin: 
No, there isn’t a sense of community here.  To be honest, people here, 
especially the Iraqis, because of what happened in Iraq, Iraqis don’t have that 
sense of being close to other Iraqis.  That trust was broken back in the 90’s.  
Even before 2003.  Because Saddam played it really well.  He was like, you 
cannot speak against him or against his regime in your own room, even in 
your own bedroom you cannot speak.  We were always saying there, “the 
walls have ears”, so don’t say anything.  So we don’t trust nobody there and 
that grows up inside of us. (Respondent 6)   
  
This is a powerful statement.  It shows first, that it was not only the current war in Iraq 
and the often covered sectarian violence that is a cause of increased tension and lack of 
trust among Iraqis, but also the longstanding effects of the political structure and 
repression in the everyday lives of Iraqis by the government.  It also shows how that is 
able to be carried over to the US and become a part of the overall experience of Iraqis in 
their resettlement here.   
 Examples of Iraqi refugees stressing their lack of desire for interacting with and 
building their social capital among other Iraqis here in Austin are salient.  Moreover, it 
spans the range of backgrounds of Iraqis here.  In other words, it was not just Iraqis that 
came here with knowledge of English and other forms of cultural capital who may have 
had more confidence to find jobs and interact with the rest of the English speaking 
population.  Iraqis who came with no English language skills and no cultural capital also 
stressed similar sentiments.  As one Iraqi who came to Austin in 2008 stated, “I’m done 
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with Iraqis. I hate them, all of them.  I am American now” (Respondent 18).  This 
particular individual no longer has any family in Iraq.  Still harboring anger towards 
violence directed at his family in Iraq, this man has no desire to maintain an Iraqi identity 
and looks only towards his future in America, despite speaking very little English or 
having high prospects for social mobility here.   
 Yet another Iraqi individual, an English speaker, had similar sentiments, if not 
quite so blunt.  
When I came here I decided not to mix with other Arabs at all.  
Why not have contact with other Arabs in the US?  We didn’t know what we 
would feel or how people live their lives here.  My wife and my brother’s 
wife didn’t want to mix with other Iraqis.  We think…well, they [Iraqis] have 
a lot of problems.  They will be friends just like that and they will have a lot 
of problems just like that. And the problems will continue to grow and grow 
without even a good reason.  They will become friends because they feel 
lonely. And then because they don’t know each other very well, they will turn 
on each other.  And people from different backgrounds, different educations, 
and different cities.  You can see it here, after a while, people will have some 
differences and the way they express their differences is a very unmodern 
way; they will fight, yell at each other, call each other bad names.  This is 
what I don’t like.  We left all that back home.  We want to start a new life and 
make use of what you have and what you think is good and no one can make 
us do anything we don’t want to do. So you take your good things that you 
already build here and I bring my own culture, the good part of the culture, 
because not all the culture is good, so I bring my good part of the culture and 
live here but many people [other Iraqis] don’t understand that.  They still 
think that they live there but they live here, so I don’t know. (Respondent 16) 
  
What many of these quotes illustrate is that there is animosity and a marked lack of trust 
among the Iraqi population both overseas and here in the US.  Whether that animosity is 
due to increased sectarian tensions after 2006, Saddam Hussein’s authoritarian regime, or 
simply perceived or real cultural aspects among the Iraqis themselves, the consequences 
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of this lack of trust and animosity is the absence of a close knit and organized community 
working together to support each other throughout the often challenging resettlement 
process.  As one resettlement agency staff member stated during a discussion about Iraqi 
refugee resettlement, “there is no cohesion.  I just think they are fearful of each other and 
what other people know.  There is no Iraqi community leader.  That scares me a little.  
Almost all the other main arrival groups have community leaders; the Burmese, the 
Bhutanese.  Even after years, the Iraqis don’t.” (Respondent 13)  
 While this agency employee believes the Iraqi refugee population in Austin would 
be better off with a community leader(s) and simply more cohesion, the fact that so many 
Iraqis do not desire this cohesion must be recognized.  It is these types of contextual and 
structural factors that must be taken into account with all refugee groups arriving to the 
US.  Furthermore, social and cultural capital are not the only ways in which refugees, 
Iraqi refugees in particular, use aspects of agency to “find their own way” in the 
American resettlement system and process.  The remainder of this section will look 
briefly at some of the other ways that Iraqis are “depending on themselves” and not the 
local agencies for the necessary support to survive in the US. 
8.2.2 (Physical) Mobility 
 As discussed in detail above, most refugees arriving to the US have very little say 
in where they will be located regardless of if they have family or friends elsewhere.  
Usually, only if a family has a predetermined sponsor in a location before arrival or if 
they have immediate family members (i.e. mother, father, spouse, or children) there will 
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they be able to be sent to that place.  Extended family members, however, including 
sisters, brothers, aunts, and uncles will rarely have bearing on where a refugee is sent.  
This can pose difficulties and much frustration for refugees and agencies alike as 
oftentimes, newly arrived refugees will want to relocate to another city or state where 
they have extended family, often their only form of social capital in the US.  US refugee 
policy and funding guidelines discourage and often prohibit this post-arrival relocation 
from happening.  This is often discouraged because refugees who relocate after arrival 
will lose much of their financial, material, and other forms of important support from the 
local agencies.   
 As stated above, before an individual or family arrives to the US, their assurance 
is sent to the local agency who then begins to use that individual’s funds in the 
resettlement process, i.e. finding and paying the deposit on an apartment, furnishing that 
apartment, paying deposit for electricity account, etc.  If a refugee decides to leave after 
they arrive then, all that money is lost.  Moreover, if an individual decides to leave, he is 
able to have the remainder of his USRP funding dispersed to him but will not be able to 
sign up for the extended financial programs which help to pay for rent, bills, etc.  Further, 
he will not be able to receive these benefits in the locale where he chooses to resettle.  
Nor will he receive the same crucial support from the refugee agency in that place (if 
there is one at all) in terms of finding an apartment, furnishing that apartment, etc.  Put 
simply, he will basically be truly on his own and will rely solely on the help of his family 
or friends in that place.  If there is a resettlement agency there, he may be able to receive 
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help in accessing social services such as food stamps and Medicaid, although all states 
have different rules regarding these benefits. 
 What are the consequences of these program guidelines?  For many refugees, 
especially those who feel particularly vulnerable in the US, it inhibits them from 
rejoining family members and friends who may be able to offer them not only much 
needed psychological support, but possibly financial support as well.  One example of 
this I observed as a community advocate for an Iraqi refugee family that arrived to Austin 
in 2008.  Their “story” is discussed in section 5.1.1, but for the purposes of this section it 
is important to point out that this family, none of whom spoke English and who knew no 
one in Austin when they arrived in 2008, had family who had arrived only months before 
to Phoenix, AZ and to Boise, Idaho.  The family that arrived here in Texas, has 
considered moving to Arizona numerous times but is afraid of finding jobs there, 
continuing the benefits of the elderly parents, and generally, starting life all over again, 
but without the help of a local agency or a community advocate volunteer.  Meanwhile 
both families have spent precious financial resources to “reunite” after long separation.  
As another Iraqi refugee put it when asked if he and his family ever considered moving to 
another state where he had extended family members, “No, its going to be like another 
immigration thing.  Like, if I go somewhere else in the states it will be like starting over 
again.  The whole process, same thing, is going to be like ohhhh, like going from Iraq to 
Austin.  So if I go from Austin somewhere it will be like leaving Iraq and going to Austin 
again.”    
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 Acknowledging that there is a reason for the dispersal policies of the US 
Reception and Placement program, there should be more of an effort made to take family 
(including extended) into account when finding locales for the placement of refugees.  In 
doing this, there would be less frustration on the part of many refugees, but also on 
already overwhelmed agency staff who are often tasked with trying to help newly 
arriving refugees who have come unannounced from other cities and states.                
8.2.3 Transnational Communication 
 One of the outcomes of the Iraqi refugee crisis and the previous outflow of Iraqi 
refugees in the 1990’s has been the creation of an Iraqi diaspora, especially among 
minority ethnicities in Iraq, namely the Kurdish community and the Iraqi Christian 
community.  Diasporas are forming for majority Arab Sunni and Shi’a Iraqis, however, as 
an outcome of the sectarian tensions that many have faced in Iraq since 2006.  
Regardless, many Iraqi families arriving to the US and to Austin, TX have extended 
family dispersed throughout the globe.  The family for which I was a community 
advocate, for example, currently has family in Syria, Sweden, the Netherlands, Australia 
and then within the US in Arizona and in Idaho.  Distance no longer poses a barrier, 
however, due to internet technology.  One of the first things the family sought out once in 
Austin was a computer and a high speed internet connection.  This gave them instant 
access to their family members throughout the world (who they communicate with on a 
weekly basis) and to Arabic media.  This technology allows them to connect not only 
with family, but also with their Iraqi and Arab identity even if they do not desire to 
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connect with Iraqis locally.  Through technology, they are able to maintain a sense of 
who they were, who they are, and finally, to control who they wish to be and what 
aspects of identity are important to preserve.  Additionally, the interview data supported 
the point that not only do many Iraqis coming here have relatives in various other parts of 
the world, but that they are in constant contact with them as well for both emotional and 
financial support. 
8.2.4 Role of religious institutions 
 Religious organizations and institutions have long played a vital role in the 
resettlement and integration of refugees in the US.  As stated above, with large 
organizations such as Episcopal Migration Ministries and Church World Servive working 
in tandem with the Department of State and the Department of Health and Human 
Services, they are an instrumental part of the reception and placement process in this 
country.  Churches, Mosques and Temples also play an important role at the local level.  
Church and/or Mosque groups often work in coordination (voluntarily) with local 
resettlement agencies to help in welcoming newly arrived refugees to a community.  
They also frequently help with providing the agency with volunteers as well as financial 
and material support in the form of furniture for apartments, help with transporting 
refugees to the various initial appointments they have, and more broadly, in offering 
someone to talk to and to do something as simple as take a newly arrived individual to 
the grocery store for the first time.   
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 While all these examples are handled through the relationship with the local 
agency, refugees themselves often seek out support from religious organizations on their 
own once their assistance from the agency has ended.  While working at RST, there were 
many instances when refugees would seek out support on their own from various 
religious groups.  These instances would often be brought to the attention of agency staff 
as those groups would often call the agency to verify that a specific family or individual 
had indeed run through the benefits available from the agency.  This occurred quite often 
and there were many times when the churches and or mosques that were approached by 
refugees did not have the resources to assist them.  It also points to the need for better 
developed and better funded long term assistance programs. 
8.2.5 Citizenship 
 Lastly, I want to briefly discuss the idea of citizenship and what it means to Iraqi 
refugees arriving to the US.  While not really an aspect of agency, citizenship is 
perceived by many Iraqis to be a pathway to more and better opportunities in America in 
the future.  There is a sense among many Iraqis that while they are potentially not being 
discriminated against because of their nationality or ethnicity, they are possibly being 
discriminated against for their “foreignness” and for their label as refugee or even 
permanent resident, rather than citizen.  As one respondent put it when asked about his 
long-term goals in the US: 
I want to get my citizenship first. Yes, getting my citizenship is important 
because I’ll be able to do a lot of things, I will be able to tell I am a part of 
this country…I want to feel like, like I’m like a part of this country.   
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Do you feel like you are a part of this country now? I feel it but not 100% to 
when I get my citizenship and then I have dreams; I want to buy a house, I 
want to settle down. I want my wife to learn English and have a life similar to 
her old life.  But she is busy taking care of our daughter at home. I want my 
daughter to get a good education.  One of the things to help do all that is to 
get citizenship, and then you will get more opportunities for jobs.  If I got 
citizenship I’m sure I’ll be able to make more money from any job I want to 
do. And not to be known only as an immigrant or refugee so I’m sure if I got 
citizenship, which is one of my main goals, my life is going to be much 
easier. I mean, I never was described as an American or a refugee here from 
anyone, never, but I don’t want to end up in that situation to have been called, 
like you’re not American or something.  Its just like, for that term, I mean, I 
know I’m not American but its kind of like keeping you away from things 
you are trying to reach.  Like whatever, like jobs or whatever. So its like you 
are losing your chances pretty much, or like decreasing your chances.  So, 
you know, I’m thinking the opposite way.  I want to increase my chances in 
my life and to improve my life and my family’s life. (Respondent 4) 
  
This passage shows that, for this individual, he does not feel fully “settled” in the US 
until he and his family have acquired their citizenship.  For him then, citizenship is a key 
aspect of true integration, of feeling and becoming a part of this community and, as he 
perceives, in helping him achieve his long-term goals and dreams.  There is a direct 
connection for him between having citizenship and a true sense of belonging.  Another 
individual, the one who is searching for the chemistry job, when asked about his goals in 
the US speaks in similar terms about the idea of citizenship: 
Man, I want to start my life here.  I don’t want to go back to Iraq.  Maybe go 
back to visit, but not to live.  But, here, goals, find a better job, try to get a 
masters degree, find a chemist job, find a wife, get the kids.  I will be citizen 
after 5 yrs.  That is just a time issue.  All refugees will be citizen after 5 years 
so I don’t need to think about it.   
You think life will change at all once you are a citizen?  Yeah, I think yeah.  I 
give you an example. When you look on the website for chemist job, some 
companies say US citizen only.  I don’t know why.  I think it’s just because 
of chemistry.  And if you are an American citizen, you can travel all around 
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the world and get a job in Europe because you are an American.  As an Iraqi 
they say, why is he coming here?  That is one of the difficulties.  So when 
you are a citizen you get more benefits.  Even here in America there will be 
more benefits when you say I am a citizen.  When you apply for a job, you 
are a citizen, you are not an immigrant, you don’t have a green card, no, you 
are a citizen.  So that’s a good thing.  And that’s what I am trying to do.  
Whatever I try, it’s to be a part of this community…I feel in between Iraqis 
and Americans.  Still need more time to be more American.  But then I think 
about going back to Iraq, and I’m like no way, I feel like more from the west 
than the from the east now.  I think I’m changing but not really changing 
because I’m not involved in this community too much.  But I’m getting too 
used to the life here, to go back to Iraq. (Respondent 20) 
  
For this respondent, citizenship is a major pathway to having more of a sense of freedom 
in employment and in physical mobility.  He sees it as improving his chances in 
employment and in the way people view you but also in simply becoming more a part of 
the community.  More importantly, this respondent is undergoing a transition in his own 
perceptions of his identity.  “I feel in between Iraqis and Americans”, he states, with the 
hope that citizenship will usher him into a new phase of belonging in the US, without 
fully compromising the cultural values and background of his “former” life.  This is a 
good example of the delicate balance of identity and ethnicity for international refugees 
and immigrants alike.  It is incremental, uneven, and for Iraqis, who do not have a 
cohesive community of support, difficult to negotiate the borders and boundaries of 
identity maintenance and potential transition. 
 It should be noted that not all Iraqis felt that citizenship was a crucial aspect in 
successfully integrating into society here.  While citizenship is always seen as a positive 
(at least in the interviews I conducted), it can also be seen as not making much difference 
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in one’s life chances.  Here is how one non-English speaking refugee regarded the idea of 
gaining American citizenship when asked about her goals: 
We don’t really have any main goals right now, we are just trying to catch up 
with life, and to live our life.  If we are able to get citizenship here, we would 
respect that.   
 
Is citizenship important??  Citizenship is important and would be nice, but 
the main thing is feeling settled down somewhere.  We still don’t know if we 
can stay here, or if we will have to go somewhere else. (Respondent 23)  
 
This individual’s experience with resettlement is markedly different than those above.  
She and her family are simply struggling to survive here and thus they are still trying to 
“catch up with life”.  Citizenship is, at this time, not one of their main concerns.  It is 
unfortunate that for her, and for many other refugees, Iraqi and otherwise, there is not the 
necessary support, funding, and assistance to help her in simply catching up with life and 
settling in the United States.  Regardless of one’s experience here in the US, citizenship 
is a fundamental concept in shaping one’s identity, future, and perception about their 
place and role in the US and their local community. 
8.3 CONCLUSION 
 Despite barriers to resettlement and successful integration due in large part to the 
current policies and programs that make up the US resettlement system, there was among 
the respondents for this study an awareness of the need and usefulness of local 
resettlement agencies.  Even for some Iraqis who came under the SIV program, spoke 
fluent English, and had a framework for cultural and societal “norms” in the US, many 
admit that they could not have made it in this country without the local agencies 
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assistance.  As one Iraqi SIV noted, “without the resettlement agencies here in the states, 
nobody, no no, 90% of the refugees cannot make it.  For myself, I cannot make it.  OK, I 
got the visa, I came to the states…OK, I arrive here, at the Austin airport.  Now where am 
I going to go? What am I going to do?  Unless you have a very close friend.  OK, I have a 
close friend but how many days is he going to accept me in his house?”  And despite 
serious complaints about his own resettlement experience with the local agency, he still 
notes here the crucial role they play in his post-arrival experience.  Another Iraqi SIV 
stated, “Without RST we would be lost the first 2 or 3 months.  They walk us half of the 
way to be settled down in US before even we get here.  They found housing, everything 
for us.  Everything else depends on you, who you are. (Respondent 7)”  This man, while 
noting the important role RST played in his own experience, also has a keen sense of the 
fact that agencies role only goes so far.  The rest, as he states, “depends on you”.   
 While one of the agency directors interviewed for this study described the US 
resettlement system as “broken”, she nevertheless stated that it needs to exist and 
moreover, that it should continue to resettle at least the same number of refugees annually 
that it currently does.  Later in the interview she describes the current system as a 
“puzzle” in which the pieces are strewn about and each city “has its pieces to make the 
puzzle whole but you just need the time and resources to put the puzzle together.”  What 
then is the role of the local resettlement agencies in this puzzle and more importantly, 
what should its role be?  Currently, local agencies in most cities are one of, if not the, 
only organization serving their respective refugee communities.  However, these agencies 
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are funded and set up on a model that does not allow for them to play these multiple 
roles.  The agencies role, as long as these organizations are funded almost solely through 
government funding, should be in offering the basic necessities and services to refugees 
arriving in their communities.  To do more, they would require more funding and more 
resources to have the ability to provide any additional services. 
 A more efficient and effective model then would be based upon the idea presented 
in the discussion on integration; that integration is a two way process which not only 
requires the incoming population(s) to adjust and be open-minded to the “norms” of the 
receiving society, but at the same time, for the receiving society to welcome and actively 
participate in the resettlement of the arriving population.  For this to happen, not only do 
local resettlement agencies need to exist as part of the puzzle of integration, but 
organizations such as the MRC, ethnic community organizations, and other service 
providers need to exist as well.  Sufficient translation services (for all community non 
profit agencies) and services to help in degree certification for educated refugees would 
be an attainable first step in allowing Iraqis and refugees from all different backgrounds 
and contexts meet their own expectations in the US and thus to integrate and to become 





Chapter 9: Discussion and Conclusion 
 
 This dissertation attempts to trace the “story” of the Iraqi refugee crisis and give 
voice to some of the victims of that crisis.  Additionally, through those voices and 16 
months of participant observation at a local resettlement agency, it attempts to gain a 
better understanding of and provide a critical reflection on the state policies and programs 
which not only helped to bring Iraqi refugees to the US but those policies that helped 
shape the early experiences of resettlement and integration for Iraqis here.  Being a vague 
term, integration in this study is defined as a two-way process that requires the open-
mindedness and adaptation of both the refugee and the receiving communities.  
Integration is also viewed in this study as a process which is long term and one in which 
refugees eventually gain the ability to participate in all sectors of the host society.  
Through the research, I found that everyday state policies can, in various ways, exclude 
refugees from becoming a part of and thus participating in many aspects of society in 
Austin.  Aside from the structural barriers of specific policies, however, cultural and 
societal differences can pose a challenge as well.  Regardless of religion, Iraqis come to 
the US with deep-rooted and embedded cultural values and various ideological strictures 
which can often play a role in the way they are (un)able to interact and participate in the 
receiving society, culture, and politics.  
 Iraqi refugees came to the US through two separate programs made available by 
the US government.  Most of these Iraqis came through the typical refugee channels, 
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which occur in cooperation with various state and international actors such as the 
UNHCR, IOM, VolAgs, and the US Department of State’s Bureau of Population, 
Refugees and Migration.  These organizations and actors take part in the often lengthy 
and highly controlled process of third country refugee resettlement.  The remainder of the 
Iraqis who came to the US since 2007 came through a unique program called the Special 
Immigrant Visa program.  To be eligible for this program, Iraqis had to have worked for 
the US armed forces or an American contractor in Iraq and after completing an extensive 
application process, were able to be admitted to the US straight from Baghdad or other 
locales inside or outside of Iraq.  The Special Immigrant Visa program is especially 
unique because Iraqis coming through this program, although they receive the same 
benefits as refugees, are able to apply and travel to the US without crossing international 
borders and are therefore not officially considered refugees.  It should be noted that many 
Iraqis that worked for the US military and US contractors also came officially as refugees 
to the US through a Priority 2 program, which brought them here through the same 
channels as other Iraqis who did not work for the US.   
 Iraqi refugees coming to the US, whether through typical channels or the SIV 
program, come from a vast range of backgrounds.  Many of the Iraqis I spoke with in the 
interviews and worked with at the resettlement agency, for example, were highly 
educated, fluent in English, and possessed vast work experience and expertise.  Other 
Iraqis interviewed, however, had lower levels of education, no knowledge of English, and 
little to no transferrable work experience.  While integration is often measured by 
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practical factors such as employment, housing, education, and language, it must also be 
measured by how refugees feel about the degree to which they are included in the social, 
cultural, economic, and eventually political fabric of the host society.  Because of the vast 
range of backgrounds, experiences, and skill sets of the Iraqis interviewed for this study, 
there were differing views on how respondents felt in terms of being a part of or being 
disconnected from society in Austin.  Some Iraqis, especially those coming through the 
SIV program, not only had knowledge of English, but many also had a sponsor here in 
the US, someone from this area, who had agreed to help them in their resettlement 
experience.  Iraqis who had these built in connections in the native community and who 
additionally spoke English, noted a real sense of feeling at home in the US, and in Austin.  
Iraqis coming as SIV’s also had more choice in their final destination in the US, which 
was a factor in having an overall sense of preparation and a general understanding for 
where they would be and what to expect.  Having worked with, spoken to, and dealt with 
many Americans in Iraq, Iraqis that came to the US through the SIV program often had a 
sort of cultural capital that some others do not.  These previous learnings and connections 
help them immensely in feeling both a sense of security, comfort, and belonging once in 
the US.   
This is in direct contrast to many Iraqis (the majority in fact) that come here with 
little to no social capital, no (or very little) knowledge of English or of any aspects of 
American society, and others yet with little education.  Without language and without any 
bridging social capital (other than the overwhelmed local resettlement agency) to help 
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navigate the daily and complex challenges of resettlement, many Iraqi refugees feel a 
sense of being “between here and there”, of not being settled, and a sense of frustration in 
the barriers that stand before them in keeping them from fulfilling their expectations and 
often a general sense of disillusionment in their futures.  Almost all Iraqi refugees talk 
about a sense of appreciation for their relative physical safety in the US, and most have 
extremely high hopes and expectations for life in this country.  Upon confronting the 
structural barriers that exist in the US, however, some Iraqis become so overwhelmed and 
hopeless that they actually travel back to the Middle East where they believe they have 
more hope and a better chance of survival.   
 No matter what program Iraqis came to the US through, and no matter their skills 
and background, social policies for refugees in the US can exacerbate already existing 
difficulties and barriers for many Iraqis and can in turn create a sense of exclusion from 
becoming fully integrated in the US.  The programs designed to help refugees integrate, 
achieve self-sufficiency, and to generally succeed in the long-term in the US are based 
upon a model of short-term and immediate results and outcomes.  Very little time or 
attention is given to refugees by resettlement agencies or by the programs that they are 
tasked with initiating and implementing.  Financial benefits programs last for 3-8 months 
for newly arrived refugees by which point they are expected to be “on their own” and 
hopefully self-sufficient.  Self-sufficiency is determined at 90 days after arrival and 
dictates that refugees are at that point able to cover all their expenses without government 
assistance.  To do this, refugees in the US are expected (required in fact) to accept the 
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first job that is offered to them, no matter their prior educational, technical, linguistic, or 
vocational background.  This fact is very difficult for many Iraqis, of all backgrounds, to 
accept and agree to.  For those that do not speak English (in itself a huge barrier to 
integration in a new country), the programs, requirements, and funding developed and 
provided by the federal Office of Refugee Resettlement for the acquisition of language 
for newly arrived refugees seems to be more of an afterthought than anything.  The 
programs are underfunded, too short, and do not (i.e. are not able) offer the long term 
intensive language courses most refugees need to really begin to acquire it.  Moreover, 
most refugees, who are required to be employed at 90 days, are not able to spend the 
necessary time attending classes or formally studying the language.  The current thinking 
in US refugee policy is that immediate entrance into the workforce will help non-English 
speaking refugees learn the language, but when survival jobs include vocations such as 
hotel, warehouse, and factory work, most refugees are entering into vocations where 
many of their co-workers are non-English speaking as well. 
 All of these programs and processes are based on an American neoliberal do-it-
yourself model that few refugees understand or thrive upon, and that most struggle with 
and find extremely difficult to overcome given their many disadvantages.  The public-
private partnership framework of the US Reception and Placement program is great in 
theory.  As the data points out, however, through interviews with service providers, there 
is very little direction, involvement, or help in developing the private side of this 
partnership.  Having some direction on this would help to improve relations with the 
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federal partners and would hopefully have the effect of improving the entire resettlement 
program and thus the individual experiences for refugees. Additionally, one problem with 
refugee resettlement in the US, which exacerbates the challenges service providers face 
in expanding private partnerships, is the fact that very few people in the US know about 
refugee issues and about refugee resettlement in America and, indeed, in their own 
communities.  There is, among many service providers and staff working in refugee 
resettlement, a sense that refugees are “invisible” in the US and that too often they seem 
to be hidden from the view of the general public.  While local stories about refugee 
resettlement at the city and community scale abound, there is very little being done on a 
national scale, either by the federal government or the national voluntary agencies to 
make refugees coming to the US a more visible issue.  Making refugee resettlement, 
refugees, and generally, refugee issues in the United States more visible through 
awareness and education could potentially help in gaining more financial, material, and 
human resources from private partnerships, rather than simply public ones.   
 Reliance primarily on public sources of funding inhibits local refugee resettlement 
agencies and individual refugees alike.  Because of strict guidelines, restrictions, and the 
need for sometimes unrealistic measurable outcomes, government funded programs, 
while still playing an important role can severely limit the flexibility of agencies to work 
with the unique challenges and backgrounds of each individual refugee.  The fact of the 
matter is that not all refugee groups are alike and for sure, within a single group, each 
individual is very different.  Every refugee arrives not only with their own set of hopes, 
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dreams and expectations, but also their own unique set of challenges and obstacles, 
whether they be health related, educational, linguistic, or psychological.  Local 
resettlement agencies and their staff need to be able to not only spend more time 
individually with each newly arrived refugee as it is a crucial period in their overall long-
term process of integration, but agencies also need to be flexible.  They need to be 
flexible and available for refugees in their first days, weeks, and possibly even months of 
starting their new lives in the US.   
 Currently, the role of many of the local resettlement agencies is more like that of a 
governmental arm distributing limited benefits and information to refugees in a rushed in-
and-out model based on short-term outcomes.  While these services are a necessary 
function, the local resettlement agency is, at the same time, one of the only means of 
social capital that many newly arrived refugees have upon arrival to the US.  Many look 
to the agency to offer much more than a check, furniture for their apartment, and a bus 
orientation.  Some look for, or at least hope for, a more welcoming environment which 
includes not only the time intensive process of navigating all the intricacies of forming a 
new life in a new society, but also long-term support and, of course, friendship.  Most of 
the time, unfortunately, local agencies are not able to provide these features.   
 Austin has only a couple models that are providing these types of services to 
refugees although they need much more.  The first example comes from the Multi-
Cultural Refugee Coalition (MRC) which provides the time and long term community 
driven support that many refugees need.  Another program is the “community advocate” 
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program at the local agency Caritas in Austin in which an individual from the community 
volunteers to help a single newly arrived family in navigating life here for their first few 
months.  This program, while in need of many more volunteers, is well-developed and 
provides refugees not only with much needed and immediate social capital, but, more 
importantly with long-term friendship and guidance.  Programs such as this should be 
much more visible and should abound in every community.  Moreover, organizations 
such as the MRC should be better funded by either federal, state, or city dollars.  
Additional funding would allow them and other organizations like it to do more and to 
stay open longer giving them the ability to offer crucial long term support and community 
resources to more refugees for a longer period of time.   
 Social policy for refugees should also make it easier for them to move from one 
place to another without the fear of losing some of their financial, material, and social 
support.  As discussed earlier in the dissertation, many refugees that come to the US do 
not have a choice in where they will resettle despite having family and other social 
support networks in other cities or areas of the country.  Because newly arrived refugees 
can potentially lose much of their funding and agency support if they move to another 
state, it often keeps them from reuniting with friends and/or family members who would 
be able to offer crucial social and emotional support and assistance in the short and long-
term resettlement process.   
 Is the current resettlement and political paradigm adequate for the Iraqi refugee 
experience?  In various examples gathered through the interview data and through my 
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participant observation of working with Iraqi refugees, the answer would be no.  And it is 
not simply the structural policies and procedures that are the cause of this, although 
certainly, as I have argued, they play a large role.  Culture, however, needs to be taken 
into account.  One of the themes to emerge from the interviews was that the Iraqis 
themselves felt somewhat “misunderstood” by the staff at the resettlement agencies.  
“Caritas and RST have such a hard time with Iraqis”, stated one respondent. Another, for 
example, notes, “they (agency employees) didn’t know how to deal with Iraqis”.  Indeed, 
at one of the annual Church World Service conferences I attended as resettlement 
coordinator for RST, there was an entire presentation for the benefit of resettlement 
agency caseworkers dedicated to the theme “Understanding Iraqi Refugees”.  In this 
presentation the American speaker discussed some of the issues that she (and those who 
helped her develop the presentation) deemed to be “unique to Iraqis”.  Included in these 
themes were: Iraqis higher than normal expectations; their deep concern with issues of 
trust, confidentiality, and security; health and trauma (trauma issues for Iraqis, she stated, 
were “fresh”); the idea that Iraqis come from an honor and shame based culture; how 
themes of insistence and persistence were normal in Iraqi and Arab culture (“this is the 
way you get things done in the Middle East”, she stated) and that actually interrupting a 
conversation is a normal manifestation of this persistence.  What is important here is not 
just the various points she makes about Iraqi culture, but also the fact there is a known 
and admitted lack of knowledge among resettlement employees in the US about Iraqis 
and Iraqi culture.    
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At the same time, many Iraqi respondents in this study admitted to their own lack 
of knowledge about life and culture in the US.  For some, navigating and negotiating 
being a part of and understanding this new life and culture was exciting while for others it 
was quite frightening and alarming.  Understanding the “new life” here and the “way 
people are thinking” in the US was a challenge and for some an impossibility.  From the 
father of a family who refuses to accept an entry level job he deems to be degrading and 
demeaning, to a family not allowing their 20 year old daughter to work because of their 
cultural views relating to gender roles, to a young uneducated Iraqi man who doesn’t 
speak English and feels so alienated in this new place that he travels back to Iraq, there 
are numerous embedded cultural beliefs that have the potential to further challenge the 
long and short term experience of resettlement in the US for Iraqis.  Additionally, Iraqis, 
unlike many other arriving refugee groups, are extremely reluctant to form organized and 
cohesive community groups of support, whether for financial purposes or emotional ones.   
Due to some of these cultural differences the interviews demonstrate, especially 
among the respondents with less knowledge of English and less transferrable 
employment experience, many Iraqi refugees are simply afraid.  They are feeling as one 
respondent mentioned, “between here and there”, and trying to “catch up with life” in the 
US.  They are here in the US, ostensibly safe, but not feeling in any way a part of the 
cultural and societal fabric, having no one (including, in many cases the Iraqi and larger 
Arabic speaking community) to turn to, and being without a sense of what their future 
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holds.  They are searching for true help, guidance, and support which is often not 
available to them in the current federal or local political paradigm.  
What much of these factors are a reminder of is the importance of the very human 
and cultural aspects of refugee migration around the world and especially to the US.  Karl 
Butzer’s article, “Coming Full Circle: Learning from the Experience of Emigration and 
Ethnic Prejudice”, reminds readers to think about a number of these aspects (2001).  In 
this article, he traces his and his family’s escape out of Nazi Germany to the United 
Kingdom, their forced removal from the UK to Canada, and finally his relocation to the 
United States as an adult.  He outlines in detail the effects upon him and his family of 
being forced from their home in Germany and how in each new place they had to 
negotiate the “rules” of the new location, the prevailing attitudes of the people there, and 
how they were able to maintain their own sense of German-ness while also re-shaping 
identity in their new “home”.   
What is important about this article in the context of this research and this 
dissertation is the significance of the human experience.  The emotional and 
psychological impact of migration, especially forced migration, is powerful.  Discussing 
the effects of policy and the structural barriers and obstacles in a new place is certainly an 
important part of the overall story, but one cannot discount the very human and 
experiential aspects of refugee migration.  While critical geopolitics and much of the 
political geography literature offers valuable perspectives on migration and to an extent 
on refugee issues, it tends to overlook much of what the very victims of forced migration 
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are actually experiencing on a human and cultural level.  Much of the interview data from 
this research begins to shed light on this human experience from the perspectives of the 
Iraqi refugees that I had the pleasure and the opportunity to speak and work with.  
Hopefully, then, this dissertation offers somewhat of a “hybrid” view of Iraqi refugee 
resettlement and integration in the US; both discussing and taking lessons from the 
participant observation where I was able to gain a better understanding of how policy 
often constricts and restricts the Iraqi refugee experience, but also how that very human 
and cultural experience was dictated to me through the voices of the refugees themselves.   
 Integration does not simply happen through successful outcomes in the realms of 
practical measures such as housing and employment, but rather through a two-way 
process in which the host society also works hard to welcome and include refugees, 
eventually empowering them to become participants in the very shaping of the social, 
cultural, economic, and political fabric of the society and community to which they 
arrived.  Participating in these aspects of society should not be accessible only to the 
second generation or to those remarkable individuals who arrived with the background, 
skills, education, motivation, and expertise to actively become and to feel a part of the 
receiving community.  Rather, it should be made accessible to all refugees through well-
developed and well-thought out programs which give them the opportunity to take part in 
society.  More visibility for refugee issues in the US, longer-term financial support, 
longer lasting and more intensive English language classes, access to education for 
adults, more funding and incentive for community-driven long term support 
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organizations (like the MRC), and an easier process for degree certification for highly 
skilled refugees would be good first steps in allowing true integration to happen for all 
refugees. 
 As a dissertation research topic and because of my own personal situation, this 
study was limited to studying a very small part of the overall process and international 
system of global refugee resettlement.  It thus leaves many opportunities for future 
research.  One of these opportunities would be to compare third country resettlement 
models and the experiences of the refugees (or certain groups) who are connected with 
those models.  Doing this could provide the makings of a more efficient and effective 
resettlement and integration program.   
 Another important area for future research would be in conducting a long-term 
research study tracking refugees through the sustained process integration and 
resettlement.  The US Reception and Placement program expects that “most” refugees 
will find satisfaction eventually through the current model of rapid employment and 
short-term financial assistance.  It would be very interesting indeed to see if this thinking 
is flawed.  From my own observation of working with refugees for the last 5 years, I have 
seen many refugees languish in the same jobs without learning English, and seemingly 
without chance at social mobility.  In the worst cases I have observed some refugees 
become homeless or even decide that their chances at survival are greater by returning to 
the conflict zones from which they originally escaped.  It would be beneficial then, to 
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study a group of refugees over an extended period to track their experience of integration 
and their resulting levels of “satisfaction”. 
 Finally, another area for further research would be to look closely at physical 
mobility of refugees to the US post arrival and to “track” secondary migration.  
Secondary migration is a big issue for refugee resettlement agencies as the comings and 
goings of refugees in the first days, weeks, and months after arrival can vastly impact an 
agency and the work that they do.  It would be extremely useful to conduct a study 
researching secondary migration movements in the US and to gain a better understanding 
of why so many refugees are moving immediately after arrival and what the 
consequences of that movement is not only for the agencies, but for the refugees 
themselves.     
 By conducting this research, I hope in the end to not only contribute to a broader 
academic dialogue but, more importantly, to lay a small piece of the groundwork for 
creating a sensible and feasible integration framework in the United States.  By having a 
better understanding of the experiences of refugees arriving to the US, in this case Iraqi 
refugees, it is my hope that this country, and the many local communities within it that 
serve refugee populations, can then come closer to empowering all refugees to become 
participants in the shaping of the social, cultural, economic, and political fabric of the 
society and community to which they arrived.  Giving vulnerable and disadvantaged 
refugee populations this opportunity would, in my mind, not only help to make the US 
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